By  von  Freytag'^Loringhoven 


Deductions  from  the  World  War 
A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 


A  Nation 

Trained  in  Arms 

Or  a  Militia? 

Lessons  in  War  from  the  Past  and  the  Present 


By 

Lieutenant-General 
Baron  von  Freytag-Loringhoven 

Author  of  "  Deductions  from  the  World-War" 
With  an  Introduction  by 

Maj.-Gen.  Sir  C.  E.  Gallwell,  K.G.B. 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and  London 

TTbe    1knic^erbocl;ec    press 

1918 


-f 


% 


Copyright,  191 8 

BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


Ube  ftnickerboclier  f>rees,  Dew  IQorf: 


INTRODUCTION 

This  little  volume,  the  work  of  a  soldier 
whose  Deductions  from  the  World  War  has 
recently  attracted  much  attention  and 
whose  views  are  expressed  with  a  modera- 
tion that  is  refreshing  in  a  representative 
of  Prussian  militarism,  should  appeal  to  all 
in  England  who  recognize  the  imperative 
necessity  of  deciding  betimes  upon  a  na- 
tional defence  policy  that  will  meet  the 
strategical  requirements  of  the  British  Em- 
pire in  years  to  come.  The  purpose  of  the 
author  is  to  show  that  a  militia  organiza- 
tion— a  military  system  under  which  the 
land  forces  of  the  State  are  composed  mainly 
or  entirely  of  troops  who  spend  only  short 
periods  in  the  ranks  in  peace  time — cannot 
be  relied  on  to  safeguard  the  realm  in  face 
of  the  jealousies,  nor  to  withstand  the  at- 


38G631 


vi  Introduction 

tacks,  of  neighbours  and  rivals.  He  has 
the  subject  that  he  is  deaHng  with  at  his 
fingers'  ends.  His  examples  culled  from 
history  are  happily  chosen  and  are  most 
illuminating.  His  account  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  German  military  machine  of 
today,  concise  as  it  is,  is  likely  to  contain 
much  information  that  will  be  new  to  most 
readers  in  the  United  Kingdom.  His  de- 
ductions from  the  World  War  are  apposite, 
and  are  convincing  on  the  whole.  His 
arguments  are  well  balanced,  they  only 
occasionally  take  the  form  of  special  plead- 
ing, and  he  can  fairly  claim  that  he  proves 
his  case. 

At  the  same  time,  we  are  not  bound  to 
agree  absolutely  with  all  that  he  writes,  nor 
are  we  compelled  to  accept  the  whole  of  his 
facts  quite  at  their  face  value.  It  may  be 
worth  while,  indeed,  before  proceeding  fur- 
ther, to  indicate  one  or  two  passages  that 
appear  to  invite  criticism.  In  treating 
of  the  present  war,  for  instance,  he  attri- 


Introduction  vii 

butes  German  successes  entirely  to  training, 
organization,  and  morale,  and  he  leaves  out 
of  accoimt,  the  enormous  advantages  that 
his  country  possessed  in  the  early  days,  as 
a  result  of  its  having  at  command  the  vast 
stores  of  war  material  which  had  been  got 
together  in  the  years  preceding  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  in  anticipation  of  the 
coming  struggle.  In  speaking  of  the  Rus- 
sian shortcomings  again,  he  ignores  the 
harrowing  lack  of  munitions  from  which 
the  Tsar's  forces  suffered  in  19 15,  and  which 
was  the  cause  of  their  discomfiture  far  more 
than  any  backwardness  in  the  personnel. 
We  cannot  reasonably  complain  at  the 
assumption  on  the  part  of  a  Prussian  general 
that  the  French  infantry  in  19 14  were  not 
a  match  in  respect  to  efficiency  for  their 
antagonists;  but  we  need  not  admit  it. 
In  his  reference  to  the  American  War  of 
Independence  the  author  also  seems  to 
fall  into  error.  He  is  justified  in  contend- 
ing that  their  espousal  of  the  cause  of  the 


viii  Introduction 

colonists  by  the  French  decided  the  issue; 
but  he  puts  the  result  down  to  the  help 
afforded  by  the  small  land  force  which  was 
dispatched  by  Louis  XVI  across  the  Atlan- 
tic. It  was  the  intervention  of  Admiral 
De  Grasse  and  his  coadjutors  that  compelled 
this  country  to  acquiesce  in  the  United 
States  separating  themselves  from  the  Brit- 
ish Isles.  "Before  quitting  that  struggle 
for  independence,"  writes  Mahan,  "it  must 
again  be  afhrmed  that  its  successful  ending, 
at  least  at  so  early  a  date,  was  due  to  control 
of  the  sea — to  sea  power  in  the  hands  of 
the  French,  and  its  improper  distribution 
by  the  English  authorities."' 

General  von  Freytag-Loringhoven  dis- 
poses very  effectively  of  the  myth  that  the 
irregular  levies  got  together  by  the  Repub- 
lican Government  after  the  French  Revo- 
lution proved  themselves  to  be  efficient 
troops  in  face  of  the  enemy.  The  achieve- 
ments   of    these    tumultuary    forces    were 

'  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History. 


Introduction  ix 

grossly  exaggerated  at  the  time,  and  the 
delusion  has  been  fostered  ever  since  by 
writers  who  have  not  been  fully  conversant 
with  the  facts.  Misconceptions  regarding 
what  the  sans-cidotte  legions  accomplished 
served  to  popularize  the  militia  idea  in 
most  countries  for  years  afterwards,  and 
nowhere  indeed  did  these  doctrines  find 
greater  favour  than  in  Prussia  itself  during 
the  years  immediately  following  the  Revo- 
lutionary and  Napoleonic  wars.  The  truth, 
however,  is  that  such  successes  as  these 
improvised  legions  could  place  to  their 
credit  were  due  almost  entirely  to  the  fact 
that  the  armies  with  which  they  were  con- 
fronted represented  the  fighting  forces  of 
a  coalition,  and  one  which  suffered  in  excep- 
tional degree  from  the  drawbacks  inherent 
in  coalitions.  The  Republican  soldiery  im- 
proved as  the  years  passed,  because  they 
gained  war  experience  in  a  succession  of 
campaigns.  And  so  it  came  about  that 
when  Napoleon  came  upon  the  scene,  mill- 


X  Introduction 

tary  organizations,  which  in  1793  and  1794 
had  often  partaken  of  many  of  the  char- 
acteristics of  an  undisciplined  rabble,  had 
developed  into  material  which  a  great  ad- 
ministrator was  able  to  transform  into  a 
mighty  engine  of  war,  and  which  a  master 
of  the  military  art  was  to  turn  to  most 
brilliant  account  in  the  field. 

The  prolonged  succession  of  struggles  in 
which  France  engaged  between  1792  and 
the  year  of  Waterloo,  affords  incontroverti- 
ble evidence  of  the  immeasurable  superior- 
ity of  trained  over  partially  trained  troops. 
That  at  different  jimctures  the  Vendeans, 
the  Tyrolese  imder  Andreas  Hofer,  and  the 
Spanish  guerillas  of  Peninsular  days,  gave 
regular  troops  of  the  highest  class  consider- 
able trouble,  cannot  be  disputed.  But,  as 
is  so  well  shown  in  this  little  volume,  those 
irregular  warriors  were  never  able  to  aqhieve 
more  than  ephemeral  triumphs,  and  when 
they  met  with  reverse  the  reverse  spelt 
rout   and   disaster.     The   Prussian  Army, 


Introduction  xi 

largely  extemporized,  won  much  distinction 
in  the  War  of  Liberation;  but,  as  recorded 
in  these  pages,  the  annals  of  the  contest 
provide  many  examples  to  show  that  the 
troops  could  not  be  depended  upon  to  stand 
a  heavy  strain.  Military  forces  of  the 
militia  class  are  incapable  of  following  up 
victory,  and  they  are  apt  to  disintegrate 
and  to  evaporate  in  the  hour  of  defeat. 
The  case  of  Bull  Rim,  to  which  General 
von  Freytag  alludes  when  touching  upon 
the  War  of  Secession,  is  a  particularly 
striking  illustration  of  this.  One  army 
collapsed  and  fled  because  a  comparatively 
insignificant  hostile  contingent  unexpectedly 
appeared  on  its  flank  during  the  combat, 
the  other  army  was  totally  unable  to  profit 
by  one  of  the  most  sweeping  tactical  suc- 
cesses ever  achieved  on  a  battlefield. 

The  most  interesting  passages  in  the 
very  informative  three  chapters  which  the 
author  devotes  to  an  analysis  of  the  gradual 
development  of   Prussia's  military  forces 


xii  Introduction 

from  the  date  of  the  French  Revolution 
down  to  1859,  are  perhaps  those  that  tell 
of  the  almost  insuperable  obstacles  which 
the  military  authorities  had  to  overcome 
when  creating  the  army  that  was  to  conquer 
in  the  campaigns  of  1864,  of  1866,  and  of 
1870-71.  Their  difficulties  were  by  no 
means  confined  to  problems  such  as  arise 
in  all  coimtries  in  connection  with  provid- 
ing the  necessary  funds  for  defence  purposes. 
The  soldiers  were  also  confronted  by  a  pub- 
lic opinion  that  was  averse  to  the  principle 
of  standing  armies,  that  was  opposed  to 
any  system  imder  which  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  young  manhood  of  the 
country  should  be  called  upon  to  remain 
more  than  a  very  few  months  with  the 
colours,  and  that  was  largely  guided  by 
very  mistaken  notions  as  to  what  a  militia 
is  capable  of  when  the  enemy  is  in  the  gate. 
Consideration  of  economy  can  never  be 
lightly  dismissed.  The  economic  drain 
which  a  State  suffers  when  large  portions 


Introduction  xiii 

of  its  citizens  are  employed  on  such  an 
unremunerative  occupation  as  soldiering  in 
peace  time,  may  justly  be  a  subject  of  con- 
cern to  the  community.  But  the  dissemin- 
ators of  a  progaganda  advocating  partial 
training  for  troops  as  fulfilling  requirements 
for  serious  war  constitute  a  national  danger. 
We  have  had  our  experience  of  this  within 
the  United  Kingdom.  During,  and  after, 
the  South  African  War  the  opponents  of 
effective  military  training  were  particu- 
larly busy.  Because  certain  improvised 
corps,  composed  of  exceptionally  good  fight- 
ing material  and  drawn  from  the  "men  who 
could  shoot  and  ride,"  acquitted  them- 
selves to  admiration  against  the  Boer 
guerillas,  writers  and  public  men  who  were 
destitute  of  technical  knowledge  and  were 
totally  unacquainted  with  the  inner  history 
of  the  conduct  of  war  decried  the  regular 
army  system  and  clamoured  for  virtually 
untrained  troops.  Had  they  had  their  way, 
such  military  contingents  as  we  might  have 


xiv  Intraduction 

got  across  the  Channel  in  August,  19 14,  as- 
suredly would  not  have  stayed  the  mighty 
German  flood  surging  round  the  outer  flank 
of  the  French  hosts,  there  would  have  been 
no  gap  between  Von  Kluck  and  Von  Buelow, 
and  even  if  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  had 
not  then  by  good  fortime  proved  a  defeat 
for  the  Allies  it  never  would  have  ended  in 
a  dramatic  and  comprehensive  victory  of 
incalculable  value  to  the  Entente  cause. 

The  author  acknowledges  quite  frankly 
that  the  German  Reserve  divisions  proved  a 
somewhat  broken  reed  in  the  opening  days 
of  the  World  War,  although  he  commends 
the  personnel  for  the  martial  spirit  that  was 
displayed.  Only  gradually,  as  he  admits, 
were  these  new  troops  brought  up  to  a 
standard  of  efficiency  to  be  compared  with 
that  possessed  as  a  matter  of  course  by  the 
old.  Our  experience  has  been  the  same 
during  the  great  contest.  Our  New  Army 
divisions  were  something  of  a  disappoint- 
ment when  first  they  took  the  field.     Com- 


Introduction  xv 

posed  as  they  were  of  splendid  material 
and  recruited  in  the  early  days  entirely 
from  genuine  volunteers,  a  very  high  esti- 
mate of  their  capabilities  was  formed  before 
they  started  for  the  Front  by  their  com- 
manders and  staffs — soldiers,  most  of  whom 
had  purchased  priceless  experience  tmder 
Sir  J.  French  during  the  retreat  from  Mons 
and  the  subsequent  strategical  recovery, 
and  whose  opinion  was  therefore  well  worth 
having.  But  it  was  found  that  these  im- 
provised troops  required  to  be  broken  very 
gradually  even  to  the  comparatively  simple 
forms  of  sedentary  warfare  that  prevailed 
in  Flanders  and  Artois  in  19 15.  That  it 
did  not  pay  to  commit  them  to  really  try- 
ing enterprises  for  a  time  after  their  entry 
into  the  theatre  of  operations,  was  proved 
not  only  on  the  Western  Front  but  also  at 
the  Dardanelles.  The  passage  from  a  dis- 
patch of  Sir  D.  Haig's  that  is  quoted  on 
p.  25,  affirms  the  Field-Marshal's  convic- 
tion that  he  must  allow  his  lately  joined 


xvi  Introduction 

divisions  as  long  a  term  as  possible  to  learn 
their  work  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  before 
trying  them  in  the  fire  of  a  great  offensive. 

But  General  von  Freytag,  it  may  be  ob- 
served, rather  misses  what  is  an  all- impor- 
tant point  when  he  is  dealing  with  the 
question  of  the  gradual  transformation  of 
recently  organized  troops  into  a  seasoned 
and  trustworthy  force  during  the  progress 
of  a  campaign.  The  metamorphosis  can 
only  be  accomplished  with  time.  Novel 
units,  or  a  callow  soldiery  of  the  militia 
type  mobilized  in  some  great  national  emer- 
gency, only  rise  to  the  heights  that  make 
them  fit  to  cope  with  fully  trained  forces, 
after  a  protracted  period  of  preparation  for 
the  ordeal.  How  long  the  process  will  take, 
depends  upon  a  variety  of  circumstances — 
upon  the  condition  under  which  the  opera- 
tions are  being  conducted,  upon  the  respec- 
tive activities  of  the  embattled  armies, 
upon  the  raw  material  of  which  the  new 
troops  are  composed,  and  so  forth.     But  it 


Introduction  xvii 

is  bound  to  be  a  matter  of  many  months — 
and  it  may  be  a  matter  of  years. 

Now,  if  one  comes  to  think  of  it,  the  con- 
ditions of  the  World  War  have  to  a  quite 
tmusual  degree  befriended  such  improvised 
formations  as  the  belHgerents  have  mustered 
for  the  fray.  At  the  date  of  writing  (Jime, 
19 1 8),  the  contest  has  already  lasted  very 
nearly  four  years.  Time,  therefore,  has 
unquestionably  not  been  lacking  to  succour 
immature  units  as  these  have  moulded  them- 
selves into  shape  for  the  great  adventure. 
They  consequently  have  not  been  put  to 
the  test  and  been  found  wholly  wanting  as 
Gambetta's  levies  were  in  the  winter  of 
1870-71.  Moreover,  in  what  has  through- 
out represented  the  decisive  theatre  of  war 
— the  Western  Front — the  fighting  partook 
of  a  stagnant,  trench- warfare  character 
just  during  those  very  months  when  the 
freshly  created  contingents  on  both  sides 
were  least  to  be  depended  upon.  But  it 
does  not  follow  that  what  has  occurred 


xviii  Introduction 

between  19 14  and  19 18  stands  for  a  prece- 
dent standardizing  what  we  have  to  expect 
in  future  struggles.  Conflicts  to  come  may 
be  of  short  duration.  They  may  be  signal- 
ized by  constantly  fluctuating  strategical 
situations.  In  place  of  lines  of  entrench- 
ments of  vast  extent  behind  which  opposing 
hosts  stand  on  guard,  we  may  see  a  succes- 
sion of  kaleidoscopic  combinations  of  war 
executed  by  mobile,  nomadic  swarms  of  men. 
The  contests  of  1859,  of  1886,  and  of 
1870-71  were,  each  of  them  brought  to  a 
speedy  conclusion.  The  Russian  Army  only 
took  nine  months  to  reach  the  gates  of  Con- 
stantinople in  the  days  of  Plevna  and  the 
Shipka  Pass.  One  single  winter  campaign 
enabled  the  Balkan  States, fighting  in  mount- 
ainous inhospitable  regions,  very  deficient 
in  communications  and  by  no  means  well 
adapted  for  the  delivery  of  lightning  strokes, 
to  overwhelm  the  forces  that  the  Ottoman 
Empire  was  able  to  place  against  them  in 
the  field.     And  so  it  may  be  in  years  to 


Introduction  xix 

come.  It  may  be  urged  that  the  Russo- 
Japanese  duel  in  the  Far  East  lasted  a  full 
year  and  a  half;  but  the  conditions  of  that 
conflict  were  abnormal  seeing  that  the 
troops  of  the  Tsar  were  making  war  at  the 
further  end  of  a  railway-line  4000  miles 
long.  The  duration  of  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion did  nearly  equal  that  of  the  World 
War  to  date ;  but  the  reason  why  the  Feder- 
als required  five  campaigns  to  overcome 
the  South,  in  spite  of  their  possessing  far 
greater  resources  and  of  their  commanding 
the  sea,  was  that  both  sides  depended,  to 
start  with,  upon  hastily  improvised  armies, 
and  that  the  victor's  fighting  forces  re- 
mained for  two  years  or  more  decidedly 
the  more  irregular  of  the  two.  Those  two 
tremendous  struggles  hardly  disprove  the 
rule  that  international  contests  since  the 
introduction  of  railways  and  modem  arma- 
ment have  not  generally  been  prolonged. 

Does  that  rule  apply  to  affrays  where 
whole  nations  gather  in  the  field,  as  the 


XX  Introduction 

Confederates  did  in  the  War  of  Secession 
and  as  the  Boers  did  in  the  South  African 
War?  Even  supposing  that  it  does  not, 
even  supposing  that  struggles  are  bound 
to  be  protracted  where  virtually  the  entire 
manhood  of  one  or  both  of  the  belligerent 
sides  takes  up  arms,  there  is  always  this 
important  point  to  be  remembered.  Granted 
that  such  conflicts  are  likely  to  extend  over 
many  months  and  even  possibly  over  many 
years,  substantial  contingents  of  thoroughly 
trained  and  highly  disciplined  warriors 
must  always  prove  a  priceless  asset  to  the 
side  that  possesses  them  at  the  outset. 
That  this  is  the  fact  is  admirably  illustrated 
by  the  course  of  the  Homeric,  long-drawn- 
out  trial  of  strength  that  is  now  in  progress. 
Had  the  Franco-British  regular  armies 
which  assembled  on  the  Western  Front  in 
August,  19 14,  been  stronger  mmierically  by, 
let  us  say,  30  per  cent,  the  enemy  would 
have  been  brought  up  short  when  half-way 
through  Belgiimi — probably  about  the  line 


Introduction  xxi 

of  the  Meuse  and  of  Namur- Antwerp ;  the 
operations  ever  since  would  have  swayed 
to  and  fro  across  that  line;  the  strategical 
situation  during  the  period  when  the  British 
Empire  was  slowly  transforming  itself  into 
a  great  confederacy  of  military  nations 
would  have  been  incomparably  more  favour- 
able for  the  Entente ;  the  position  of  affairs 
today,  with  Russia  eclipsed,  would  have 
been  a  far  less  anxious  one  for  us  than  it 
actually  is. 

The  author  writes  as  a  soldier,  expressing 
views  on  questions  which  only  soldiers 
generally  examine  into  in  all  their  details 
and  concerning  which  most  soldiers  are  in 
agreement.  Although  a  protagonist  of  mili- 
tarism as  it  is  understood  and  is  practised 
in  Prussia,  he  puts  the  case  for  the  trained 
army  and  against  the  militia  system  tem- 
perately, neither  exaggerating  the  merits  of 
the  one  nor  unduly  disparaging  what  can 
be  produced  under  the  other.  He  quotes 
Treitschke  and  Clausewitz,   but  the  pas- 


xxii  Introduction 

sages  chosen  do  not  vaunt  domination 
established  by  force  over  neighbouring 
States  and  races  as  the  highest  ideal  of 
statesmanship.  As  in  his  previous  work, 
he  pays  a  tribute  to  what  Lord  Kitchener 
achieved  in  fashioning  a  formidable  and 
martial  nation  in  arms  out  of  the  essentially 
non-military  population  of  Great  Britain, 
which  cannot  fail  to  propitiate  readers  in 
England.  His  chivalrous  references  to  the 
valour  of  the  French  regular  troops  in  their 
terrible  year,  1870,  and  to  the  grit  and  pa- 
triotism displayed  by  a  people  hereditarily 
hostile  to  Germany  in  answer  to  Gambetta's 
trtmipet  call,  strike  a  particularly  pleasant 
note.  But  dreamers  of  dreams  that  con- 
jure up  Leagues  of  Peace  will  not  find 
much  more  to  encourage  them  in  this  little 
vol  time  than  was  to  be  derived  from  its  pre- 
decessor. Deductions  from  the  World  War. 

C.  E.  C. 

June,  191 8 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

Heraclitus'  description  of  war  as  the 
begetter  of  all  things  is  equally  true  at  the 
present  day.  It  cannot  be  otherwise. 
Such  a  World  War  as  the  present,  quite 
apart  from  its  other  effects,  must  produce 
a  very  marked  quickening  of  the  intellectual 
activities.  It  is  a  result  of  the  World  War 
that  the  question  discussed  in  the  following 
pages  comes  up  for  discussion  once  again, 
and  hence  it  has  seemed  advisable  to 
examine  it  thoroughly  and  impartially. 
In  doing  so,  all  those  questions  of  purely 
military  politics  which  the  future  must 
bring  with  it  will  be  disregarded,  even  if 
the  author  does  not  disguise  the  conviction 
to  which  his  study  of  history  and  his  long 
experience  have  brought  him.  The  im- 
prejudiced  reader  will  admit  that  not  only 


xxiv  Author's  Preface 

the  words  of  Heraclitus,  but  also  that 
saying  of  Ben  Akiba  constantly  repeated 
by  Gutzkow — ' '  There  is  nothing  new  under 
the  sun" — are  equally  true  today. 

This  work  is  a  sequel  to  the  recently 
published  voliime,  Deductions  from  the 
World  War,  with  which  it  exhibits  many 
points  of  connection.  To  a  certain  extent 
it  is  an  amplification  of  that  work,  in  so  far 
as  it  deals  with  the  organization  of  an  effi- 
cient national  army. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I  PAG. 
In  the  World  War          .         .         .         .         i 
the  germans the  french the  eng- 
lish  the  russians 

CHAPTER  n 

Before  the  French  Revolution  45 

the  old  prussian  army the  ameri- 
cans and  the  war  of  independence 

CHAPTER  HI 

The  French  Armies  of  the  Time  of  the 

Revolution  AND  UNDER  Napoleon  .   59 

the  FRENCH  ARMIES  OF  THE  FIRST  REPUB- 
LIC— THE  ARMY   OF   THE   FIRST  EMPIRE 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Prussian  Army  in  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion       ......        80 

the    work    of    SCHARNHORST CONDUCT 

of  the  VARIOUS  SECTIONS  OF  THE  PRUS- 
SIAN army  in  the  WAR  OF  LIBERATION 

XXV 


xxvi  Contents 

CHAPTER  V 

PAGE 

The  Prussian  Army  in  the  Nineteenth 

Century  .         .         .         .         .103 

the  peace  years  from  1 8 14  TO  1859 — 

the       reorganization      of      1859 — THE 

prusso-german  army  down  to  the 
present  day 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Opposition   to  Standing  Armies  in 
Germany  during   the   Nineteenth 

Century 120 

the  opposition  to  the  army  reor- 
ganization OF  1859  in  'PRUSSIA — 
advocates    OF  A  MILITIA 

CHAPTER  VII 

Popular  Risings      .....      141 
la     vendee — ^the      spanish     revolt 
against    napoleon — the    tyrol,    1809 
the    boers the    polish    rising   of 

1830-31 

CHAPTER  VIII 

The  North  Americans  in  the  Civil  War 

OF  1861-65 161 

composition  of  the  armies — conduct 

OF   THE  armies   IN  THE  FIELD 


Contents  xxvii 

CHAPTER  IX 

PAGE 

The  French  Army  from  the  Restoration 

UNTIL    I87I  .....       180 

FROM  THE  SECOND  PEACE  OF  PARIS  UNTIL 
1870 THE   WAR   OF    I87O-7I 

CHAPTER  X 
Conclusion      ......      206 


A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 
Or  a  Militia? 


CHAPTER  I 


IN    THE   WORLD  WAR 


The  World  War  has  witnessed  a  great 
many  new  formations  of  troops  on  both 
sides.  The  heavy  losses  suffered  by  the 
existing  army-units  made  it  necessary  to 
reduce  considerably  the  time  allowed  for 
training  the  reserves.  As  a  temporary 
measure,  it  was  necessary  to  send  them 
against  the  enemy  after  a  very  brief  course 
of  instruction.  By  degrees,  all  those  cap- 
able of  bearing  arms  were  called  upon. 
The    armies    and    the    home-country    were 


2         A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

blended  into  one  whole.  The  arriere-ban^ 
of  ancient  times,  vastly  extended  in  scope, 
was  revived  once  again. 

The  Germans 

German  militarism,  which  our  enemies 
first  decried  and  then  by  degrees  them- 
selves adopted,  did  not,  prior  to  the  World 
War,  embrace  our  whole  nation,  since  uni- 
versal military  service,  in  its  literal  sense, 
in  reality  existed  only  in  law.  If,  however, 
the  essence  of  militarism  is  to  be  sought 
in  the  military  organization  of  the  nation, 
then  indeed  it  had  been  established  among 
us  for  the  last  htmdred  years.  The  rigor- 
ous discipline  with  which  it  was  accom- 
panied was  transferred  automatically  to 
numerous  branches  of  industry,  and  proved 
beneficial  to  their  work.  Compulsory  edu- 
cation   also    contributed    to    this    result. 

^  The  summons  of  the  sovereign  of  the  early  feudal  state 
to  all  freemen  calling  them  to  the  field  with  their  vassals, 
eqmpment,  and  three  months'  provisions. — Translator. 


Or  a  Militia?  3 

There  is  some  truth  in  the  saying  that  the 
Prussian  schoohnaster  won  the  Battle  of 
Koniggratz.  The  immense  improvement 
since  that  date  in  the  education  of  the  whole 
German  people  has  also  borne  fruit  in  the 
World  War.  "It  was  only,"  writes  Stege- 
mann/  "the  spirit  of  the  army  and  the 
complete  devotion  of  the  whole  nation  to 
the  service  of  the  Fatherland  which  enabled 
Germany  to  enter  upon  such  a  war,  and  to 
engage  in  it  so  energetically  and  organize 
it  so  thoroughly  that  it  became  the  expres- 
sion of  the  full  and  arduous  life,  the  purpose- 
ful activity,  of  the  whole  people,  and  raised 
the  nation  above  itself." 

A  Prussian  general,  commenting  on  the 
saying  that  the  Prussian  schoolmaster  won 
Koniggratz,  once  said  that  the  name  of 
this  schoolmaster  was  Clause witz.  "The 
seed  which  he  sowed  bore  rich  fruit  on 
the  battlefields  of  1866  and  1870-71.  The 
superiority   of   out   leadership,    which   was 

'  Geschichte  des  Krieges,  i.,  loo. 


4         A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

there  revealed,  was  very  largely  the  result 
of  the  work  On  War,  which  has  been  a 
source  of  instruction  to  a  whole  line  of  dis- 
tinguished soldiers.  And  Moltke's  saying, 
that  'strategy  is  a  system  of  accommoda- 
tions, the  translation  of  knowledge  into 
practical  life, '  is  quite  in  harmony  with  the 
teaching  of  Clausewitz.  Moltke's  intellec- 
tual development  corresponded  closely  with 
that  of  Clausewitz,  until  the  Field- Marshal 
began  to  outstrip  his  instructor.  ...  A 
great  deal  of  his  teaching  has  been  embodied 
in  our  field  service  regulations."'  For, 
throughout,  the  latter  set  intelligence  above 
mere  form,  and  thus  secured  that  adaptabil- 
ity requisite  for  coping  with  the  various  new 
problems  which  confronted  us  in  the  World 
War. 

The  training  of  the  General  Staff  in  the 
German  Army  was  thoroughly  practical; 
it  was  based  upon  a  close  association  with 

'  Count  Schlieffen.  Introduction  to  the  5th  edition  of 
Vom  Kriege.     Berlin,  1905. 


Or  a  Militia?  5 

the  troops.  The  training  of  the  latter 
culminated  in  manoeuvres  organized  on  a 
warlike  scale.  The  rigorous  demands  which 
these  manoeuvres  made  upon  the  men  have 
bred  up  that  hard  fighting  race  which  has 
stood  the  test  of  the  World  War.  It  was 
by  means  of  these  large-scale  manoeuvres 
that  the  army  was  educated  for  a  war  of 
movement,  and  it  is  the  war  of  movement 
which,  wherever  we  have  been  able  to 
resort  to  it,  has  prociired  us  the  greatest 
successes.  The  army  did  not  rest  on  its 
laurels  of  1870-71,  but  with  unremitting 
industry  pursued  its  work  year  in  year  out. 
It  was  in  the  army  that  the  wish  expressed 
by  Treitschke  in  respect  of  the  defeat  of 
the  year  1806 — that  this  defeat  should  be 
"as  ineffaceable  from  the  memory  of  all 
future  generations  as  a  personal  injtuy,  an 
admonition  upon  all  to  vigilance,  humility, 
and  loyalty"' — found  its  fulfilment.  The 
achievements    of   our   army   in   the   World 

'  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i. 


6         A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

War  were  the  fruit  of  the  spirit  of  the  Ger- 
man people;  but  they  were  only  rendered 
possible  by  means  of  the  previous  peace- 
training  under  the  superintendence  of  the 
All-Highest  War  Lord,  a  training  continued 
year  by  year  and  extending  from  the  care- 
ful drilling  of  the  individual  soldier  to  the 
instruction  of  the  large  units.  Only  upon 
the  basis  of  such  a  training  was  it  possible 
to  increase  the  army  during  the  war  in 
accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  world- 
conflict. 

The  first  new  formations  did  not  prove 
equal  to  the  test.  It  became  necessary  to 
send  to  the  Front,  where  they  were,  more- 
over, exposed  to  peculiarly  difficult  condi- 
tions, the  new  Reserve  Corps,  the  formation 
of  which  had  been  decreed  in  the  middle 
of  August,  1 9 14.  Hardly  ever  have  troops 
— or,  at  any  rate,  the  bulk  of  them — ex- 
hibited such  high  qualities  of  spirit  and 
will  as  did  these  new  regiments,  but  three 
fourths  of  them  were  war- volunteers,   en- 


Or  a  Militia?  7 

listed — except  for  a  certain  number  of 
older  men — from  the  youth  of  all  classes, 
including  a  large  number  of  graduates  from 
the  universities.  Moreover,  the  few  men 
among  these  troops  who  had  already  served 
in  the  army  were  elder  members  of  the 
Landwehr  and  the  Landsturm.  Subse- 
quently, the  firmness  of  the  new  formation 
was  enhanced,  wherever  possible,  by  in- 
cluding in  them  a  considerable  proportion 
of  men  possessing  actual  experience  of  war. 
The  new  corps  who  were  put  into  the  line 
at  the  Yser  in  the  autumn  of  19 14  lacked, 
above  all,  experienced  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers.  The  reserve  bat- 
talions were  no  longer  able  to  furnish  the 
latter  in  sufficient  numbers.  There  had 
been  heavy  losses  among  the  officers  of  the 
active  army  and  the  younger  reserve  officers 
during  the  first  battles;  the  few  who  were 
left  had  to  remain  at  their  posts  before  the 
enemy.  Hence  it  became  necessary  to  have 
recourse  to  the  older  half-pay  officers  and 


8         A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

reserve  officers,  who  had  long  since  aban- 
doned any  form  of  military  exercise,  and 
whose  physical  efficiency  was  in  the  majority 
of  cases  no  longer  up  to  the  mark.  Hence 
that  confident  leadership  in  battle,  which 
is  so  particularly  necessary  in  the  case  of 
young  troops,  was  not  fully  ensured.  Only 
gradually,  in  the  course  of  the  war,  after 
the  improvement  of  their  officers'  corps, 
were  these  new  troops  brought  to  the  level 
of  the  old  corps. 

The  reserve  officers,  in  the  course  of  the 
war,  to  a  large  extent  stepped  into  the  place 
of  their  comrades  of  the  active  army,  and 
they  proved  completely  equal  to  the  test. 
A  great  deal  had  already  been  done  before 
the  war  to  train  our  reserve  officers,  and 
dtiring  the  war  this  training  has  been  con- 
tinued by  means  of  courses  of  instruction 
held  behind  the  Front.  The  long  war  has 
completely  transformed  them  into  profes- 
sional soldiers.  The  sphere  in  which  they 
showed  to  best  advantage  was  in  the  leader- 


Or  a  Militia?  9 

ship  of  the  lower  units — the  companies, 
and — to  a  certain  extent  also — the  bat- 
talions. 

The  control  of  military  instruction  was, 
even  during  the  war,  entrusted  to  the  older 
officers  of  the  active  army.  For  this  work, 
and  also  for  the  leadership  of  the  higher 
tmits,  it  was  indispensable  to  employ  men 
who  had  made  the  profession  of  arms  their 
life-task.  Generally  speaking,  the  officers  of 
the  reserves  and  the  Landwehr  acquitted 
themselves  so  valiantly  only  because  they 
were  introduced  into  the  solid  framework  of 
the  officers'  corps  of  the  active  army,  which, 
even  in  peace  time  had  been  the  vehicle  for 
the  transmission  of  the  military  spirit  and 
traditions  through  the  army. 

The  impossibility  of  building  up  in  a 
short  time  an  even  moderately  efficient 
officers'  corps  is  very  clearly  revealed  in  an 
article  in  the  New  York  Army  and  Navy 
Journal  of  September  15,  191 7.  In  it  the 
writer  comments  on  the  fact  that  so  many 


lo       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

candidates  for  the  profession  of  officers  fail 
to  pursue  their  course  of  training  to  the  end. 
The  commandant  of  a  drill  school  of  in- 
struction, in  reply  to  an  inquiry  as  to  the 
reasons  which  led  to  this,  declared  that  a 
very  large  number  of  the  candidates  are 
deficient  in  those  qualities  which  are  indis- 
pensable for  one  who  is  to  fill  the  position 
of  an  officer.  The  candidates  for  the  most 
part  exhibit  a  general  apathy  from  the  out- 
set. Many  of  them,  moreover,  are  incap- 
able of  giving  an  order  clearly  and  distinctly. 
Many,  also,  lack  the  faculty  of  forming  a 
decision  adapted  to  a  given  situation. 
Others  cannot  be  brought  to  maintain, 
both  on  duty  and  off  duty,  the  bearing  and 
conduct  of  an  officer  and  a  gentleman. 
Finally,  there  is  lacking  in  almost  all  the 
sense  of  subordination,  smd,  as  a  consequence 
of  this,  many  of  them  throw  up  the  course, 
because  they  have  taken  offence  at  some 
rebuke  from  a  superior  officer.  Equally 
with  the  officers  of  the  reserves,  many  of 


Or  a  Militia?  ii 

our  troops  also  have  been  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent transformed  into  professional  soldiers. 
The  excitement  of  danger  has  spurred  them 
on.  Aviators,  storm-troops,  flame-thrower 
troops,  mine-troops,  have  performed  won- 
ders; their  courage  has  mounted  to  ever 
greater  heights.  The  length  of  the  war  to 
a  certain  extent  cancelled  the  disadvantage 
due  to  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  the 
new  levies  could  be  given  only  a  compara- 
tively short  course  of  training.  Recruits, 
as  well  as  the  members  of  the  Landsturm 
who  had  not  experienced  active  service, 
when  they  were  put  into  the  line,  were 
always  posted  to  a  imit  which  had  already 
stood  the  test  of  war.  Where  this  support 
was  not  present  in  sufficient  strength,  these 
new  levies  could  not  be  described  unre- 
servedly as  fully  efficient  soldiers.  None 
the  less,  trench  warfare  almost  always 
afforded  the  possibility  of  continuing  the 
training  of  the  new  levies  in  recruit-depots 
behind  the  Front,  only  the  groundwork  of 


12       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

their  training  being  given  them  at  home. 
The  same  system  was  employed  in  the 
allied  Austro-Himgarian  Army.  After  two 
months'  training  in  the  home  country,  the  re- 
cruits were  put  into  draft-finding  battalions 
with  men  who  had  recovered  from  their 
woimds,  and  these  battalions  were  then  sub- 
jected to  a  longer  course  of  training  behind 
the  Front  before  the  men  were  distributed 
among  the  troops  in  the  front  lines.  In 
Germany,  our  old  sergeant-majors  and  war- 
rant officers,  many  of  whom,  though  they 
had  retired  from  military  service  years  ago, 
voluntarily  returned  to  it,  rendered  valu- 
able service  in  connection  with  the  home- 
training.  Those  sergeant-majors,  through 
whose  hands  recruits  were  constantly 
passing  during  the  World  War,  those  old 
officers  who  marched  at  the  head  of  the 
reserve  battalions,  contributed  generously 
to  the  German  successes.  Patiently,  day 
after  day,  they  performed  their  tasks  in 
the  Fatherland,  although  they  were  never 


Or  a  Militia?  1.3 

to  see  the  fruits  of  their  arduous  educational 
labours  reach  maturity  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy. 

The  fact  that,  in  the  German  national 
army,  the  qualities  requisite  for  every  task 
that  had  to  be  performed  were  present  where 
they  were  needed  testified  to  its  excellent 
organization  and  training.  The  work  of  a 
century  now,  at  the  hour  of  supreme  danger, 
proved  its  worth.  As  a  result  of  this  work, 
moreover,  the  army  constantly  proved  ade- 
quate to  the  new  tasks  which  fell  to  its  share, 
and,  despite  the  very  great  demands  upon 
the  national  strength,  never  sank  to  the 
level  of  a  loose  militia.  Such  would  inevit- 
ably have  been  the  fate  of  a  national  army 
which  had  been  less  well  disciplined  in  time 
of  peace.  Such  an  army  would  not  have 
been  capable  of  defying  for  years  the  assault 
of  an  enemy  superior  in  numbers,  at  the 
same  time  preserving  to  the  end  the  strength 
to  attack  whenever  the  opportimity  arose, 
and  to  pursue  a  victorious  and  irresistible 


14       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

offensive  across  the  mountains  of  the  Rou- 
manian frontier  and  the  Alps.  Yet  much 
would  have  been  easier,  and  the  arduous 
struggle  would  have  been  shortened,  if  our 
peace-preparation  had  been  still  more  com- 
prehensive, above  all,  if,  before  the  war,  we 
had  actually  enlisted  all  those  liable  for 
service.  The  fact  that  we  did  not  do  this 
is  the  best  refutation  of  the  accusation 
made  by  our  enemies  that  Germany  delib- 
erately provoked  the  war.  It  could  not, 
moreover,  be  foreseen  that  the  war  would 
take  on  such  vast  proportions,  and  that 
technical  science  would  develop  to  such  an 
extent  in  the  course  of  it.  That  it  did  so 
develop  is  a  proof  that  the  highest  degree 
of  preparedness  in  these  matters  is  part  of 
the  full  equipment  for  war  of  a  nation. 
Only  the  human  ramparts  in  the  West  and 
the  East  secured  for  us  the  time  in  which 
to  bring  our  technical  war-equipment  to 
the  highest  level  of  efficiency.  Every  war 
engenders  new  developments  in  this  sphere, 


Or  a  Militia?  15 

every  war  brings  surprises,  but  we  ought  to 
make  it  our  endeavour  to  limit  the  possibility 
of  such  surprises  as  far  as  lies  in  our  power. 

The  French 

In  contrast  to  ourselves,  France  had  al- 
ready in  time  of  peace  drawn  upon  her  na- 
tional strength  to  the  utmost  limits,  and 
had  considerably  lowered  her  standard  of 
military  fitness.  Hence  it  resulted  that 
the  total  war-strength  of  the  country, 
which  comprised  only  thirty-nine  and  a 
half  million  inhabitants,  was  not  only  equal 
to  that  of  the  German  Empire,  with  its 
close  upon  sixty-seven  million  inhabitants, 
but,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  even  ex- 
ceeded it.  Stegemann'  considers  that  the 
estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  French  Army 
in  August,  19 14,  at  one  and  a  half  million 
is,  if  anything,  below  the  mark.  The  total 
fighting  strength  gradually  accumulated 
by  the  French,  he  estimates  at  five  and  a 

'  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i.,  85. 


1 6       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

half  millions,  in  connection  with  which  it 
has  to  be  considered  that  France  called  up 
a  considerable  black  army,  numbering  in 
all  700,000  men.  The  war-preparedness 
of  the  French  Army  had  been  continually 
increased,  with  a  view  always  to  the  re- 
vanche. In  1913  France  reverted  to  the 
three  years'  term  of  service,  and  called  up 
the  classes  of  two  years  simultaneously. 
By  this  means,  the  peace-strengths  of  the 
corps  were  notably  increased,  an  advan- 
tage at  the  beginning  of  the  war  which 
should  not  be  underestimated.  According 
to  Stegemann, '  however,  the  same  degree 
of  preparedness  for  war  did  not  extend 
throughout  the  whole  army.  In  this  re- 
spect, the  territorial  divisions  left  something 
to  be  desired,  and  "defects  of  organization 
were  already  revealed  at  the  calling  up  of 
the  reserves." 

As  regards   the  efficiency  of  the  army, 
the  same  writer  pronounces  the  following 

•  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i.,  88. 


Or  a  Militia?  17 

judgment:'  "The  French  Army,  which  was 
intended  for  an  offensive  movement  on  a 
large  scale,  had,  to  be  sure,  after  its  aug- 
mentation in  the  course  of  the  last  few 
years,  accepted  the  offensive  theory  in 
principle,  but  was,  in  fact,  by  its  very 
nature,  unprepared  for  far-reaching  move- 
ments and  encoimters  in  unknown  territory. 
It  was  much  more  adapted  for  the  *  offen- 
sive defensive. '  The  latter  affords  the 
French  opportunity  for  displaying  their 
ingenuity  in  the  erection  of  strong  points 
of  support,  for  winning  small  territorial 
gains  by  the  independent  action  of  the 
subordinate  command,  and  for  constantly 
renewing  the  morale  and  courage  of  the 
troops  by  dint  of  minor  successes.  Their 
lack  of  mobile  heavy  howitzers,  such  as  we 
possessed  from  the  outset,  was  partially 
made  up  for  in  the  case  of  the  French,  by 
their  extremely  skilful  use  of  their  field- 
artillery.    If  they  were  not  equal  to  the  Ger- 

'  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i.,  87. 


1 8       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

mans  in  a  war  of  movement,  they  showed 
themselves  from  the  outset  masters  in  the 
art  of  rearguard  tactics.  As  a  result  of 
the  heightened  self-confidence  which  was 
infused  into  their  ranks  after  the  Battle  of 
the  Mame,  they  became  more  and  more 
worthy  of  respect  as  opponents,  though 
they  were  more  skilful  in  the  technique 
than  in  the  actual  tactics  of  fighting.  The 
close  proximity  of  their  sources  of  supplies, 
due  to  the  fact  that  they  were  fighting  in 
their  own  country,  was  very  much  in  their 
favour,  and  enabled  them  to  make  full  use 
of  their  abundant  technical  resources,  in 
particular  of  their  long-range  heavy  artil- 
lery. Since  they  had  free  access  to  the 
sea,  they  had  at  their  disposal  an  almost 
imlimited  supply  of  munitions." 

Individually,  the  French  infantry  were 
not  equal  to  the  German.  General  Cher- 
fils  commented  regretfully  on  this  fact 
when   he  wrote:'    "The  German  is  a  true 

»  Echo  de  Paris,  November  23,  1915. 


Or  a  Militia?  19 

soldier.  Discipline  has  become  part  of  his 
flesh  and  blood.  That  is  his  greatest  source 
of  strength."  The  General  extols  that 
uniformity  of  training  which  penetrated 
into  the  lowest  ranks  of  the  German  Army. 
"The  opponents  of  a  long  term  of  active 
military  service  and  of  thorough  prepara- 
tion in  time  of  peace  should  consider  the 
following  facts:  A  militia  army  with  an 
abridged  term  of  training  may  perform 
heroic  deeds,  the  regiments  may  exhibit  a 
high  standard  of  cohesion,  but  such  an  army 
will  lose  all  its  strength  if  circimistances 
compel  it  to  break  up  its  principal  units  and 
to  blend  these  together."  Although  the 
whole  French  nation  had  passed  through 
the  school  of  arms,  the  steadiness  and 
cohesion  in  the  formations  was,  in  contrast 
with  ours,  not  so  firm  but  that  it  was 
seriously  impaired  as  a  result  of  the  numer- 
ous new  formations  and  the  continual 
bringing  up  of  new  levies. 


20       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 
The  English 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  England 
had  at  her  disposition  a  field-army  of 
160,000  men  in  the  home-country  and  in 
the  colonies,  exclusive  of  India,  as  well  as 
reserve  and  garrison  troops  to  the  number 
of  127,000  men.  It  had  been  arranged 
that,  under  the  protection  of  the  force,  the 
insufficiently  trained  territorial  army,  num- 
bering 300,000  men,  should  complete  their 
training  in  the  space  of  six  months.  In 
India,  the  regular  English  troops  numbered 
77,000  men,  and  there  was  a  native  army 
of  214,000  men.  By  degrees,  the  English 
field-army  was  augmented  by  considerable 
fighting  forces  from  the  colonies — Canadians, 
Indians,  New  Zealanders,  and  Australians. 
Nevertheless,  the  raising  of  the  army  to  a 
force  numbering  millions  was  accomplished 
within  the  home-country  itself.  Lord  Kitch- 
ener built  tip  twelve  divisions  out  of  the 
six  regular  divisions  existing  before  the  war, 


Or  a  Militia?  21 

and  twenty-eight  divisions  out  of  the  four- 
teen very  imperfectly  organized  territorial 
divisions,  thus  doubling  the  army.  These 
divisions  were  supplemented  by  the  thirty 
so-called  Kitchener  divisions.  By  July, 
19 1 5,  the  army  had  been  increased  by  more 
than  two  million  volunteers.  Nevertheless, 
the  growing  need  of  men  resulting  from  the 
unforeseen  extension  of  the  war  made  it 
necessary,  in  January,  19 16,  to  introduce 
universal  military  service. 

A  contemporary  author  writes : '  "In  the 
eyes  of  all  those  who  have  studied  the  his- 
tory of  England  during  the  last  three  cen- 
turies, the  introduction  of  universal  military 
service  will  appear  as  something  so  outside 
the  customary  course  of  events  as  almost 
to  possess  the  significance  of  a  revolution. 
The  English  people  had  always  exhibited 
a  deep-rooted  aversion,  not  only  to  military 
service,  but  also  to  the  establishment  and 

•  Julian  Grande,  Grosshritannien   uiid  sein  Ileer.      Zurich, 
1917.     Pp.   21-2. 


22       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  maintenance  of  a  large  army.  This 
aversion  was  not  the  fruit  of  any  reflection. 
It  is  a  deeply  rooted  sentiment,  an  expres- 
sion of  the  English  temper,  a  peculiarity 
of  the  national  consciousness.  The  English- 
man can  only  conceive  independence  in  the 
form  of  personal  freedom.  In  view  of  this, 
it  is  exceedingly  noteworthy  that  such  a 
revolution  should  have  been  accomplished 
so  easily,  and,  in  fact,  by  universal  consent, 
in  the  space  of  barely  eighteen  months. 
That  this  was  possible  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  men,  whose  task  it  was  to  guide 
the  nation  through  the  tremendous  vicis- 
situdes in  which  Europe  is  plunged  at 
present,  had  the  good  sense  not  to  force 
the  issue,  but  to  allow  events  to  develop 
to  a  logical  conclusion.  Consequently,  the 
revolution  came  about  as  an  integral  part 
of  the  national  development.  It  has  been 
asserted  that,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
struggle,  Lord  Kitchener  was  urged  by 
some  to  introduce  universal  military  service 


Or  a  Militia?  23 

forthwith.  He  emphatically  declined  to 
do  so,  and  he  was  right.  At  that  time  the 
English  people,  great  as  was  the  danger 
with  which  they  were  confronted,  had 
formed  no  notion  of  its  true  extent,  and 
had  not  reached  any  clear  understanding 
of  the  task  that  had  to  be  accomplished. 
Hence  this  nation,  which  clings  so  tena- 
ciously to  its  comfort  and  its  prejudices, 
would  not  have  understood  why,  short  of 
irresistible  necessity,  it  should  abandon  a 
system  which  was  in  such  complete  har- 
mony with  its  traditions  and  so  excellently 
suited  to  its  habits.  Kitchener  preferred 
to  allow  the  nation  to  come  slowly  to  a 
realization  of  the  truth,  in  the  meantime 
continually  increasing  the  number  of  re- 
cruits, until  it  was  obvious  to  everyone 
how  inadequate  was  a  system  which,  with 
quite  a  few  exceptions,  had  placed  the  whole 
nation  upon  a  war-footing.  The  fact  that, 
at  the  call  of  the  government,  over  five 
million  English  came  forward  voluntarily 


24       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

for  the  defence  of  their  country,  before 
a  single  man  had  been  compulsorily  en- 
listed in  the  army,  sheds  imperishable 
glory  on  the  name  of  Lord  Kitchener  and 
is  a  just  source  of  pride  to  the  English 
people." 

In  the  matter  of  the  training  of  the  new 
troops,  no  less  than  in  that  of  the  constitu- 
tional innovations,  England  took  her  time. 
The  long  war  of  entrenchments  afforded 
the  possibility  for  this.  First  in  the  home- 
country,  then  behind  the  Front  in  France, 
the  newly-formed  divisions  were  subjected 
to  a  thorough  training,  before  they  were 
put  into  the  line.  It  was  not  until  the 
spring  of  19 16  that  the  English  were  able 
to  take  over  extensive  sections  of  the  Front 
which  had  hitherto  been  held  by  the  French, 
and  even  then  they  could  not  in  all  respects 
be  classed  as  fully  efficient  fighting  troops. 
The  English  Commander-in-Chief,  Field- 
Marshal  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  refers  to  this 
in  his  report  to  the  Ministry  of  War  on  the 


Or  a  Militia  ?  25 

23d  of  December,  1916:'  "The  principle 
of  an  offensive  campaign  during  the  sum- 
mer of  19 1 6  had  already  been  decided  on 
by  all  the  Allies.  .  .  .  Subject  to  the  neces- 
sity of  commencing  operations  before  the 
simimer  was  too  far  advanced,  and  with 
due  regard  to  the  general  situation,  I  desired 
to  postpone  my  attack  as  long  as  possible. 
The  British  armies  were  growing  in  num- 
bers and  the  supply  of  munitions  was 
steadily  increasing.  Moreover,  a  very  large 
proportion  of  the  officers  and  men  under 
my  command  were  still  far  from  being 
fully  trained,  and  the  longer  the  attack 
could  be  deferred,  the  more  efficient  they 
would  become.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Ger- 
mans were  continuing  to  press  their  attacks 
at  Verdun,  and  both  there  and  on  the  Italian 
Front,  where  the  Austrian  offensive  was  gain- 
ing ground,  it  was  evident  that  the  strain 
might  become  too  great  to  be  borne  unless 
timely  action  were  taken  to  relieve  it." 

'  The  Times,  December  30,  1916. — Translator. 


26       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

These  words  of  the  English  Commander- 
in-Chief  contain  an  indirect  admission  that 
the  German  supreme  command  was  well- 
advised  in  anticipating  the  enemy  by 
opening  the  attack  on  Verdtin  in  the  spring 
of  1916.  The  report  contains,  moreover, 
a  confession  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  Eng- 
lish troops  in  the  summer  of  19 16,  notwith- 
standing the  long  course  of  training  which 
had  been  allotted  to  them.  Even  at  this 
date,  the  English  divisions  could  only  cope 
with  the  simple  tasks  of  trench  warfare, 
when  backed  up  by  a  considerable  superi- 
ority in  respect  of  heavy  and  siege  artillery. 
The  English  army  was  by  no  means  adapted 
for  a  war  of  movement.  English  officers 
who  have  been  taken  prisoners  have  them- 
selves admitted  this  fact.  Moreover,  the 
higher  officers  of  the  English  Army  lacked 
that  understanding  which  can  only  be 
acquired  as  the  result  of  a  long  training 
from  youth  upwards  and  upon  the  basis  of 
traditions  such  as  existed  in  the  German 


Or  a  Militia?  27 

Army.  English  prisoners  have  frequently 
complained  of  the  inadequate  military  train- 
ing of  their  officers.  This  deficiency  is  to 
a  large  extent  responsible  for  the  failure  of 
the  repeated  attempts  of  the  English  to 
break  through  our  lines,  notwithstanding 
the  stout  and  reckless  courage  with  which 
these  attempts  were  carried  out.  In  every 
case,  they  resulted  only  in  a  more  or  less 
insignificant  gain  of  territory,  never  in  a 
decisive  victory. 

It  is,  in  fact,  impossible  to  build  up  an 
army  adequate  to  all  the  demands  of  war 
in  the  course  of  the  war  itself.  The  Eng- 
lish army  of  millions  has  furnished  a  proof 
of  this.  All  the  care  that  was  bestowed 
upon  it,  all  its  valuable  technical  resources, 
all  its  unlimited  supply  of  munitions,  were 
powerless  to  alter  this  fact. 

The  Russians 

In  order  to  understand  the  conduct  of 
the  Russian  national  army   in   the    World 


28       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

War,  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  brief  survey 
of  the  past  history  of  the  Russian  Army. 

After  the  Crimean  War  a  complete  de- 
parture was  made  from  the  form  of  train- 
ing which  had  prevailed  in  the  Russian 
Army  under  Nicholas  I.  Formality  and 
stiffness  in  the  bearing  of  the  individual 
soldier  as  well  as  of  the  unit  as  a  whole  was 
done  away  with  entirely,  as  being  out  of 
harmony  with  the  national  character,  though 
this  change  undoubtedly  involved  the  sacri- 
fice of  some  indispensable  aids  to  discipline. 
It  was  believed  that  the  inborn  submis- 
siveness  of  the  Russian  soldier  rendered  the 
rigid  discipline  of  the  drill-master  entirely 
superfluous,  and  it  was  overlooked  that  this 
lowering  of  the  requirements  from  the 
unit  in  respect  of  outward  appearance  and 
uniformity  necessarily  involved  a  serious 
relaxation  of  its  inward  cohesion,  and  that 
where  there  was  no  careful  training  of  the 
individual  soldier,  the  practice  of  even  the 
simplest  movements  by  the  unit  as  a  whole 


Or  a  Militia?  29 

must  take  up  so  much  time  that  the  training 
for  war  would  necessarily  prove  too  short. 
The  recruit  was  just  as  willing,  but  the 
old  subordination  disappeared  more  and 
more,  and  moreover  could  not  be  made 
up  for  by  a  lofty  and  instinctive  sense  of 
duty,  as  in  the  case  of  a  nation  of  old 
civilization.  Finally,  in  the  year  1874,  with 
the  introduction  of  universal  military  ser- 
vice, the  army  acquired  an  entirely  different 
character.  In  place  of  the  old  soldiers, 
with  their  long  term  of  service,  who  looked 
upon  their  regiment  as  their  home,  we  now 
find  men  who  belonged  to  the  service  only 
for  a  few  years. 

The  change  from  an  army  of  professional 
soldiers  to  an  army  based  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  universal  military  service,  took 
place,  of  course,  only  by  degrees,  so  that, 
when  the  Balkan  War  of  1877-78  broke 
out,  universal  military  service  had  still  not 
become  fully  effective.  General  Kuropat- 
kin,  the  leader  of  the  Russian  Army  in  the 


30       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Manchurian  campaign,  in  his  Report  on 
the  Russo-Japanese  War, '  admits,  in  the 
course  of  his  historical  retrospect  of  the 
campaign,  that  those  troops  which  had  not 
already  spent  the  winter  of  1876-77  in  a 
mobilized  condition  on  the  Roumanian 
frontier,  but  had  only  later  been  brought 
to  war- strength,  exhibited  in  certain  cases 
a  lack  of  firm  cohesion.  He  writes:  "This 
first  war  after  the  introduction  of  universal 
military  service,  even  if  it  ended  in  a  victory 
over  the  Turks,  none  the  less  proved  how 
very  far  we  were  behind  our  western  neigh- 
bours in  respect  of  our  arrangements  for 
mobilization  and  concentration.  .  .  .  We 
were  stronger  in  defence  than  in  attack. 
...  As  in  the  Crimean  War,  we  showed 
ourselves  weak  in  power  of  manoeuvre, 
and  on  several  occasions,  and  especially  at 
Plevna,  were  clumsy  in  the  conduct  of  our 
offensive."  Again  in  1904,  he  declares 
that  the  tactical  training  of  the  army  still 

'  Part  IV.     The  Result  of  tfie  War.     Warsaw,  1906. 


Or  a  Militia?  31 

left  a  very  great  deal  to  be  desired;  in 
fire  tactics  it  was  far  behind  the  German 
Army.  Kiiropatkin  holds  General  Drago- 
mirow  largely  to  blame  for  the  fact  that 
the  old  notion  that  the  bayonet  was  the 
supremely  important  weapon  for  deciding 
a  contest,  still  held  sway.  Dragomirow 
went  so  far  as  to  insist  that  the  infantry 
advancing  to  attack  ought  not  to  lie  down 
when  halted.  He  might  have  recognized 
that  the  character  of  the  Russian  soldier 
renders  impossible  that  individualistic  train- 
ing which  modem  warfare  demands.  His 
writings  had  a  very  great  influence,  because 
he  ingratiated  himself  with  the  public  by 
his  manner  of  emphasizing  the  moral  factor. 
The  ear  of  the  Russian  people  was  charmed 
by  the  repeated  insistence  upon  the  incom- 
parable qualities  of  the  Russian  soldier  and 
the  irresistible  strength  of  his  bayonet; 
it  was  so  beautiful  and — so  comfortable, 
for  there  was  no  exhortation  to  continued 
labours.     That  unceasing  labour  which  was 


32       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

carried  on  year  in  year  out  in  the  German 
Army  was  unknown  in  Russia. 

General  Kuropatkin  regrets  not  only  the 
tactical  inadequacy  of  the  army  entrusted 
to  him;  he  also  criticizes  its  intrinsic  worth 
in  more  than  one  respect,  and  the  Russian 
troops  engaged  in  the  Manchurian  campaign 
were,  in  fact,  of  very  unequal  value.  In 
any  case,  the  impression  gained  from  General 
Kuropatkin 's  statements  is  that  the  army 
as  a  whole,  even  apart  from  the  inferiority 
of  its  tactical  training,  was  far  from  being  a 
thoroughly  trustworthy  instrtiment  of  war. 
The  judgment  of  the  imfortunate  general 
may,  of  course,  have  been  influenced  by 
the  desire  to  exculpate  himself  by  emphasiz- 
ing the  blame  attaching  to  his  troops;  on 
the  other  hand,  there  can  be  no  more 
terrible  experience  for  a  commander  in  the 
field  than  to  mistrust  the  value  of  his  own 
troops.  The  blame  for  what  happened  in 
Manchuria  ought  not  to  be  attributed  solely 
to  the  Russian  leadership.     Even  the  best 


Or  a  Militia?  33 

will  was  frequently  powerless  to  accomplish 
anything  with  such  troops  as  had  to  be 
dealt  with.  In  the  fourth  section  of  his 
Report,  Kuropatkin  aims  chiefly  at  ex- 
pounding lessons  for  the  future.  He  is  a 
loyal  son  of  Russia,  and  he  does  not  close 
his  eyes  to  the  many  defects  of  his  coimtry. 
Before  the  Manchurian  campaign,  when 
he  was  Minister  of  War,  he  frequently,  in 
opposition  to  the  extravagant  schemes  of 
the  Pan-Slav  party,  maintained  that  the 
first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  consolidate 
and  strengthen  the  internal  organization 
of  the  country.  In  contrast  to  the  impe- 
rialists, he  maintained  that  the  present 
boundaries  of  the  Russian  Empire  were  suf- 
ficiently extensive,  and  he  made  no  secret 
of  his  conviction  that  it  would  be  a  very 
long  time  before  the  Russian  soldier  would 
be  an  equal  match  for  the  German  or  the 
Austro-Hungarian.  He  recognizes  that 
universal  military  service  has,  from  a 
moral  point  of  view,  improved  the  Russian 


34       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

soldiers  in  the  mass,  but  he  points  out  that, 
in  view  of  the  low  standard  of  culture  of 
the  individual  soldier,  it  is  difficult  to  infuse 
into  him  that  notion  of  military  discipline, 
which  distinguishes  in  such  high  degree 
the  German  soldier.  He  regrets  that  cor- 
poral punishment  should  have  been  done 
away  with  even  in  time  of  war,  because 
the  dread  of  corporal  punishment  is  the 
only  means  of  restraining  bad  elements  in 
the  army  from  offences  against  their  supe- 
rior officers.  The  events  of  the  Revolution 
of  19 1 7  have  proved  his  views  only  too  well 
justified. 

The  officers'  corps  of  the  Manchurian 
Army  left  something  to  be  desired  in  more 
than  one  respect.  Kuropatkin,  while  he 
insists  that  there  were  many  glorious  excep- 
tions, expresses  his  opinion  of  the  Russian 
officer  as  follows :  ' '  Upon  the  whole  it  may 
be  said  that  in  all  ranks  there  was  a  defi- 
ciency of  men  of  strong  soldierly  character, 
men  of  iron  nerve  capable  of  sustaining  a 


Or  a  Militia?  35 

day  of  continued  fighting  without  flagging. 
It  is  evident  that  neither  our  education 
nor  our  manner  of  life  during  the  last  forty 
to  fifty  years  has  been  calculated  to  develop 
strong,  independent  characters.  Otherwise, 
they  would  have  been  represented  in  the 
army  in  far  greater  niimbers."  After  such 
an  opinion  from  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
the  following  description  of  the  retreat 
from  Moukden  by  a  German  observer' 
cannot  be  dismissed  as  an  exaggeration: 
"Officers  under  the  influence  of  alcohol 
made  the  most  insulting  comments  on 
Russia's  policy  in  regard  to  Eastern  Asia, 
and  in  such  loud  tones  that  everyone  could 
hear  them.  I  believe  I  am  not  saying  too 
much  if  I  attribute  the  chief  share  of  the 
blame  for  the  complete  dissolution  of  the 
army  to  the  conduct  of  the  officers,  which 
in  the  majority  of  cases  was  beneath  con- 
tempt."    This  judgment  is  of  all  the  more 

•Ullrich,  Die  Feuer probe  der  Russisclien  Armee  im  Kriege, 
1904-5.     Berlin,  19 lo.     R.  Eisenschmidt. 


36       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

value  in  view  of  the  impartiality  of  its 
author,  who  could  write  on  the  loth  of 
March,  1905:  "On  this  fateful  day  I  have 
seen  officers  who  have  staked  their  lives 
in  the  attempt  to  maintain  their  authority, 
and  I  have  also  seen  how  readily  the 
Russian  soldier  submits  to  an  energetic 
personality." 

Kuropatkin  passes  a  far  more  favourable 
judgment  on  the  officers  of  the  General 
Staff  than  on  the  generals  and  staff  officers. 
He  accords  full  recognition  to  their  sense 
of  duty  and  honour  and  their  faculty  of 
endurance,  and  in  the  World  War  they 
have  for  the  most  part  proved  themselves 
worthy  of  his  praise.  But  the  General  is 
in  agreement  with  the  judgment  of  foreign 
officers  when  he  says :  "The  general  opinion 
in  regard  to  the  higher  command  was  that, 
in  spite  of  their  excellent  theoretical  train- 
ing and  their  unquestionably  high  moral 
qualities,  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff 
were  estranged  from  the  rest  of  the  army." 


Or  a  Militia?  37 

They  exhibited  none  of  that  zealous  co- 
operation with  the  latter  which  is  such  a 
striking  and  healthy  characteristic  of  the 
German  General  Staff  officers. 

Far  too  many  of  the  conditions  which  at 
one  time  contributed  to  the  efficiency  of 
the  Russian  troops,  ceased  to  exist  after 
the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century ;  they 
could  not,  indeed,  any  longer  exist.  An 
important  fact,  moreover,  was  that  the  war 
in  the  Far  East  was  thoroughly  unpopu- 
lar both  with  the  officers  and  the  men.  They 
had  no  clear  conception  of  what  they  were 
fighting  for,  and  looked  upon  the  war  as 
something  in  the  nature  of  an  unsuccessful 
colonial  enterprise.  Hence  the  disaster  to 
the  Russian  arms  was  not  felt  in  any  way 
as  a  disgrace.  Kuropatkin  repeatedly  em- 
phasizes the  fact  that  in  this  respect  the 
Russians  were  far  inferior  to  the  Japanese, 
who  were  inspired  by  a  lofty  national  ambi- 
tion, and  that  an  army  which  is  based  on 
the  principle  of  universal  military  service 


38       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

must  be  supported  by  general  public  opin- 
ion. He  writes:  "In  a  collision  between 
two  nations,  material  weapons  count  for 
less  than  spiritual  forces.  Where  the  spirit 
of  the  nation  and  army  is  of  higher  worth, 
where  there  is  revealed  a  more  self-sacrific- 
ing devotion  to  the  Fatherland,  there  is 
the  greater  likelihood  of  victory." 

Such  a  likelihood  of  victory  appeared  on 
the  outbreak  of  the  World  War  to  lie  on 
the  side  of  the  Russians,  both  in  virtue  of 
their  huge  numbers  and  of  the  undoubted 
popularity  of  the  war,  at  any  rate  at  the 
beginning;  and  that  all  the  more,  since  the 
experiences  gained  during  the  Manchurian 
campaign  had  not  been  disregarded.  In  the 
ten  years'  interval  between  the  Peace  of 
Portsmouth  and  the  outbreak  of  the  World 
War,  much  had  been  done  to  promote  the 
war-preparedness  of  the  Russian  Army. 
But  though  individual  improvements  were 
effected,  it  was  impossible  to  infuse  a  new 
spirit  into  a  national  army  of  gigantic  size 


Or  a  Militia?  39 

within  the  space  of  ten  years,  more  espe- 
cially in  view  of  the  low  standard  of  culture 
and  the  apathetic  temperament  of  the  Rus- 
sian people.  The  excellent  passive  quali- 
ties of  the  Russian  soldier — his  patience, 
his  capacity  of  resistance  to  weather  condi- 
tions and  the  impressions  of  the  conflict — 
were  equally  revealed  in  the  World  War; 
and  the  huge  Russian  Army  was  an  obedient 
tool  in  the  hands  of  its  leaders  when,  in- 
structed by  the  failure  of  their  defensive 
tactics  in  Eastern  Asia  they  embarked  on 
a  reckless  offensive.  Only  from  a  nation 
like  the  Russian  could  such  an  immense 
human  sacrifice  have  been  exacted.  Owing 
to  its  insensibility  to  losses  and  defeats,  as 
well  as  to  the  moral  effects  of  retreat,  the 
Russian  Army  maintained  its  cohesion  even 
in  the  most  difflcult  situations.  Never- 
theless, the  unwieldy  character  of  the  Rus- 
sian masses  showed  itself  just  as  it  had  done 
in  previous  wars.  In  spite  of  the  popular 
notion  of    the  inexhaustible  supply  of  the 


40       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Russian  reserves,  the  niimber  of  thoroughly 
trained  men  who  could  be  sent  to  the  Front 
grew  less  and  less  as  time  went  on,  so  that 
the  efficiency  of  the  army  steadily  declined; 
although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  great 
pains  were  taken  to  profit  by  the  experi- 
ences of  the  war,  and  that  the  Russian 
Army  still  remained  a  redoubtable  adver- 
sary. The  achievements  of  the  Russians 
in  respect  of  organization,  both  before  and 
during  the  war,  are  very  striking.  Of 
course,  in  passing  any  judgment  upon 
Russia,  it  ought  not  to  be  forgotten  that 
months  before  the  order  was  given  for  its 
actual  mobilization,  the  Russian  Army  had 
been  brought  to  a  high  level  of  prepared- 
ness. Only  as  a  result  of  this  fact  was  it 
enabled  to  overcome  the  difficulties  conse- 
quent upon  the  vast  extent  of  the  empire. 
This  is  at  once  evident  if  we  consider  that 
a  total  of  two  million  combatants,  equipped 
with  abundant  and  excellent  artillery,  en- 
tered the  field  of  battle  in  August,   19 14, 


Or  a  Militia?  41 

that  in  the  late  autumn  of  the  same  year 
the  Russian  Anny  was  estimated  at  five 
million,  and  that  the  total  nimiber  of  men 
called  under  arms  must  have  been  not  less 
than  twelve  million.'  When  we  consider, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  even  this  immense 
superiority  of  nimibers  proved  incapable 
of  crushing  the  German  and  Austro-Hun- 
garian  armies  and  achieved  no  more  than 
temporary  successes  on  sections  of  the  Front, 
we  recognize  that  this  army  suffered  from 
serious  moral  deficiencies,  and  that  it  did 
not  deserve  the  name  of  a  well-trained 
national  army.  Fortunately  for  us  and 
for  our  allies,  Kuropatkin's  apprehensions 
were  proved  to  be  justified ;  otherwise  the 
world's  history  might  have  taken  a  differ- 
ent course.  Even  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  Revolution,  the  Russians  proved  them- 
selves true  to  their  national  character  on 
several  occasions  by  offering  a  stout  resist- 
ance;   but,  on   the  whole,    the    army   was 

'  Stegemann,  loc.  cit.,  i.,  78. 


42       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

disorganized  by  the  Revolution,  and  its 
capacity  of  resistance  was  diminished  to 
a  most  serious  extent.  All  too  soon  it 
proved  necessary  to  restrict,  or  even  to 
cancel  entirely,  those  blessings  of  freedom 
which  had  been  bestowed  upon  the  army_ 
The  temporary  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Russian  Army,  General  Komilow,  may 
have  lacked  great  gifts  of  leadership,  and 
possibly  his  conduct  at  the  time  of  the 
Revolution  was  open  to  censure,  but  the 
views  which  he  expressed  at  the  Moscow 
State  Conference  are  none  the  less  worthy 
of  attention.  The  General  said:'  "The 
old  regime  bequeathed  to  us  an  army  in 
many  respects  deficient,  but  none  the  less 
it  was  an  army  capable  of  fighting  and 
resisting  and  ready  for  self-sacrifice.  As 
the  result  of  a  series  of  legal  enactments 
emanating  from  people  who  had  no  under- 
standing of  the  spirit  of  the  army,  it  has 
been  transformed  into  a  distracted  mob.  .  .  . 

'  Armee  und  Flotte  des  freien  Russia  nd,  August  30,  1917. 


Or  a  Militia?  43 

History  and  experience  prove  the  necessity 
of  discipline,  without  which  no  army  can 
exist.  Only  an  army  welded  together  by 
an  iron  discipline,  and  controlled  by  the 
single  and  inflexible  will  of  its  leader  is 
capable  and  worthy  of  victory.  Only  such 
an  army  can  stand  every  test.  ...  I  am 
not  opposed  to  the  Soldiers'  Committees, 
but  I  desire  that  their  activities  should  be 
restricted  to  questions  of  economics  and 
home  policy,  the  limits  of  which  must  be 
constitutionally  defined,  and  that  they 
should  not  interfere  in  any  way  with  the 
conduct  of  military  operations  or  the  choice 
of  leaders." 

General  Alexeiew,  who  temporarily  re- 
sumed the  chief  command  of  the  army  of 
the  Revolution  in  succession  to  Komilow, 
said :  ' '  We  no  longer  have  an  army  capable 
of  resisting  the  last  blow  which  the  Germans 
are  preparing  to  deal  us.  The  condition 
of  the  army  is  irremediable."  Only  an 
army  the  foundation  of  which  was  radically 


44       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

unsound  could  have  sunk  to  such  a  condi- 
tion in  so  brief  a  space  of  time. 

In  any  case,  the  World  War  has  revealed 
very  clearly  that  only  a  strongly  united, 
well-trained  national  army  is  equal  to  great 
military  achievements;  such  achievements 
cannot  be  performed  by  troops  of  the  char- 
acter of  a  militia.  Past  history  teaches 
the  same  lesson. 


CHAPTER  II 

before  the  french  revolution 

The  Old  Prussian  Army 

The  practice  of  maintaining  a  permanent 
standing  army  first  made  its  appearance  as 
a  consequence  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 
Owing  to  the  limited  financial  resources  of 
the  princes  of  that  day,  and  the  difficulty 
of  provisioning  troops  during  war  in  the 
thinly  populated  and  meagrely  cultivated 
countries,  these  hired  armies  could  not  be 
raised  to  great  strength.  When  the  cam- 
paign was  ended,  a  large  proportion  of 
the  troops  were  always  discharged.  This 
scanty  armed  force  was  substantially  supple- 
mented by  a  national  defensive  army,  a  so- 
called  militia.    In  Brandenburg-Prussia,  the 

45 


46       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Great  Elector  endeavoured  to  extend  the 
national  levy  in  his  State.  The  national 
armed  force  of  the  Mark  did  good  service 
on  the  occasion  of  the  Swedish  invasion 
of  1674-75,  and  the  militia  of  the  Duchy 
of  Prussia,  the  so-called  Wibranzen,  was 
formed  into  regiments,  and  took  part  in 
the  war  between  Sweden  and  Poland.  King 
Frederick  I  extended  the  organization  of  the 
militia,  and  introduced  short  manoeuvres. 
According  to  the  rolls,  the  total  strength 
of  the  Prussian  militia  was  25,000  men. 

In  France  the  militia  was  re-established 
tmder  Louis  XIV,  with  the  avowed  inten- 
tion of  forming  an  auxiliary  army  in  addi- 
tion to  the  standing  army.  It  numbered 
70,000  men,  disposed  in  thirty  regiments, 
and  in  the  form  both  of  complete  units  and 
of  reinforcements  for  the  hired  standing 
regiments,  it  rendered  good  service  in  the 
numerous  wars  in  which  that  monarch 
engaged.  Later  on,  it  was  temporarily 
abolished,  but  was  introduced  once  again, 


Or  a  Militia  ?  47 

a  decade  before  the  Revolution.  The  or- 
ganization of  the  English  militia,  as  it 
existed  up  to  the  time  of  Lord  Haldane's 
army  reforms  of  1907,  had  been  handed 
down  from  the  Middle  Ages.  The  militia 
served  for  the  defence  of  the  home  country. 
From  1907  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  World 
War,  it  formed  the  so-called  Special  Reserve 
of  the  standing  army  (the  Expeditionary 
Force) ;  while,  out  of  the  volunteers  and  the 
yeomanry,  which  existed  in  addition  to  the 
militia  proper,  was  formed  the  Territorial 
armyj^  The  militia  of  the  United  States 
of  Anrerica  was  organized  upon  the  old 
English  model.  Both  countries  possessed 
a  large  militia  and  a  small  hired  army. 

In  Prussia,  the  provincial  militia  dis- 
appeared under  King  Frederick  William  I. 
The  necessity  of  sustaining  a  world  conflict 
by  his  own  unaided  strength  induced  Fred- 
erick the  Great,  during  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  to  restore  this  institution  once  again. 
In  East  Prussia  it  was  only  established  to  a 


4^       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

limited  extent,  but  in  Pomerania  the  na- 
tional militia  rendered  no  small  assistance 
in  defending  the  country  against  the  Swedes 
and  the  Russians.  In  Pomerania  and  the 
Uckermark,  lo  battalions,  6  squadrons 
were  formed;  in  the  Kurmark  and  Neu- 
mark,  3  battalions,  i  squadron  each;  in 
the  province  of  Magdeburg  and  Halber- 
stadt,  3  battalions.  Retired  officers  were 
employed  with  these  provincial  troops. 

On  the  one  hand  the  great  expense  of 
hiring  foreign  soldiers,  on  the  other  hand 
the  disturbance  to  town  and  country  in- 
dustries caused  by  such  a  levy  of  home 
recruits  as  had  been  made  under  Frederick 
I,  induced  King  Frederick  William  I,  in 
the  year  1733,  to  adopt  a  new  plan  for  the 
systematic  reinforcement  of  the  army  by 
instituting  the  Kanton  Regulations.  The 
various  regiments  were  henceforth  reinforced 
from  definite  districts  allotted  to  them  for 
this  purpose  and  named  "Kantons."  As 
a    result    of    this    system    the    regiments 


Or  a  Militia?  49 

acquired,  through  their  local  recruitment,  a 
definite  territorial  connection,  and  in  their 
Kantons  they  had  at  their  disposal  a  per- 
petual war  reserve  consisting  of  men  who 
had  been  trained  and  then  discharged. 
Side  by  side  with  this  system,  the  enlist- 
ment of  foreign  recruits  still  continued,  so 
that,  at  the  death  of  King  Frederick  William 
I  in  the  year  1740,  three  fourths  of  the 
total  number  of  men  serving  with  the 
colours  were  still  foreigners,  that  is  to  say, 
not  native  Prussians,  a  circumstance  only 
to  be  explained  by  the  anxiety  of  the  King 
to  improve  above  all  the  economic  condi- 
tion of  his  country.  The  notion  of  univer- 
sal military  service  did  not  exist  at  that 
time.  Even  though  the  Kanton  Regula- 
tions decreed  that  "every  Prussian  sub- 
ject is  liable  to  bear  arms,"  there  were 
abundant  exemptions  from  the  Kanton 
system,  which  only  pressed  upon  the  lower 
and,  in  particular,  the  peasant  class  of 
the  population.     None  the  less  the  Kanton 


50       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

system  did,  to  a  certain  extent,  pave  the  way 
for  the  subsequent  introduction  of  universal 
military  service,  inasmuch  as  it  kindled  and 
maintained  in  the  mass  of  the  population 
the  consciousness  of  an  obligation  due  to 
the  King  and  the  State. 

It  was  thanks  to  this  system  thct,  m 
spite  of  the  heavy  losses  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  Frederick  the  Great  had  con- 
tinuously at  his  command  a  reservoir  for 
the  replenishment  of  his  army,  a  fact  which 
was  all  the  more  important,  since  the  hired 
foreign  soldiers,  particularly  after  defeats, 
could  not  always  be  depended  upon.  At 
the  close  of  the  reign  of  King  Frederick, 
about  half  the  army  consisted  of  hired 
foreigners,  though  the  latter  were,  for 
the  most  part,  Germans  from  non-Prussian 
provinces,  while  some  even  were  Prussians 
who  were  not  subject  to  the  Kanton  obliga- 
tion. In  view  of  the  world-wide  glory  which 
Prussian  arms  had  won  under  King  Fred- 
erick, it  is  not  surprising  that,  under  his 


Or  a  Militia?  51 

successors,  there  was  evidenced  a  disin- 
clination to  make  radical  changes  in 
the  constitution  of  the  army,  particularly 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  Frederick  himself 
had  left  his  father's  system  practically  un- 
changed. Hence,  the  army  which  was 
defeated  at  Jena  and  Auerstedt,  was  still 
completely  Frederician  in  organization  and 
character,  little  as  it  was  animated  or 
directed  b>  the  Frederician  spirit.  It  was 
by  no  means  a  worthless  and  demoralized 
army  that  was  defeated  in  1806. 

Von  der  Goltz  writes:'  "The  technical 
achievements  in  respect  of  manoeuvring 
are  really  astonishing,  if  one  considers  that 
the  length  of  service  of  the  majority  of  the 
infantry  was  very  short.  It  is  ti*ue  that 
the  home-levies,  the  Kantonists,  served  as 
a  rule  for  twenty  years,  but  they  only 
spent  the  first  year  with  the  colours,  and 
even   this   period   was   often    considerably 

^Von  Rossbach  bis  Jena  und  Auerstedt.     Berlin,  1906.    Page 
198.     E.  S.  Mittler  und  Sohn,  Konigl.  Hofbuchhandlung. 


52       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

reduced,  sometimes  even  to  three  months. 
Moreover,  they  were  only  called  up  for 
manoeuvres  every  two  years  at  the  most, 
so  that  the  infantry  soldier  had  in  all  only 
about  one  and  three  quarter  years  of  actual 
service."  The  cavalry  suffered  to  a  more 
serious  extent  under  these  conditions.  It 
was  inevitable  that  their  standard  of  effi- 
ciency should  decline,  since  cavalry  can- 
not be  rendered  adequate  for  service  in 
the  field,  when  half  their  number  are  never 
seated  on  a  horse  except  during  their  term 
of  training,  that  is  to  say,  for  ten  and  a 
half  months  in  the  year.'  Hence  the  con- 
ception of  the  old  Prussian  Army  as  a  hired 
army  with  a  long  term  of  service  is  not 
wholly  correct.  Such  being  its  composi- 
tion, the  credit  for  its  training  and  excel- 
lent discipline  must  be  attributed  to  the 
untiring  zeal  of  capable  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers.     This  zeal  has  con- 

'Jany,     Urkundliche    Beitrage,    6    Heft.     Der    Preussische 
Kavalleriedienst  vor  1806,  p.  i. 


Or  a  Militia?  53 

tinued  down  to  the  present  day,  and  is 
responsible  for  the  fact  that,  during  the 
World  War,  even  men  who  had  only  re- 
ceived a  brief  training  always  adapted 
themselves  to  the  spirit  of  the  whole  army 
comparatively  soon. 

In  the  army  of  1806  there  was  a  great 
deal  that  was  out  of  date,  but  it  was  not 
the  composition  and  the  method  of  training 
of  the  troops  that  were  responsible  for  their 
defeat.  All  the  individual  faults  and  omis- 
sions which  contributed  to  the  total  sum 
of  misfortune  in  this  campaign  are  seen  to 
be  of  minor  significance,  when  we  compare 
the  notions  in  regard  to  operations  held 
by  the  respective  leaders.  The  Prussian 
Army  owed  its  defeat  first  and  foremost 
to  the  fact  that  it  had  to  cope  with  a 
hitherto  unknown  mode  of  warfare  con- 
ducted by  a  leader  of  genius,  who  was  in 
fact  the  founder  of  modern  warfare  on  a 
large  scale. 


54      A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

The  Americans  and  the  War  of 
Independence 

Even  Napoleon's  military  machine, 
though  it  was  based  upon  other  principles 
than  the  Prussian  Army  of  that  time,  was 
not  really  the  nation  in  arms.  The  French 
Army  of  the  time  of  the  Revolution  did  for 
a  time  answer  to  this  description,  but  never 
completely;  and  it  soon  lost  once  again  all 
semblance  of  a  national  army  and  was 
transformed  into  a  praetorian  army.  The 
idea  of  replacing  the  standing  army  by 
a  nation  in  arms  had  indeed  frequently 
been  suggested  by  the  encyclopaedists  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  and  it  gained  new 
credit  as  a  result  of  the  War  of  Independ- 
ence of  England's  North  American  colonies. 
The  example  of  the  North  American  militia 
presented  itself  as  an  ideal  to  the  leaders  of 
the  French  Revolution.  How  little  capable 
that  militia  actually  was  of  standing  any 
serious  test  may  be  deduced  from  the  fol- 
lowing opinion  of  it  expressed  by  Washing- 


Or  a  Militia?  55 

ton  in  1776.  The  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  Federal  troops  writes : '  "  If  I  was  called 
upon  to  declare  upon  oath,  whether  the 
militia  have  been  most  serviceable  or  hurt- 
ful upon  the  whole,  I  should  subscribe  to 
the  latter.  .  .  .  Experience,  which  is  the 
best  criterion  to  work  by,  so  fully,  clearly, 
and  decisively  reprobates  the  practice  of 
trusting  to  militia,  that  no  man,  who  regards 
order,  regularity,  and  economy,  or  who  has 
any  regard  for  his  own  honour,  character, 
or  peace  of  mind,  will  risk  them  upon  this 
issue." ^  "The  militia,  who  come  in,  you 
cannot  tell  how,  go,  you  cannot  tell  when, 
and  act,  you  cannot  tell  where,  consume 
your  provisions,  exhaust  your  stores,  and 
leave  you  at  last  at  a  critical  moment."^ 
In    1780    Washington    writes:     "Had    we 

»  The  German  version  of  the  following  extracts  is  quoted 
by  the  author  from  Milizheere  by  Colonel  v.  Zimmermann 
{Vierteljahrshefte  ftir  Truppenfiihrimg  und  Heereskunde. 
191 1).  The  English  text  is  taken  from  the  Writings  of 
George  Washington.  Collected  and  edited  by  W.  C.  Ford. 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York. — Translator. 

^  Loc.  cit.,  iv.,  445-6.  i  Loc.  cit.,  v.,  115. 


56       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

formed  a  permanent  army  in  the  beginning, 
which,  by  the  continuance  of  the  same  men 
in  the  service,  had  been  capable  of  dis- 
cipline ...  we  should  not  have  been  the 
greatest  part  of  the  war  inferior  to  the 
enemy  .  .  .  enduring  frequently  the  mor- 
tification of  seeing  inviting  opportunities 
to  ruin  them  pass  unimproved."' 

To  be  sure,  the  militia  could  boast  suc- 
cesses on  certain  occasions,  the  most  im- 
portant being  at  Saratoga,  where,  in  1777, 
their  11,000  men  compelled  Burgoyne,  the 
English  General,  with  6000  men,  to  lay 
down  their  arms.  In  the  case  of  the  Eng- 
lish troops,  whose  numbers  were  inadequate 
to  the  extent  of  the  theatre  of  war,  and  who 
were  separated  by  the  ocean  from  their 
home  supplies,  there  was  a  lack  of  any 
centralized  leadership.  None  the  less,  it 
is  extremely  improbable  that  the  War  of 
Independence  would  have  ended  victori- 
ously  for   the   American   Colonies,   if  the 

'  Loc.  cit.,  viii.,  393-4- 


Or  a  Militia  ?  57 

American  militia  had  not  been  backed  up 
in  sufficient  strength  by  a  standing  army 
(even  though  it  was  only  a  weak  standing 
army)  and,  later,  by  a  French  auxiliary 
corps.  The  espousal  of  the  cause  of  the 
young  Republic  by  the  French  may  be 
said  to  have  decided  the  issue. 

General  von  Beseler'  writes  as  follows: 
"The  mass  of  the  troops  remained, 
throughout  the  whole  duration  of  the  eight 
years'  war,  a  badly  armed  and  badly 
equipped  militia,  whose  achievements,  when 
they  were  inspired  by  the  necessities  of  the 
moment,  were  often  astonishing  and  indeed 
heroic,  but  who  showed  themselves  com- 
pletely unequal  to  the  demands  of  continu- 
ous and  exhausting  operations.  This 
property  of  the  army  gave  a  special  character 
to  the  conduct  of  the  war.  The  Americans 
remained  throughout  in  a  condition  of 
alert,  defensive;  they  kept  an  eye  on  the 

'  Der    Freiheitskampf    Nordamerikas    und    der    Burenkrieg. 
Lecture  delivered  before  the  Military  Society  at  Berlin,  1901. 


58       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

position  and  movements  of  the  enemy,  and 
endeavoured  to  thwart  the  co-operation  of 
the  various  divisions  of  their  forces  by 
obstructing  their  Hnes  of  march.  This  for 
the  most  part  very  passive  procedure, 
which  offered  no  opportunity  for  pushing 
matters  to  a  decisive  victory,  was  com- 
pletely alien  to  Washington's  energetic  per- 
sonality, and  can  only  be  explained  by  the 
deficiencies  of  the  American  forces  in  respect 
both  of  numbers  and  quality." 


CHAPTER  III 

the  french  armies  of  the  time  of  the 
revolution  and  under  napoleon 

The  French  Armies  of  the  First 
Republic 

The  national  army  of  the  French  Revo- 
lution was  on  a  level  with  its  American 
prototype  as  regards  the  meagreness  of  its 
achievements.  In  1789,  the  army  of  the 
French  kingdom  numbered  236,000  men. 
By  the  addition  of  the  provincial  militia, 
it  could,  in  case  of  war,  be  raised  to  295,000 
men.  At  a  committee  of  the  Convention 
which  assembled  in  October,  1789,  a  propo- 
sal was  made  for  introducing  universal  mili- 
tary  service.  It  was,  however,  rejected 
in  favour  of  the  retention  of  voluntary 
enlistment,    that   is   to   say,   of    a  mercen- 

59 


6o       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

ary  regular  army  such  as  had  existed 
hitherto,  because  only  an  army  of  this 
nature  seemed  worthy  of  a  free  nation, 
especially  since  it  was  believed  that,  in 
case  of  need,  recourse  could  be  had  at 
any  time  to  the  newly  established  National 
Guard,  which  had  taken  the  place  of  the 
provincial  militia.  This  volunteer  forde, 
according  to  the  lists  for  June,  1790,  al- 
ready at  that  date  numbered  2,571,700 
citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms.  Since 
the  regular  army  showed  a  deficiency  of 
over  30,000  men,  it  was  necessary  to  have 
recourse  to  the  National  Guard  in  order  to 
strengthen  it.  It  was  held  to  be  out  of  the 
question  to  suggest  to  the  free  citizens 
that  they  should  be  compulsorily  enlisted 
in  the  army.  It  was  therefore  decided,  in 
1 79 1,  that  special  battalions  should  be 
established,  in  the  formation  of  which, 
however,  that  system  of  compulsion  hitherto 
regarded  with  abhorrence  could  not  be 
any    longer   dispensed   with,    so   that   the 


Or  a  Militia?  6i 

designation  "  Volunteer  Battalions  "  did  not 
really  apply  to  them.  As  a  compensation 
for  their  compulsory  enlistment,  these  so- 
called  volunteers  were  accorded  numerous 
favours  which  were  not  enjoyed  by  the 
soldiers  of  the  regular  army,  and  this 
differentiation  between  men  who  were  de- 
stined to  fight  side  by  side  was  necessarily 
prejudicial  in  its  effects/The  volunteers 
chose  their  own  officers;  they  drew  higher 
pay ;  and  the  punishments  inflicted  on  them 
were  very  lenient  as  compared  with  those 
of  the  regular  troops.  Further,  they  had 
the  right  to  retire  from  the  army  at  two 
months'  notice,  on  the  ist  of  December. 
All  the  protests  of  the  generals  against 
these  evils,  and  their  repeated  attempts 
simply  to  incorporate  the  volunteers  in 
the  regular  troops  were  disregarded  by  the 
leaders  of  the  Revolution.  The  conduct  of 
the  volunteers  in  the  face  of  the  enemy 
seldom  corresponded  to  the  hopes  which 
had  been  placed  on  them. 


62       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Camille  Rousset,  in  his  work,  Les  Vol- 
ontaires, "  was  the  first  to  dispose  of  the 
legendary  notions  which  had  attached 
themselves  to  these  volunteers.  The  various 
battalions  were,  of  course,  of  very  unequal 
worth.  Some  of  them — in  particular  those 
who  had  elected  as  their  officers  members 
of  the  former  provincial  militia — fought 
well.  Large  numbers  of  the  volunteers 
were  filled  with  a  lofty  sense  of  honour  and 
the  purest  patriotism,  and  not  a  few  of 
these  rose  later  to  high  rank  in  the  army; 
but  the  organization  of  the  volunteer  troops 
was  inadequate.  Even  after  Valmy,  the 
Minister  of  War  described  the  volunteers 
as  an  undisciplined  mob,  and  proposed  the 
infliction  of  heavy  penalties  for  their  con- 
tmual  mutinies.  General  Biron  considered 
that  it  was  the  election  of  their  own  officers 
by  the  men  which  was  above  all  prejudicial 
to  discipline.  The  deputies  of  the  Conven- 
tion, who  were   dispatched  to  the  armies, 

I  Paris,  1870. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  63 

complained  of  pillaging  in  their  own  coun- 
try, and  of  the  most  brutal  excesses  on  the 
part  of  these  troops.  Remonstrances  were 
met  only  by  riots  and  demands  to  be  dis- 
charged. The  men  maintained  that  they 
were  intended  only  for  the  defence  of  the 
frontiers  and  not  to  be  led  to  the  field  of 
slaughter.  Numbers  of  them  simply  left 
the  ranks  of  their  own  accord.  When,  on 
the  i8th  of  March,  1793,  Dumouriez  was 
defeated  by  the  Duke  of  Coburg  at  Neer- 
vinden,  the  volunteer  battalions  of  his 
army  broke  up  completely  in  the  course  of 
the  retreat;  he  was  left  with  only  20,000 
men  of  the  old  regular  troops. 

In  July,  1792,  the  Convention  declared 
"the  country  in  danger,"  and  hence  all 
citizens  capable  of  bearing  arms  to  be 
liable  for  military  service.  By  this  means 
a  further  300,000  men  were  procured.  The 
battalions  into  which  these  were  formed, 
the  so-called  "Federates,"  were  even  more 
unserviceable  in  the  field  than  the  volun- 


64       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

teers.  Mutinies  in  their  case  were  part  of 
the  order  of  the  day.  The  majority  of  them 
could  only  be  armed  with  pikes,  and  nothing 
was  done  to  provide  them  with  uniforms. 
The  serious  deficiencies  which  had  charac- 
terized both  the  old  and  the  new  troops 
resulted  in  the  introduction,  in  February, 
1793,  of  the  so-called  Requisition.  It  was 
decreed  by  law  that  every  unmarried  citizen 
of  from  eighteen  to  forty  years  of  age  should 
be  liable  for  military  service  until  a  total 
number  of  300,000  men  had  been  reached. 
Of  this  number,  100,000  were  destined  for 
the  reinforcement  of  the  regular  army  and 
200,000  for  the  volunteer  battalions.  Since 
the  law  provided  for  numerous  exemptions, 
and  since  the  population  was  hostile  to  this 
conscription,  the  result  of  the  Requisition 
was  far  below  expectations,  namely,  no  more 
than  180,000  men. 

Hence,  on  August  23,  1793,  the  Conven- 
tion decreed  the  lev^e  en  masse,  which  de- 
clared  all   Frenchmen   liable   for  military 


Or  a  Militia  ?  65 

service,  so  long  as  the  enemy  remained  on 
the  soil  of  the  Republic.  A  literal  levee  en 
masse  was  in  fact  only  made  in  the  threat- 
ened frontier  provinces,  and  even  there  only 
temporarily;  but  none  the  less  the  law  did 
procure  the  necessary  recruits  for  filling 
up  the  gaps  in  the  army,  which  were  be- 
coming more  and  more  conspicuous.  In 
October,  1793,  as  a  result  of  this  law,  the 
I^/^pj^lic  had  600,000  men  under  arms. 
l^Q  place  of  the  voluntary  s^;stem  had  been 
'^  taken  by  an  increasingi5'^rastic  system  of 
compulsory  servic 

There  had  been  a  gradual  reversion  from 
a  pure  national  army  to  a  standing  army, 
except  that  the  latter,  both  as  regards 
regulars  and  volunteers,  was  now  replen- 
ished by  compulsorily  enlisted  instead  of 
by  hired  soldiers.  In  the  matter  of  organi- 
zation, moreover,  there  was  a  return  to 
earlier  methods.  Under  a  decree  dated 
November,  1793,  the  voltmteer  battalions 
were  amalgamated  with  the  regular  troops. 


66       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

This  process  was  carried  out  by  degrees, 
each  battaHon  of  regulars  being  fused  with 
two  volunteer  battalions  to  form  a  so-called 
half -brigade.  The  latter  designation  was 
all  that  remained  to  commemorate  the  long 
series  of  blunders  which  were  made  by  the 
leaders  of  the  Revolution,  because  they 
were  filled  with  misleading  abstract  theo- 
ries concerning  the  efficiency  of  national 
levies:  blunders  which,  if  the  Coalition  had 
pursued  a  more  determined  policy,  mus;, 
have  brought  about  the  downfall  of  France. 
In  the  year  1803,  imder  the  Consulate,  the 
half -brigades  were  converted  into  regiments, 
and  the  circle  was  thus  outwardly  com- 
pleted. 

Only  gradually  was  military  discipline 
infused  into  these  new  troops.  The  insub- 
ordination which  had  been  tolerated  for 
years  was  not  easily  subdued.  Rebellion, 
plunder,  and  desertion  continued  for  a  long 
while  to  be  of  ordinary  occurrence.  In 
April,    1794,  the  general  of  a  division  at 


Or  a  Militia  ?  67 

Landrecies  in  attempting  to  arrest  the 
flight  of  a  runaway  soldier  was  shot.  A 
whole  half-brigade  mutinied,  and  General 
Bemadotte  only  arrived  just  in  time  to 
rescue  General  Marceau  from  the  rebels. 
Bemadotte's  own  half-brigade  broke  down 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  so  that  it  was  only 
by  an  energetic  personal  intervention  that 
he  was  able  to  avert  disaster. ' 

None  the  less,  by  the  formation  of  the 
half -brigades,  the  organization  of  the  army 
was  improved.  Those  mob  tactics,  peculiar 
to  completely  untrained  levies,  which  made 
their  appearance  also  in  the  American  War 
of  Independence,  gave  place  more  and  more 
to  systematic   extended-order    fire    action. 

In  the  employment  of  fire,  the  French 
Army  of  the  Revolution  gradually  became 
superior  to  the  old  European  armies,  who 
on  the  whole  kept  to  the  close  shoulder  to 
shoulder  tactics.  None  the  less,  these  skir- 
mishes did  not  possess  the  decisive  signifi- 

» Klaeber,  Marschall  Bernadotte. 


68       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

cance  which  has  commonly  been  attributed 
to  them.  The  muzzle-loading  rifle,  with  its 
slow  fire  and  uncertain  aim,  and  with  the 
additional  disadvantage  that  it  could  only 
be  loaded  standing,  or  at  the  most  kneeling^ 
did  not  permit  of  such  a  devastating  massed 
rifle-fire  as  accords  with  our  present-day 
notions.  Of  still  greater  advantage  to  the 
armies  of  the  Revolution  than  their  adroit- 
ness in  skirmishing  was  the  high  degree  of 
mobility  which  they  had  acquired  in  the 
course  of  the  long  war.  Their  experience 
of  actual  warfare  gradually  made  up  for 
the  original  defectiveness  of  their  training. 
The  national  army,  such  as  it  was  conceived 
at  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution,  was 
gradually  transformed  into  a  praetorian 
army,  which,  during  its  absence  from  the 
home-country,  gradually  became  denation- 
alized; and  the  transformation  was  com- 
pleted when  a  new  Caesar,  in  the  person  of 
Napoleon,  assumed  the  command.  The 
following  words  of   Mommsen   concerning 


Or  a  Militia?  69 

Hamilcar  Barca  are  equally  applicable  to 
Napoleon:  "Like  a  true  general,  he  was 
able  to  substitute  his  own  person  for  his 
country  in  the  affections  of  his  soldiers; 
in  the  course  of  the  long  campaigns,  the  sol- 
dier came  to  regard  the  camp  as  a  second 
home,  and  his  patriotism  was  replaced  by 
enthusiasm  for  the  flag  and  ardent  devo- 
tion to  his  great  leader. " ' 

The  Army  of  the  First  Empire 

In  the  year  1798,  a  law  relating  to  con- 
scription rendered  every  Frenchman  from 
twenty  to  twenty-five  years  of  age  liable 
for  military  service.  None  but  the  physi- 
cally unfit  and  the  married  were  exempted; 
all  the  rest  could  be  enlisted  in  case  of  need. 
The  population  had  only  submitted  to  the 
levee  en  masse  under  the  pressure  of  urgent 
danger,  and  as  a  temporary  institution, 
and  moreover  the  levy  was  made  only  in 
certain  localities.     Hence  they  resisted  the 

'  Romische  Geschichte,  i.,  2. 


70       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

new  law  with  the  utmost  energy.  The  hope 
of  seeing  the  recruiting  for  the  army  placed 
at  length  upon  a  sure  foundation  was  not 
fulfilled.  The  number  of  those  who  escaped 
the  obligation  to  serve  was  still  large. 
Hence  it  was  found  necessary,  in  1800,  to 
sanction  the  purchase  of  exemption  and  the 
furnishing  of  a  substitute.  As  soon  as 
Napoleon,  under  the  title  of  First  Consul, 
assumed  the  direction  of  the  State,  he 
established  order  with  a  firm  hand  in  place 
of  the  disorder  which  had  prevailed  under 
the  Directory  in  the  department  of  recruit- 
ing for  the  army;  and  the  country  gradu- 
ally accustomed  itself  to  the  new  method 
of  enlistment,  although  it  never  became 
popular. 

The  warlike  ardour  of  the  nation  soon 
died  out  after  the  repulse  of  the  invasion 
of  1792:  to  such  an  extent,  in  fact,  that 
the  French  people  exhibited  very  little 
affection  for  the  victorious  imperial  army. 
The  spirit  of  that  army  was  embodied  in 


Or  a  Militia?  71 

the  old  soldiers.  They  infused  steadiness 
into  the  ranks  of  the  new  recruits,  who,  in 
consequence  of  the  arbitrary  continuation 
by  Napoleon  of  the  extended  conscription, 
flocked  to  the  army  in  ever  greater  numbers. 
But,  above  all,  in  the  course  of  the  long  war, 
an  experienced  officers'  corps,  the  vehicle  of 
a  definite  tradition,  had  been  constructed 
out  of  elements  which,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Revolution,  threatened  to  become  com- 
pletely dispersed.  None  the  less,  the  con- 
nection with  the  army  of  the  ancien  regime 
had  by  no  means  been  completely  lost. 
This  connection  was  revealed  most  con- 
spicuously in  the  case  of  the  generals.  Half 
the  generals  of  the  army  which  took  the 
field  in  1805  had  already  held  officers'  rank 
imder  the  monarchy.  But  the  corollary  was, 
that  the  army  was  by  no  means  devoid  of 
senior  officers  who  either  had  not  adopted 
the  profession  of  arms  originally,  or  had 
not  served  in  it  continuously.  Three  fifths 
of  the  staff  officers,  more  than  half  of  all 


72       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  officers  of  the  Grande  Armee  of  1805, 
had  belonged  to  the  royal  army,  ^  although 
very  few  of  them  had  held  officers'  rank. 
The  majority  of  them  were  still  privates 
or  sergeants  at  the  beginning  of  the  Revo- 
lution, and  had  left  the  army  in  order  to 
occupy  positions  as  officers  with  the  volun- 
teer battalions.  Other  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men  had  remained  with  the 
regular  troops,  and  had  been  promoted 
either  to  fill  the  places  of  officers  of  the 
aristocracy  who  had  emigrated,  or  because 
they  had  distinguished  themselves  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy.  They  constituted  in 
1805  the  senior  captains  and  subaltern 
officers  of  the  army,  who,  in  spite  of  their 
experience  of  war,  were,  on  account  of 
their  advanced  age  and  their  limited  educa- 
tion, looked  upon  with  small  favour  by 
their  superior  officers.  In  regard  to  the 
men  belonging  to  the  volunteer  battalions 
who  were  promoted  to  officers'  rank,  many 

'  Alombert-Colin,  Campagne  de  180$  en  AUemagne,  i. 


Or  a  Militia?  73 

proved  unsatisfactory;  but  many,  on  the 
other  hand,  were  individuals  of  distin- 
guished intelligence  and  culture  since  the 
huge  upheaval  of  the  time  and  the  anarchy 
at  home  induced  many  men  of  patriotic 
and  energetic  temperament  to  enter  the 
army.  The  latter,  together  with  the  pupils 
from  the  schools  at  St.  Cyr  and  Fontaine- 
bleau,  represented  the  yoimger  and  more 
educated  officers  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry. 
The  ranks  of  the  officers  of  the  artillery  and 
the  engineers  were  replenished  by  the  pupils  ■ 
from  the  joint  school  at  Metz. 

A  considerable  number  of  the  officers  of 
the  regular  infantry  had  belonged  to  the 
so-called  velites  of  the  Guard.  Young  men 
of  good  family  also  enlisted  in  the  army  as 
volunteers  in  comparatively  large  numbers; 
and  these  were  promoted  to  officers'  rank 
after  a  short  term  of  service,  and  frequently 
passed  up  through  the  various  subordinate 
positions  with  astonishing  rapidity.  In 
this  connection,  and  owing  to  the  growing 


74       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

need  of  officers,  there  were  frequent  exhibi- 
tions of  favouritism  which  were  strongly 
resented  by  the  old  soldiers.  There  were 
even  cases  of  men  who  had  never  done 
service  with  the  unit  being  made  officers. 
None  the  less,  in  the  year  1805,  it  could 
still  be  said  that  the  troops  were  commanded 
by  young  generals  and  colonels,  for  the 
most  part  also  comparatively  young  staff 
officers,  and  old  captains  and  lieutenants.' 
Clausewitz  writes ""  with  reference  to  the 
French  Army  of  the  First  Empire:  "After 
all  this  was  perfected  by  the  hand  of  Buona- 
parte, this  military  power,  based  on  the 
strength  of  the  whole  nation,  marched  over 
Europe,  smashing  everything  in  pieces  so 
surely  and  certainly  that,  wherever  it  en- 
countered only  the  old-fashioned  armies, 
the  result  was  not  doubtful  for  a  moment." 
And  Napoleon  did,  in  fact,  make  ever- 
increasing  demands  on   the  man-power  of 

»  Alombert-Colin,  loc.  oil. 

*  Vom  Kriege.     Skizzen  zum  8  Buck  j  Kapitel  B.     "On 
War,"  iii.,  lOi.     Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner,  Ltd.,  London. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  75 

the  country,  of  which  he  had  originally 
shown  himself  sparing.  Between  1805  and 
1 807  he  demanded  420,000  recruits.  Purely 
arbitrary  levies  were  substituted  for  the 
regular  system.  The  age  of  enlistment, 
which  in  1804  had  still  been  twenty  years 
four  months,  was  lowered  in  1807  to  eighteen 
years  six  months. '  After  the  defeat  of  his 
army  in  Russia,  Napoleon  called  no  less 
than  1,227,000  men  to  the  colours  within 
the  space  of  fourteen  and  a  half  months. 

The  constant  increase  of  its  numbers, 
together  with  the  losses  sustained  by  the 
veterans,  gradually  impaired  the  mtrinsic 
value  of  the  army.  In  the  latter  wars  of 
the  Empire,  it  forfeited  more  and  more  the 
character  of  a  professional  army,  without, 
however,  acquiring  that  of  a  trained  national 
army,  since  the  feverishness  with  which 
Napoleon  plunged  into  one  war  after  an- 
other did  not  afford  the  possibility  of  an 
even    tolerably    thorough    training.      The 

»  Morvan,  Soldat  Imperial,  i. 


76       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

infantry,  in  spite  of  its  deterioration,  still 
performed  brilliant  achievements  on  the 
field  of  battle,  under  the  eye  of  the  Emperor; 
but  as  early  as  1809  it  became  evident  that, 
on  the  whole,  its  value  was  no  longer  what 
it  had  been.  Finally,  the  new  recruits  of 
18 1 3  broke  down.  The  new  troops  did 
indeed  display  great  courage  at  Gross- 
Gorschen  and  Bautzen,  but  the  victories 
gained  by  the  Emperor  were  Pyrrhic  vic- 
tories. On  both  occasions  the  army  went 
to  pieces  completely  during  the  pursuit. 
Napoleon  himself  declares,  in  reference  to 
this  fact :  "With  a  young  army  it  is  possible 
to  take  a  strong  position,  but  not  to  carry 
through  a  campaign  to  a  conclusion,  in 
accordance  with  a  definite  plan."^ 

It  was  not  to  be  wondered  at.  Only 
fourteen  days  before  Gross-Gorschen  Mar- 
shal Marmont  had  written:''  "Here  [at 
Hanau]  we  have  a  large  collection  of  men, 

'  Maximes  de  guerre  et  pensee  de  Napoleon  I. 
^  Rousset,  La  grande  armee  de  1813. 


Or  a  Militia?  77 

but  not  an  organized  army.  The  result 
would  be  disastrous  if  these  troops  were  to 
be  brought  into  collision  with  the  enemy 
before  they  had  acquired  some  firmness  and 
had  been  furnished  with  all  the  necessities." 
After  the  Battle  of  the  Katzbach,  Mac- 
donald's  army  was  completely  dispersed. 
Rousset  writes  in  regard  to  it:'  "If  the 
Battle  of  the  Katzbach  had  been  fought 
with  stout  men  and  thoroughly  trained 
soldiers,  it  is  possible  that  Macdonald 
would  not  have  been  defeated,  or  at  any 
rate  would  only  have  suffered  such  a  reverse 
as  could  have  been  made  good  again ;  fought 
as  it  was  with  young  men  and  with  soldiers 
whose  training  dated  from  yesterday,  it 
became  the  beginning  of  a  catastrophe. 
No  clearer  demonstration  has  ever  been 
furnished  of  the  power  of  physical  and  moral 
energy,  of  fortitude  of  body  and  spirit  in 
the  face  of  inclemency  of  the  weather, 
hunger  and  thirst  and  all  the  sufferings  of 

'  Loc.  cil. 


78       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

war:  the  power,  in  fact,  of  that  stoicism 
which  is  no  sudden  phenomenon,  but  the 
gradual  and  unconscious  result  of  military 
training,  which  is,  in  fact,  nothing  else 
than  a  heightened  sense  of  honour  and 
duty."  It  was  not  so  much  the  effective- 
ness of  the  enemy's  weapons  or  his  pursuit 
which  shattered  the  army  as  the  excessively 
bad  weather.  Out  of  100,000  men,  the 
Marshal  brought  back  only  50,000  to 
Bautzen.  Lauriston's  (5th)  corps  of  this 
army  had  gone  into  battle  on  the  26th  of 
August  with  more  than  18,000  men;  at  the 
end  of  the  month  it  numbered  only  6000 
men.  Lauriston  urged  Berthier,  the  Major- 
General  of  the  army,  to  bring  up  some  of 
the  Guards,  in  the  hope  that  the  sight  of 
a  really  efficient  body  might  have  a  steady- 
ing effect  on  the  shattered  army.  After  the 
defeat  of  Dennewitz,  Marshal  Ney  brought 
his  army  into  safety  at  Torgau,  behind  the 
Elbe.  He  had  to  admit  that  he  could  no 
longer  control  the  troops,  that  they  refused 


Or  a  Militia  ?  79 

to  obey  and  were  dispersing.  These  are 
phenomena  which  have  never  manifested 
themselves  to  the  same  extent  in  firmly 
organized  and  disciplined  armies,  even  after 
retreats ;  and  it  must  be  remembered  more- 
over that  neither  the  Katzbach  nor  Denne- 
witz  was  a  battle  of  envelopment  on  a  large 
scale. 

The  Emperor  fully  realized  the  deficien- 
cies of  his  army  of  recruits,  and  there- 
fore took  all  the  more  pains  to  create  a 
thoroughly  trustworthy  picked  troop  by 
strengthening  his  Guard,  which  had  been 
instituted  after  the  Russian  catastrophe. 
Subsequently,  during  the  truce  and  in  the 
autumn  campaign  of  181 3,  some  of  the 
other  corps  attained  greater  firmness,  but, 
on  the  whole,  the  army  never  overcame  the 
characteristic  deficiencies  of  an  improvisa- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  IV 

the  prussian  army  in  the  war  of 
liberation ' 

The  Work  of  Scharnhorst 

The  Prussian  Army  of  the  year  1813  was 
also  an  improvisation. 

In  the  reorganization  which  was  set  on 
foot  after  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  Scharnhorst 
endeavoured  above  all  to  secure  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  great  conception  of  a  nation  in 
arms.  The  hiring  of  foreign  soldiers  was 
completely  done  away  with.  Only  sons  of 
the  Fatherland  were  henceforth  to  partake 
of  the  honour  of  defending  their  native  soil. 

•  Das  Preussische  Heer  der  Befreiungskriege.  Herausgege- 
ben  vom  Grossen  Generalstabe.  Kriegsgesch.  Abieilung  ii. 
Berlin,  19 12-14.  E.  S.  Mittler  und  Sohn,  Konigl. 
Hofbuchhandlung. 

80 


A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms        8i 

Universal  military  service  did  not  yet 
exist ;  on  the  contrary,  there  were  numerous 
exemptions  from  the  liability  for  service. 
It  had  been  Schamhorst's  original  inten- 
tion that  the  army  should  be  maintained 
at  such  strength  that  the  mass  of  the  popula- 
tion capable  of  bearing  arms  could  be  trained 
in  it,  while  the  more  cultivated  classes  could 
be  dismissed  after  a  short  term  of  service 
and  recruits  inserted  in  their  place.  At  the 
same  time,  preparations  were  made  for 
the  formation  of  a  provincial  militia,  the 
Landwehr  of  1813,  which,  in  case  of  war, 
should  be  used  as  garrison  troops.  In  it 
were  to  be  enrolled  all  those  men  who  had 
not  been  through  the  school  of  the  standing 
army.  The  question  of  creating  such  mili- 
tia troops  had  been  frequently  discussed 
before  this  time,  and  the  formation  of 
seventy-eight  provincial  reserve  battalions 
had  already  been  carried  out  in  the  year 
1806  on  the  outbreak  of  war. 
These  far-reaching  plans  of  Schamhorst 


82       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

for  the  reorganization  of  the  army  could 
not  be  put  into  execution,  because  Napoleon, 
by  a  treaty  of  September,  1808,  imposed 
upon  Prussia  the  humiliating  condition 
that  she  should  not  maintain  more  than 
42,000  men  with  the  colours.  Since,  how- 
ever, the  State  had,  by  the  Peace  of  Til- 
sit, been  reduced  to  half  its  former  size, 
comprising  rather  less  than  5,000,000  in- 
habitants, it  was  no  longer  in  a  position  to 
maintain  a  strong  army  in  time  of  peace, 
and  hence  this  limitation  of  its  total  armed 
strength  was  less  vexatious  to  Prussia  than 
the  further  conditions  of  the  treaty.  The 
bodies  of  troops  to  be  maintained  were 
limited  to  a  fixed  number,  and  the  organiza- 
tion of  a  militia  was  forbidden.  By  this 
restriction,  the  system  of  the  skeleton  army, 
only  to  be  filled  out  in  case  of  war,  and  its 
support  by  means  of  the  provincial  militia, 
as  well  as  the  principal  ideas  underlying 
Schamhorst's  reforms,  were  rendered  abor- 
tive.    Napoleon  could  not,  of  course,  alter 


Or  a  Militia?  83 

the  fact  that  there  was  still  a  considerable 
war  reserve  of  trained  soldiers  in  the  Kan- 
tons.  By  far  the  greater  number  of  these 
were  men  who  had  received  their  training 
in  the  old  army;  a  smaller  proportion 
consisted  of  the  so-called  "Kriimper,"  that 
is  to  say,  men  who  after  a  short  term  of 
service  had  been  discharged,  in  order  to 
make  room  for  other  recruits.  The  regi- 
ments, in  their  lists  of  the  reserves  available 
in  their  Kantons,  do  not  distinguish  be- 
tween the  "Kriimper"  and  the  discharged 
soldiers  of  an  earlier  date.  Moreover  it  is 
obvious  that,  in  the  five  years  between 
1808  and  1 8 12,  Scharnhorst's  Kriimper 
system  could  not  furnish  any  considerable 
war  reserve.  Further,  the  strict  supervision 
which  the  French  kept  over  the  country 
made  it  necessary  to  confine  the  number  of 
men  thus  discharged  within  comparatively 
narrow  limits.  It  was  therefore  decreed  in 
1808  that  from  three  to  five  men  every 
month    should    be    withdrawn    from    each 


84       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

company^  and  their  place  taken  by  others. 
In  181 1  large  numbers  of  the  Kriimper  were 
assembled  for  some  months  in  labour  bri- 
gades and  employed  in  making  entrench- 
ments. In  the  same  year  it  was  prescribed 
that  every  year,  for  four  successive  months, 
eight  men  each  month  should  be  enrolled  as 
recruits  in  every  company,  and  that  the 
same  number  of  older  men  should  be  dis- 
charged .  These  insufficiently  trained  Kriim- 
per were  summoned  to  manoeuvres  for  a 
short  time,  and  from  time  to  time  also  they 
were  drilled  by  officers  dispatched  to  the 
Kant  on  s.  Experience,  however,  proved  this 
system  to  be  far  from  satisfactory.  Hence, 
in  18 12,  a  six  months'  term  of  enlistment 
was  introduced,  and  at  the  same  time  it  was 
decreed  that  no  men  who  had  served  less 
than  a  year  should  be  discharged  as  Kriim- 
per. The  mobilization  in  the  following  year 
of  almost  half  the  army  for  the  auxiliary 
corps  to  be  sent  by  Napoleon  against  Russia 

'  The  peace  strength  was  150  men,  war  strength  188. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  85 

interrupted  both  the  putting  into  full  execu- 
tion of  the  Krumper  system  and  the  tranquil 
continuance  of  the  development  of  the  army. 

Conduct  of  the  Various  Sections  of 
THE  Prussian  Army  in  the  War  of 
Liberation 

The  number  of  men  with  experience  of 
military  service  available  in  the  country  was 
sufficient  to  enable  the  regular  troops  to  be 
raised  to  their  full  strength  in  the  spring  of 
1 8 13,  and,  by  the  enrolment  of  new  recruits, 
by  degrees  fifty-two  reserve  battalions  as 
well  as  twenty-three  and  a  quarter  garrison 
battalions  were  erected.  Of  the  reserve  bat- 
talions, five  were  converted  into  regular 
battalions  during  the  truce,  seven  were  dis- 
persed; the  rest  were  formed  into  reserve 
regiments  which  comparatively  soon  reached 
the  standard  of  the  old  skeleton  regiments. 
It  was  these  skeleton  regiments  which,  at 
Gross-Gorschen  and  Bautzen,  restored  the 


86       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

ancient  glory  of  Prussian  arms.  Boy  en, 
who  was  afterwards  Minister  of  War,  pro- 
nounced the  following  opinion  concerning 
them:  "Well- trained,  led  by  young,  ener- 
getic, and  experienced  officers,  and  full  of 
confidence  in  their  new  organization,  that 
half  of  the  army  which  had  shared  in  the 
campaign  of  1812  had  acquired  experience 
of  war  and,  above  all,  self-confidence;  the 
troops  were  encouraged  by  the  respect  which 
they  inspired  in  friend  and  foe,  and  from 
general  down  to  the  last  musketeer,  they 
were  filled  with  a  praiseworthy  sense  of 
honour."' 

On  February  3,  18 13,  the  order  was  issued 
for  the  formation  of  the  volunteer  Jager 
detachments.  They  were  to  be  linked  to  the 
existing  troops,  and  were  intended  to  com- 
prise those  individuals  who  had  hitherto 
escaped  the  Kanton  obligation,  that  is  to 
say,  in  particular,  the  cultivated  and  well- 

'  Erinnerungen.     Herausg.     von     F.     Nippold.       Leipzig, 
1889-90. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  87 

to-do  classes,  who  were  able  to  equip  and 
support  themselves,  for  it  was  still  con- 
sidered out  of  the  question  to  suggest  to 
these  men  that  they  should  take  their  place 
in  the  ranks  by  the  side  of  the  common 
soldiers.  This  concession  to  the  notions  pre- 
vailing at  that  time  was  not  a  success.  If 
they  had  definitely  entered  the  ranks,  these 
Jager  volunteers,  like  their  successors  the 
one-year  volunteers,  would  have  been  able 
to  influence  the  other  men  by  their  example, 
and  this,  more  particularly  in  view  of  the 
low  standard  of  culture  at  that  time,  would 
have  been  of  great  value.  Even  experienced 
officers  allowed  themselves  to  be  misled 
by  the  ideology  of  the  time.  It  was  believed 
that  the  Jager  detachments  would  be  able 
to  render  valuable  services  forthwith  in 
the  so-called  "light  service,"  namely,  in  skir- 
mishing, and  in  reconnaissance  and  escort 
duty;  and  the  fact  was  overlooked  that  for 
these  duties  a  far  more  thorough  training 
was  required  than  for  service  in  the  ranks. 


88       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Certain  occurrences  in  the  American  War 
of  Independence/  La  Vendee,  "^  and  in  Spain 
had  given  rise  to  this  notion.  It  was  over- 
looked, however,  that  the  town -bred  ele- 
ments, of  which  the  Jager  detachments 
were  chiefly  composed,  had,  for  the  most 
part,  hitherto  occupied  themselves  with 
learned  studies  and  could  not,  therefore,  pos- 
sess the  qualities  of  those  guerilla  fighters. 
This  was  to  appear  very  shortly.  In  the 
spring  campaign  of  1813,  Bliicher  ordered 
that,  in  face  of  the  enemy,  a  soldier  of  the 
regular  army  was  always  to  be  posted  as 
double  post  with  a  Jager  volunteer.  The 
marching  achievements  of  the  Jager  de- 
tachments were,  up  to  the  year  18 14,  very 
insignificant.  If  any  considerable  demands 
were  made  upon  them  in  this  respect,  a 
very  large  number  were  left  behind.  The 
Jager  volunteers  and  the  other  volunteer 
corps  did,  to  be  sure,  contribute  to  the  army 
a  spirit  of  generous  enthusiasm  which  ought 

'  See  p.  161.  ^  See  p.  141. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  89 

not  to  be  underestimated.  Moreover,  they 
formed  a  good  training  school  for  officers 
of  the  Landwehr;  but,  considered  as  fight- 
ing troops,  their  performances  were  of 
very  small  value.  By  an  order  of  the  9th  of 
February,  18 13,  exemption  from  the  Kanton 
obligation  was  abolished,  and  therewith  uni- 
versal military  service  was  introduced,  at 
any  rate  for  the  duration  of  the  war.  The 
order  issued  on  the  17th  of  March  to  the 
Landwehr  and  Landsturm  summoned  the 
mass  of  the  nation  to  arms.  Every  man 
capable  of  bearing  arms  between  the  ages 
of  seventeen  and  forty  years  who  was  not 
a  member  of  the  standing  army,  whether  he 
had  already  served  or  not,  was  liable  for 
service  in  the  Landwehr.  As  soon  as  the 
formation  of  the  Landwehr  was  completed, 
the  raising  of  the  Landsturm  was  to  be 
commenced.  The  latter  were  to  be  called 
upon  for  "a  war  of  self-defence,"  in  case  of 
enemy  invasion;  though,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,   they  have  never  been  employed  in 


90       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

actual  warfare.  For  the  purpose  of  putting 
these  measures  into  operation,  the  State  was 
divided  into  four  "MiHtary  Governments," 
with  a  miHtary  and  civil  governor  at  the 
head  of  each.  The  activities  of  these  Mili- 
tary Governments  were  similar  to  those  of 
our  deputy-chief-command  in  war.  They 
were  equipped  with  a  large  measure  of  power 
and  responsibility,  and,  as  a  result  of  their 
labours,  the  task  of  the  central  authority, 
the  Ministry  of  War,  which  was  at  that  time 
in  a  backward  stage  of  development,  was 
considerably  lightened.  The  task  of  replen- 
ishing the  army  lay  chiefly  in  the  hands  of 
these  provincial  authorities,  and,  in  spite 
of  the  great  difficulties  which  had  to  be 
faced,  was  upon  the  whole  successfully 
accomplished. 

The  organization  of  the  Landwehr,  in 
spite  of  the  self-sacrificing  spirit  of  the 
classes  who  were  called  to  its  ranks,  made 
but  slow  progress.  In  the  autumn  of  the 
year  1813,  the  troops  still  lacked  uniforms 


Or  a  Militia?  91 

and  equipment.  The  officers  of  the  Land- 
wehr  were  elected  by  the  district  committees, 
and  the  appointments  were  then  confirmed 
by  the  king.  Only  the  staff  officers  were 
directly  nominated  by  the  king.  The  Land- 
wehr  officers  included  several  who  had 
formerly  belonged  to  the  regular  army.  The 
officers  commanding  the  regiments,  without 
exception,  and  the  bulk  of  those  command- 
ing the  battalions,  had  belonged  to  the  old 
army.  It  ought  not  to  be  forgotten  that 
the  magnificent  improvisation  which  the 
Prussian  Army  exhibited  in  the  War  of 
Liberation  was  only  rendered  possible  by 
the  assistance  of  the  numerous  officers  of 
the  old  army,  who  were  available  in  the 
coimtry  or  who  hastened  to  it  from  other 
parts  of  Germany.  x\s  a  result  of  the  reor- 
ganization, the  replenishment  of  the  officers' 
corps  was  placed  upon  a  different  footing. 
It  preserved  its  aristocratic  character,  inso- 
much as  the  nomination  to  officer's  rank 
by  the  king  took  precedence  of  election  by 


92       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  officers'  corps.  For  the  rest,  the  latter 
opened  its  ranks  to  any  man  who  gave  proof 
of  satisfying  the  requirements  in  respect 
both  of  professional  knowledge  and  of 
general  culture,  whereas  hitherto,  in  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  various  imits, 
the  acquisition  of  officer's  rank  had  been  a 
privilege  confined  to  those  of  noble  birth. 
In  the  few  years  between  the  Peace  of  Tilsit 
and  the  beginning  of  the  War  of  Liberation, 
it  was  only  the  youngest  officers  who  could 
be  affected  by  these  innovations;  it  was 
chiefly  the  much-abused  officers'  corps,  the 
"Junkers"  of  1806,  who  in  18 13  led  the 
Prussian  Army  to  victory;  though  this  offi- 
cers' corps  had,  it  is  true,  been  considerably 
renovated  as  compared  with  that  of  1806, 
and  was  filled  with  an  entirely  different 
spirit. 

It  was  only  because  experienced  officers 
were  available  for  most  of  the  higher  posi- 
tions in  the  Landwehr  also  that  it  was 
possible  to  employ  the  latter  in  the  field. 


Or  a  Militia?  93 

It  had  not  been  originally  anticipated 
by  Schamhorst  that  they  should  be  so 
employed,  and  indeed,  in  view  of  their  com- 
position and  their  lack  of  arms  and  equip- 
ment, they  were  very  ill  adapted  for  the 
purpose.  They  had  not  enough  gims  to  go 
round,  so  that  the  front  ranks  in  the  triple 
array  which  prevailed  at  that  time  were 
often  armed  with  pikes.  Guns  had  to  be 
captiired  from  the  enemy.  For  the  most 
part  without  cloaks,  clad  only  in  linen 
breeches,  many  of  them  without  shoes, 
these  new  formations,  who  moreover  were 
unaccustomed  to  hardships,  were  exposed 
to  the  inclemencies  of  the  rainy  auttmin  of 
18 13.  None  the  less,  necessity  demanded 
that  recourse  should  be  had  to  the  Land- 
wehr.  In  order  to  supplement  in  some 
degree  their  lack  of  solid  cohesion,  the  Land- 
wehr  troops  were,  at  the  end  of  the  truce, 
inserted  in  the  divisions  known  as  mixed 
brigades,  the  latter  as  a  rule  being  made  up 
of  one  line  regiment,  one  reserve  regiment. 


94       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

and  one  Landwehr  regiment.  The  cavalry 
regiments  in  the  campaign  of  August,  1813, 
consisted  in  some  cases  of  two  regular 
and  two  Landwehr  squadrons,  although  the 
judgments  expressed  in  regard  to  the  offi- 
cers and  men  of  the  Landwehr  cavalry  were 
much  more  favourable  than  those  on  the 
infantry.  In  spite  of  all  the  zeal  expended 
upon  them,  and  although  their  training  was 
entrusted  to  officers  of  the  regular  army,  the 
Landwehr  troops  were,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  autumn  campaign,  still  very  unsatis- 
factory, as  was  indeed  inevitable,  since  they 
consisted  of  completely  untrained  men  be- 
longing to  a  wide  variety  of  annual  levies. 
At  the  beginning,  the  junior  officers  fre- 
quently lacked  the  requisite  authority  and 
professional  knowledge.  Serious  crime  and 
desertions,  sometimes  attaining  formidable 
proportions,  were  the  order  of  the  day. 
Our  modem  Landwehr,  every  member  of 
which  has  been  through  the  school  of  the 
standing  army,  has  nothing  in  common  with 


Or  a  Militia?  95 

the  Landwehr  of  18 13  save  its  name.  Even 
at  that  time  a  few  regiments  and  battalions 
stood  out  in  favourable  contrast  with  the 
mass,  in  consequence  either  of  a  particularly 
fortunate  composition  or  of  the  valour  of 
their  commanders. 

The  Landwehr  was  not  equal  to  coping 
with  difficult  military  situations.  A  Land- 
wehr battalion  of  the  Silesian  Army  com- 
pletely broke  down  in  the  Battle  of  Niederau 
on  the  23d  of  August.  When  the  commander 
of  this  battalion,  in  order  to  protect  it  from 
the  enemy's  artillery  fire,  which  was  causing 
losses  in  its  ranks,  tried  to  move  it  back 
quite  a  little  distance  to  the  cover  of  an 
undulation  of  ground,  as  the  result 'of  a  shell 
bursting  in  its  midst,  it  dispersed  in  all 
directions.  The  desperate  attempts  of  the 
officers  to  reassemble  the  battalion  were  to 
no  purpose.    It  had  to  be  disbanded. 

The  Brandenburg  Landwehr  employed 
with  the  Northern  Army,  where  it  was  a 
case  of  directly  defending  house  and  home. 


96       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

upon  the  whole  acquitted  themselves  well. 
But  even  they  displayed  the  characteristic 
qualities  of  an  improvised  body  of  troops. 
Colonel  von  Zimmermann  writes  in  refer- 
ence to  the  Battle  of  Hagelberg  on  the  27th 
of  August,  1813:'  "Although  the  Prussians 
had  a  considerable  nimierical  superiority 
over  the  enemy,  the  quite  insignificant  losses 
incurred  in  the  first  encoimter  were  suffi- 
cient to  throw  the  latter  into  utter  confusion 
and  even  to  embarrass  the  second  encounter. 
It  was  only  thanks  to  the  intervention  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  von  der  Marwitz  that 
what  was  on  the  way  to  becoming  a  defeat 
was  converted  at  the  last  moment  into  a 
victory.  The  battalions  were  so  untrained 
that  there  could  be  no  question  of  tactical 
control  of  the  fighting.  The  battle  swayed 
as  chance  directed;  and  all  the  Landwehr 
battalions  had  moments  of  weakness,  when 
they  were  only  saved  from  disaster  by  the 

^  Vierteljahrshefte  jiir    Truppenfiihrung    und   Heereskunde. 
1912.     2  Heft. 


Or  a  Militia?  97 

bravery  of  their  officers.  It  should  not  be 
forgotten  moreover  that  the  enemy  troops 
consisted  of  recruits  and  were  of  very  in- 
ferior worth." 

The  Landwehr  of  Kleist's  corps,  the  main 
army,  went  to  pieces  to  a  serious  extent  in 
the  course  of  the  retreat  from  Dresden.  At 
the  Battle  of  Kulm,  on  the  30th  of  August, 
a  Landwehr  regiment,  as  soon  as  it  encoim- 
tered  the  enemy's  fire,  faced  about  and 
collided  with  a  line  regiment  which  was 
following  it  as  a  reserve.  Temporary  panics 
have  been  known  to  seize  even  otherwise 
trustworthy  troops,  but  they  have  generally 
been  due  to  exceptional  circumstances,  and 
in  any  case  have  been  more  quickly  recov- 
ered from.  Occurrences,  however,  like  those 
we  have  mentioned,  which  sprang  from 
quite  trifling  causes,  illustrate  how  very 
little  reliance  can  be  placed  on  untrained 
troops.  Subsequently,  the  Landwehr  was 
gradually  raised  to  the  level  of  an  efficient 
fighting  troop.     Even  the  stem  Yorck  ad- 


98       A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

mitted,  after  the  Battle  of  Wartenburg  on 
the  3d  of  October,  that  his  Silesian  Land- 
wehr  had  stood  the  great  test  with  high 
distinction.  The  battalions  who  helped  to 
win  the  passage  of  the  Elbe,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  were  of  hardly  more  than  the  strength 
of  a  company,  and  hence  were  made  up  of 
the  stoutest  and  most  zealous  members  of 
the  Landwehr. 

What  was,  if  anything,  an  even  more 
serious  cause  of  annoyance  to  their  leaders 
than  the  occasional  collapse  of  the  Landwehr 
troops  in  the  course  of  an  engagement,  were 
the  heavy  losses  which  they  sustained  on 
the  march.  During  the  evolutions  of  the 
main  army  in  the  middle  of  September,  the 
regular  troops  of  Kleist's  corps  were  dimin- 
ished by  only  3.5  per  cent,  as  a  result  of 
their  exertions,  while  the  Landwehr  of  the 
same  corps  were  diminished  by  22  per  cent. 
As  a  result  of  the  severe  marches  which 
preceded  the  Battle  of  Leipzig,  out  of  the 
28,500  men  of  Kleist's  corps,  only  about 


Or  a  Militia  ?  99 

4400  Landwehr  troops  remained. '  The  ad- 
vance to  the  Bober,  the  retreat  behind  the 
Katzbach,  and  the  pursuit  after  the  battle 
of  the  26th  of  August,  demanded  enormous 
exertions  from  the  troops  amid  unceasing 
torrents  of  rain;  and  to  these  exertions  the 
Landwehr  or  Yorck's  corps  proved  them- 
selves as  inadequate  as  the  recruits  of  Mac- 
donald's  army.^  In  the  first  eighteen  days 
of  the  autumn  campaign,  the  losses  of  the 
corps  in  respect  to  regular  troops  were 
4040  out  of  a  total  of  16,747,  while,  in 
respect  to  Landwehr  troops,  its  losses  were 
7092  out  of  a  total  of  13,370.  As  a  result 
of  the  increasing  number  of  desertions, 
corporal  punishment  was  restored  by  royal 
decree  in  the  Upper  Silesian  Landwehr.  In 
this  connection,  however,  it  ought  to  be 
borne  in  mind  that  patriotism  in  the  Prus- 
sian sense  was  at  that  time  hardly  to  be 
expected  from  the  Polish  inhabitants  of 
Upper  Silesia,  nor  yet  from  the  West  Prus- 

'  Zimmermann,  loc.  cit.  '  See  p.  77. 


loo     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

sians,  concerning  whom  also  many  com- 
plaints were  made.  Moreover,  in  view  of 
the  defective  education  of  the  mass  of  the 
lower  classes  and  the  conditions  in  which 
they  lived  at  that  time,  they  could  not  be 
expected  to  display  the  same  degree  of  en- 
thusiasm for  and  intelligent  participation 
in  the  conflict  as  was  evinced  on  the  out- 
break of  the  World  War.  Droysen^  re- 
marked 'justly:  ''It  would  have  been  an 
easier  task  to  have  improved  the  discipline 
of  the  Landwehr  if  one  could  have  clothed 
their  nakedness  and  satisfied  their  himger. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  the  exhaustion  of 
the  men  as  the  result  of  continuous  forced 
marches  and  their  insufficient  nourishment 
were  responsible  for  a  great  deal.  It  was 
not  from  their  fear  of  a  flogging  that  many 
of  the  Landwehr,  after  they  had  recuperated 
themselves  at  home,  returned  to  the  corps 
once  again,  so  that  the  Landwehr,  which  on 
the   1st  of  September  had   totalled  6277, 

»  Yorcks  Leben,  iii. 


Or  a  Militia?  loi 

fourteen  days  later  had  increased  to  8540. 

Lack  of  food  and  clothing  endangers  the 
military  discipline  of  even  the  best  troops: 
how  much  more  serious,  then,  must  be  its 
effects  on  such  undisciplined  masses  as 
these?  Hence,  on  the  one  hand  we  have,  in 
the  case  of  the  Landwehr  of  18 13,  to  admit 
extenuating  circumstances  which  the  Prus- 
sian State  had  not  at  that  time  the  means  to 
remedy;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  these  new 
troops  exhibited  all  the  defects  resulting 
from  an  inadequate  training.  It  was  clear 
that  a  short  term  of  training  could  at  the 
most  produce  external  results;  it  could  not 
effect  the  inward  transformation  of  the  man 
into  the  soldier.  Clausewitz  speaks  to  the 
same  effect  when  he  says:'  "Physical  exer- 
tions must  be  practised  less  to  accustom  the 
body  to  them  than  the  mind." 

If  one  wishes  to  form  a  just  estimate  of 
the  efficiency  of  the  militia  as  it  existed  in 
the  form  of  the  Prussian  Landwehr  of  that 

'  Vam  Kriege,  I.  Buch,  8  Kap. 


102     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

time,  it  ought  in  the  first  place  to  be  remem- 
bered that  the  enemy  forces  to  which  it  was 
opposed  were  themselves  of  very  inferior 
worth.  Subsequently,  in  the  course  of  the 
long  war,  and  under  the  influence  of  increas- 
ing success,  the  Landwehr  rose  more  and 
more  to  the  level  of  the  regular  troops,  and 
in  1 8 15  could  scarcely  be  distinguished  from 
the  latter,  with  the  exception  of  the  regi- 
ments drawn  from  the  new  western  pro- 
vinces, which  were  composed  for  the  most 
part  of  former  soldiers  of  Napoleon. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    PRUSSIAN    ARMY    IN    THE    NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 

The  Peace  Years  from  1814  to  1859 

Universal  military  service,  which  origi- 
nated in  18 13  out  of  the  need  of  the  moment, 
and  was  at  first  intended  to  last  only  for  the 
duration  of  the  war,  was  made  a  permanent 
institution  by  the  law  of  September  3,  18 14, 
concerning  the  liability  for  military  service. 
At  the  same  time  the  Landwehr  also  was 
declared  to  be  a  permanent  institution. 
This  law,  together  with  the  order  of  the  21st 
of  November,  1815,  concerning  the  Land- 
wehr, henceforth  constituted  the  basis  of 
Prussia's  armed  strength.     Every  Prussian 

capable  of  bearing  arms  was  bound  to  serve 
1^3 


104     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

in  the  standing  army  from  the  age  of  20  up 
to  the  age  of  23,  in  the  reserve  from  the  age 
of  23  up  to  the  age  of  25,  in  the  first  levy  of 
the  Landwehr  from  the  age  of  25  up  to  the 
age  of  32,  in  the  second  levy  of  the  Land- 
wehr from  the  age  of  32  up  to  the  age  of  39. 
The  Landsturm  was  composed  of  all  those 
capable  of  bearing  arms  between  17  and  49 
years  of  age  who  were  not  included  either  in 
the  standing  army  or  the  Landwehr.  The 
privilege  of  the  one-year  voluntary  service 
was  subject  to  proof  of  a  certain  degree  of 
culture  and  the  condition  that  the  individ- 
ual should  bear  his  own  cost  of  mainten- 
ance. This  institution  took  the  place  of  the 
volunteer  Jager  detachments. 

The  organization  of  the  army,  in  the  shape 
which  it  assinned  after  the  first  and  second 
Peace  of  Paris,  was  the  work  of  General  von 
Boyen,  who  occupied  the  post  of  Minister 
of  War  from  June,  18 14.  He  made  it  his 
aim  to  effect  a  complete  separation  between 
the  standing  army  and  the  Landwehr,  so 


Or  a  Militia  ?  105 

that  they  should  to  a  certain  extent  exist 
as  two  armies  side  by  side.  Both,  however, 
were  to  be  equally  subject  to  the  generals 
in  command  in  their  district.  For  every 
regiment  of  the  standing  army,  there  were  to 
be  two  Landwehr  regiments.  By  this  means 
the  Minister  hoped  to  enable  the  coimtry,  in 
the  event  of  a  war,  to  acquit  itself  in  a 
manner  befitting  its  recovered  status  of  a 
Great  Power  and  its  recent  and  considerable 
increase  of  territory,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  adapt  himself  to  the  bad  state  of  the 
national  finances.  It  very  soon  appeared, 
however,  that  the  number  of  men  who  had 
been  through  the  school  of  the  standing 
army  and  had  passed  on  to  the  Landwehr, 
was  not  anything  like  sufficient  to  meet 
requirements,  more  particularly  since  about 
a  third  of  the  standing  army  was  composed 
of  soldiers  who  had  re-enlisted  or  had  pro- 
longed their  time  of  service.  Owing  to  the 
hard  times  and  the  difficulty  of  finding 
lucrative  employment,  military  service  was 


io6     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

regarded  by  many  as  a  tolerable  means  of 
gaining  a  livelihood,  and,  moreover,  the  old 
tradition  of  the  professional  soldiery  was  not 
yet  extinguished  even  among  the  common 
people.  Hence  it  arose  that,  as  the  years 
went  on,  a  constantly  increasing  number  of 
recruits  who  had  only  been  through  a  term 
of  service  of  a  few  weeks  were  put  into  the 
Landwehr  forthwith.  Consequently  the  in- 
fantry of  the  Landwehr  were  in  danger  of 
undergoing  a  constant  deterioration,  and  the 
cavalry  of  becoming  completely  worthless. 
At  the  same  time,  the  number  of  competent 
Landwehr  officers  was  considerably  dimin- 
ished. The  majority  of  those  among  them 
most  fitted  for  their  position  by  character 
and  inclination  had,  after  the  war,  received 
appointments  in  the  regular  army,  and 
though  the  Landwehr  still  possessed  a  num- 
ber of  officers  who  had  stood  the  test  of  war, 
the  younger  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers  had  not  received  a  sufficiently 
thorough  military  training. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  107 

In  the  great  manoeuvres  which  took  place 
at  the  Rhine,  in  the  autumn  of  the  year  18 19, 
before  King  Frederick  William  III,  these 
deficiencies  were  very  clearly  revealed,  and 
owing  to  this  fact  and  also  to  the  necessity 
of  effecting  further  economies  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  State  revenues,  it  was 
resolved  to  diminish  the  number  of  the 
Landwehr  troops.  Boyen's  theory,  that  the 
Landwehr  should  constitute  an  independent 
militia,  was  set  on  one  side.  The  General 
retired  from  the  position  of  Minister  of  War 
at  the  end  of  18 19,  and,  under  his  successor, 
General  von  Hacke,  32  battalions  and  as 
many  squadrons  of  the  Landwehr  were  dis- 
banded, so  that  henceforward,  for  every 
regiment  of  the  standing  army,  there  was 
one  Landwehr  regiment  of  the  same  size. 
Every  Landwehr  battalion  comprised,  as 
before,  one  squadron.  To  the  first  levy  of 
the  Landwehr  were  attached  in  time  of 
peace  weak  battalion-staffs  and  the  ser- 
geants-major of  the  companies,  correspond- 


io8     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

ing  to  our  present-day  Landwehr  district 
command ;  the  second  levy  of  the  Landwehr, 
which  was  destined  mainly  for  garrison 
duties,  was  provided  with  no  staffs  in  time 
of  peace.  Fifty-four  garrison  companies 
which  continued  to  exist  after  the  disband- 
ing of  the  garrison  battalions  in  the  year 
1820  were  to  serve  as  cadres  for  it  in  case 
of  war. 

The  hopes  which  had  been  placed  upon 
this  remodelling  of  the  army,  and  especially 
upon  the  closer  connection  of  the  Landwehr 
with  the  standing  army,  were  only  to  a  very 
small  extent  realized.  In  the  year  1830, 
when  it  became  necessary  to  assemble  troops 
for  the  protection  of  the  western  and,  more 
particularly,  the  eastern  frontiers,  serious 
deficiencies  were  revealed;  and  yet  it  had 
only  been  a  question  of  raising  four  army 
corps  under  Field-Marshal  Count  Gneisenau 
as  a  result  of  the  Polish  Revolution.  It  was 
unmistakably  revealed  that  the  war-pre- 
paredness of  the  army  had  not  been  ensured 


Or  a  Militia?  109 

to  such  an  extent  as  was  required  for  the 
pursuit  of  an  energetic  and  far-sighted  policy. 
In  order  to  place  the  regular  troops  of  the 
army  corps  upon  the  eastern  frontier  on  a 
war  footing,  it  was  necessary  to  have  re- 
course to  the  first  levy  of  the  Landwehr.  In 
the  west,  the  large  and  numerous  places  of 
arms  demanded  such  strong  garrisons  that 
the  possibility  of  forming  any  considerable 
army  for  purposes  of  operations  seemed  to 
be  excluded.  Since  the  year  1820  the  Land- 
wehr had  still  further  deteriorated  in  respect 
to  efficiency  for  purposes  of  war,  since,  from 
motives  of  economy,  simultaneously  with 
the  reduction  of  its  numbers,  the  supposed 
strengths  of  the  various  tinits  of  the  stand- 
ing army  had  also  been  reduced.  In  order, 
therefore,  to  guarantee  to  some  extent  the 
war  strength  of  the  Landwehr,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  a  smaller  number  of  battalions 
were  levied,  the  following  very  dubious 
measure  was  resorted  to:  Every  year,  a 
number  of  so-called  War  Reserve  recruits 


no     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

were  given  a  superficial  training  lasting  six 
weeks,  and  were  then  enrolled  in  the  reserve. 
These  men  and  numerous  so-called  Land- 
wehr  recruits,  who  had  only  done  from  four 
to  six  weeks'  service  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Landwehr  manoeuvres,  now  made  up  half 
of  the  first  levy  of  the  Landwehr.  Since 
the  meagre  financial  resources  of  the  State 
forbade  the  employment  of  the  most  effec- 
tual remedy  for  these  defects,  namely,  the 
formation  of  increased  cadres,  in  the  year 
1833  the  two  years'  term  of  service  was 
introduced  in  the  infantry,  in  order,  by 
increasing  the  total  number  of  recruits  every 
year  to  ensure  that  a  sufficient  number  of 
thoroughly  trained  men  should  be  available 
in  case  of  war.  It  was  expressly  stated  that 
this  was  to  be  only  a  temporary  measure. 
In  1852,  the  three  years'  term  of  service 
was  again  introduced. 

In  the  'forties  of  last  century,  no  intelli- 
gent person  could  any  longer  blind  himself 
to  the  fact  that,  although  the  population  had 


Or  a  Militia?  in 

almost  doubled  itself  since  the  year  1814, 
the  annual  enlistment  of  recruits  did  not 
amount  to  more  than  forty  thousand,  uni- 
versal military  service  was  a  mere  illusion. ' 
In  the  troubled  years  between  1848  and 
1850,  further  unpleasant  experiences  in 
connection  with  the  Landwehr  were  added 
to  those  of  previous  occurrence.  Above  all, 
the  officers'  corps  left  much  to  be  desired. 
At  that  time,  there  was  no  such  thorough 
and  systematic  training  of  the  officers  of  the 
Landwehr  as  exists  in  the  case  of  our  present- 
day  officers  of  the  retired  class;  hence  the 
bulk  of  the  officers  of  the  Landwehr  lacked 
any  experience  of  service.  As  a  result  of  this 
circumstance  and  of  the  defective  training 
of  the  men,  the  Landwehr  proved  itself 
imfitted  for  immediate  employment  in  the 
field.  Only  by  detaching  to  it  numerous 
officers  of  the  standing  army  was  it  foimd 


•  Courbiere,  Die  Preussische  Landwehr  in  ihrer  Enlwicklung 
von  18 1 5  bis  zier  Reorganisation  von  185Q.  Berlin,  1867.  E.  S. 
Mittler  und  Sohn. 


112     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

possible  to  give  it  the  necessary  firmness. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  view  of  the  weakness 
of  the  standing  army,  the  co-operation  of 
the  Landwehr  in  the  fighting  in  the  pro- 
vince of  Posen,  in  Schleswig,  and  in  Baden 
could  not  be  dispensed  with.  How  little  the 
army,  as  a  result  of  its  constitution  at  that 
time,  was  really  efficient  for  purposes  of  war 
was  inevitably  and  unmistakably  revealed 
when  the  mobilization  of  the  whole  army  in 
the  year  1850  for  the  first  time  put  to  a 
serious  test  the  military  organization  which 
had  existed  since  the  year  18 14. 

One  consequence  of  the  experience  gained 
at  that  time  was  that,  in  order,  in  case  of 
mobilization,  to  be  able  to  fill  at  least  half 
the  positions  of  commanders  of  the  com- 
panies and  squadrons  of  the  Landwehr  with 
captains  and  cavalry  captains  of  the  active 
army,  in  the  year  1852  the  number  of  these 
officers  with  the  regular  troops  was  corre- 
spondingly increased  in  time  of  peace.  At 
the    same    time    it    was    endeavoured    to 


Or  a  Militia?  113 

establish  a  closer  connection  between  the 
regular  troops  and  the  Landwehr  by  arrang- 
ing that  henceforward  every  line  regiment 
should  be  permanently  brigaded  even  in 
peace  time  with  the  Landwehr  regiment  of 
the  corresponding  number.  Consequently, 
the  divisions  included  two  and  the  army 
corps  four  of  these  mixed  brigades.  The 
skeleton  corps  of  the  Landwehr  cavalry 
regiments  were  brought  into  intimate  asso- 
ciation with  the  regular  cavalry  regiments. 
Further,  the  three  years'  term  service  was 
restored  in  the  infantry.  These  measures, 
though  good  in  themselves,  could  at  the 
most  effect  a  trifling  amelioration,  but  by  no 
means  a  complete  removal,  of  the  existing 
evils.  Such  a  removal  only  ensued  as  a 
result  of  the  reorganization  of  the  year  1859. 

The  Reorganization  of  1859 

Beginning  from  the  mobilization  of  the 
year  1859,  the  Prince  of  Prussia,  as  regent, 


114     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

organized  the  army  upon  a  new  system 
based  upon  a  new  law  with  respect  to  the 
liabiHty  to  military  service.  Thereby  he 
forged  the  tool  with  the  aid  of  which  he 
established  Prussia  in  her  rightful  position 
as  a  Power. 

By  the  reorganization  of  1859,  the  first 
levy  of  the  Landwehr  was  completely  sepa- 
rated from  the  field  army  proper,  and 
was  destined  to  be  employed  in  war  only 
for  tasks  of  secondary  importance.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  infantry  regiments  of  the 
standing  army  were  almost  doubled,  and 
the  other  arms  were  considerably  strength- 
ened. The  term  of  service  with  the 
colours  was  fixed  at  three  years,  that  with 
the  reserve  was  increased  from  two  to  four 
years;  service  in  the  Landwehr  was  reduced 
from  fourteen  to  nine  years,  four  with  the 
first  and  five  with  the  second  levy.  Only 
in  the  case  of  necessity  was  the  latter  to 
be  utilized  for  garrison  purposes,  for  which 
alone  it  had  been  originally  destined;  since 


Or  a  Militia?  115 

now  the  first  levy  was  to  a  large  extent 
available  for  these  duties.  These  measures 
improved  the  war-preparedness  of  the  army 
very  considerably,  and  they  were  of  the 
more  importance,  since  railways  had  re- 
cently become  an  important  instrument  of 
war,  and  by  their  aid,  mobilization  and 
transport  were  effected  so  rapidly  that  only 
troops  permanently  in  readiness  could  meet 
the  requirements  of  the  chief  command. 

The  Prusso-German  Army  down  to  the 
Present  Day 

The  army  thus  remodelled  on  the  basis  of 
universal  military  service  proved  in  1866 
its  intrinsic  superiority  both  to  the  Austrian 
Army  and  to  the  South  German  contingents. 
The  striking  success  of  Prussian  arms 
rendered  everywhere  apparent  the  advan- 
tages of  universal  military  service.  The 
fact  that  its  influence  in  Saxony  and  in  the 
South  German  contingents  was  revealed  so 
promptly  was  due  to  the  circumstance  that 


ii6     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  existing  conditions  in  these  districts 
were  very  favourable  to  it.  As  a  result  of 
that  highly  developed  sense  of  duty  com- 
mon to  all  the  German  races,  in  combination 
with  the  example  furnished  by  the  Prussian 
Army,  the  German  Army  was  already  in 
1870  welded  together  by  a  strong  sense  of 
unity.  After  the  victorious  war  of  1870-71 
and  the  foimdation  of  the  German  Empire, 
the  Prussian  army  legislation  was,  under 
the  constitution,  extended  to  the  German 
Empire. 

In  the  year  1874,  the  "  Ersatzreserve, " 
consisting  of  two  classes,  was  formed  out 
of  (a)  those  fit  for  service  with  high  ex- 
emption numbers;  (b)  those  exempted  from 
service  on  account  of  domestic  circum- 
stances; (c)  those  temporarily  unfit  for 
service;  (d)  those  suffering  from  minor 
physical  defects.  The  first  class,  embracing 
five  annual  levies  of  the  above,  was  to  serve, 
in  case  of  mobilization,  for  the  reinforcement 
of  the  army  and  the  formation  of  reserve 


Or  a  Militia?  117 

troops.  The  members  of  the  second  class 
belonged  to  the  "  Ersatzreserve "  up  to  the 
age  of  thirty-one,  when  they  were  transferred 
to  the  Landsturm.  The  second  class  was 
not  obliged  to  attend  manoeuvres,  whereas 
the  first  class  might  be  called  upon  in  time 
of  peace  to  attend  four  manoeuvres,  two  of 
ten  weeks'  and  four  weeks'  duration  respec- 
tively, and  two  of  two  weeks'  duration  each. 
Unfortunately,  in  the  year  1893,  when  the 
two  years'  term  of  service  was  introduced, 
this  obligation  to  attend  manoeuvres  was 
allowed  to  lapse  in  the  case  of  all  arms  ex- 
cept the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery.  In  the 
year  1888  the  second  levy  of  the  Landwehr 
was  revived,  and  the  liability  to  service  in 
the  Landsturm  was  extended  from  forty- 
two  to  forty -five  years  of  age. 

Not  only  had  the  increased  armaments 
of  France  and  Russia  rendered  it  necessary, 
during  the  years  preceding  the  World  War, 
to  add  continuously  to  Germany's  army 
burdens,  but  also  the  political  situation  was 


ii8     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

such  as  to  demand  a  still  further  strengthen- 
ing of  our  armed  force.  It  is  true  that  the 
peace  strength  of  the  German  Army  had, 
since  the  year  1874,  been  increased  by  about 
350,000  men;  nevertheless  we  were  on  the 
point  of  being  outstripped  by  France,  with 
her  population  of  about  27,000,000  less 
than  ours.  Already  the  situation  was  similar 
to  that  which  existed  in  Prussia  before  the 
reorganization  of  1859;  seeing  our  popula- 
tion was  nearly  67,000,000,  the  liability 
to  military  service  could  no  longer  be  de- 
scribed as  universal;  the  high  moral  value 
of  universal  service  was  in  danger  of  being 
lost  once  again.  Hence  the  Army  Bill  of 
19 1 3  proposed  to  extend  the  obligation  to 
military  service  in  accordance  with  the  size 
of  the  population  by  increasing  the  annual 
enlistment  of  recruits  by  63,000  men.  In 
order  to  cover  the  cost,  an  army  contribu- 
tion of  a  milliard  marks  was  levied. 

The  putting  into  execution  of  the  army- 
increase  voted  in  19 13  was  interrupted  by 


Or  a  Militia  ?  1 19 

the  outbreak  of  the  World  War.  The 
crowds  of  war  volunteers  who  thronged  to 
the  colours  in  August,  19 14,  and  the  huge 
augmentation  which  our  army  underwent 
in  the  coiirse  of  the  war,  afford  convincing 
proof  how  large  a  proportion  of  our  national 
strength  had  not  been  utilized  in  time  of 
peace  with  a  view  to  future  wars. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE     OPPOSITION     TO     STANDING     ARMIES     IN 

GERMANY  DURING  THE  NINETEENTH 

CENTURY 

The  Opposition  to  the  Army 
Reorganization  of  1859  in  Prussia 

The  reorganization  of  the  Prussian  Army 
was,  as  we  know,  accomplished  only  after 
a  prolonged  and  bitter  struggle  with  the 
national  assembly,  which  was  several  times 
dissolved.  In  spite  of  its  opposition.  King 
William,  supported  by  Bismarck  and  Roon, 
insisted  on  that  remodelling  of  the  army 
which  he  recognized  to  be  necessary.  "At 
the  present  day,"  wrote  Heinrich  von  Sybel' 
in    1889,    "unanimous   appreciation   is   ac- 

^  Die  Begriindung   des  Deulschen  Reiches  durch  Wilhelm  7, 

ii-,  375. 

120 


A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms      121 

corded  to  the  work  of  King  William,  without 
which  the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire 
would  have  remained  a  mere  illusion.  At 
that  time,  however,  it  was  not  so."  The 
remodelling  of  the  army  organization  was 
regarded  as  a  slight  upon  the  Landwehr, 
"  that  splendid  product  of  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion, the  genuine  embodiment  of  the  people 
in  the  army."  The  delegate  of  the  com- 
mission for  considering  the  Army  Bill,  Major- 
General  Stavenhagen,  a  retired  officer, 
agreed,  in  i860,  to  an  augmentation  of  the 
levy  of  recruits  by  63,000  men;  and  he 
raised  no  objection  to  the  increase  of  the 
regular  regiments.  But  he,  too,  denounced 
the  separating  of  the  standing  army  and  the 
Landwehr  "as  an  insult  to  the  latter,  and 
an  abandonment  of  the  most  sacred  tradi- 
tions of  the  Prussian  nation." 

The  reasons  why  it  was  from  the  outset 
impossible  that  the  achievements  of  the 
Landwehr  in  the  War  of  Liberation  should 
have  been  equal  to  those  of  the  regular 


122     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

troops  have  already  been  explained ;  but  the 
fact  has  no  less  been  emphasized  that  they 
did  frequently  break  down.  If,  in  spite  of 
this,  a  large  proportion  of  the  cultivated 
classes  gave  the  Landwehr  the  chief  credit 
for  the  work  of  liberation,  this  must  be 
mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  bulk  of 
humanity  concern  themselves  with  the  ex- 
ternal aspect  of  historical  events  and  do  not 
seek  for  their  deeper  causes.  The  old  Prus- 
sian Army  had  been  defeated ;  the  new  army, 
an  improvisation,  largely  interspersed  with 
imtrained  Landwehr  troops,  had  conquered. 
By  the  majority  this  was  accounted  suffi- 
cient proof  that  it  was  mainly  the  addition 
of  the  popular  element  that  had  secured 
the  victory.  "For  the  language  of  sound 
human  reason,"  writes  Treitschke,'  "the 
crabbed  party  spirit  of  the  liberals  had  no 
ear.  The  phrase  'Freischar'  (free  army) 
sounded  as  seductively  to  them  as  the 
phrase  'Freistaat'   (free  state).     Those  in- 

'  Deutsche  Geschichte,  ii. 


Or  a  Militia?  123 

significant  Prussian  volunteer  corps  were 
compared  with  the  Spanish  guerillas,  and 
the  'sacred  bands'  were  regarded  as  the 
true  authors  of  Napoleon's  downfall." 
Moreover  the  officers  of  the  Landwehr  con- 
tributed something  to  the  spread  of  this 
notion.  Had  they  not  held  their  own  in 
the  field  equally  with  their  comrades 
of  the  active  army?  They  were  intoxi- 
cated by  military  exploits,  which  the 
latter  regarded  simply  as  the  performance 
of  their  duty,  and  they  were  inclined  to 
look  down  on  the  professional  officer,  who 
was  usually  their  inferior  in  respect  of 
education,  and  was  now,  in  time  of  peace, 
toiling  away  at  the  tricks  of  the  barrack 
square. 

Yet  any  one  who,  like  Theodore  von 
Bemhardi,  had  preserved  an  impartial  judg- 
ment on  matters  of  military  history  was 
brought  to  quite  a  different  conclusion.  In 
an  essa}^  written  in  the  year  1 860, '  he  sounds 

'  Leipzig.     S.  Hirzel. 


124     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

an  impressive  warning  against  expecting 
too  much  from  the  nobler,  more  idealistic  im- 
pulses of  himianity,  which  may  exercise  valu- 
able influence  at  moments  of  enthusiasm, 
but  should  not  be  reckoned  upon  as  a  con- 
stant factor  in  connection  with  permanent 
institutions.  He  contests  the  traditional 
theory  concerning  the  decisive  importance 
of  the  Landwehr  in  the  War  of  Liberation. 
"The  nation  in  arms,"  he  writes,  "consti- 
tutes the  Prussian  Army.  The  standing 
army  is  the  military  training  school  for  the 
whole  male  youth  of  the  nation;  but  it  is 
not  merely  that;  it  is  far  more.  It  is  the 
strong  framework,  well  prepared  in  advance, 
into  which,  should  war  call  our  colours  into 
the  field,  the  armed  youth  of  the  nation  is 
to  be  inserted.  ...  It  seems  really  neces- 
sary to  recall  these  things  to  the  memory, 
because  it  is  quite  a  common  thing  to  hear 
people  talk  as  though  a  quite  vaguely  con- 
ceived and  formless  crowd  of  men  who  have 
been  drilled  at  some  time  or  other  and  for 


Or  a  Militia?  125 

some  period  or  other  of  their  lives,  could  be 
transformed  forthwith  into  an  army." 

Advocates  of  a  Militia 

This  strange  theory  did  not  take  shape 
gradually  during  the  long  years  of  peace; 
it  made  its  appearance  directly  after — and 
even  during  the  actual  course  of — the  Wars 
of  Liberation.  It  was  derived  from  the 
French  Revolution  and  its  intellectual  fore- 
runners. By  the  German  doctrinaires  also 
the  people  in  arms  was  deemed  the  ideal 
foundation  for  the  army.  The  issue  of  the 
war,  for  which  the  blunders  of  the  Coalition 
were  in  fact  responsible,  appeared  to  them  a 
proof  that  cowardly  mercenaries  were  power- 
less when  opposed  to  the  heroic  champions 
of  freedom.  Hardly  had  the  allied  armies, 
in  1 8 14,  shattered  the  power  of  Napoleon 
in  France,  when  the  Rheinische  Merkur 
laimched  the  most  virulent  abuse  against 
standing  armies,  despite  the  fact  that  it  was 


126     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  standing  armies  who  had  just  led  the 
march  into  Paris.  "Henceforth  the  only 
standing  army  must  be  the  chivahy  of  the 
nation,  all  those  who  feel  within  themselves 
the  courage,  the  strength,  and  the  vocation 
to  serve  their  country  as  a  shield  for  defence 
and  a  sword  for  attack,  all  those  who  have 
been  vouchsafed  the  gift  of  vigorous  and 
manly  strength.  This  army  must  be  the 
supreme  school  of  military  art,  the  strong- 
hold and  refuge  of  the  people,  the  defender 
and  the  crowning  glory  of  their  prince."' 

In  a  pamphlet  dated  1814,  Professor  Fries, 
of  Heidelberg,  appealed  for  "an  arming  of 
the  people  in  place  of  the  old,  mendicant 
system."  "Rid  yourselves,"  he  exclaims, 
"of  the  burden  of  the  standing  armies. 
Their  maintenance  has  been  a  needless  drain 
upon  the  finances  of  the  State."  He  looked 
upon  the  standing  armies  merely  as  schools 

'  This  and  the  following  are  quoted  from  Pinkow.  Der 
Literarische  und  Parlamentarische  Kampf  gegen  die  Institution 
des  stehenden  Heeres  in  Deutschland  iji  der  ersten  Hdlfte  des  19 
Jakrhunderts.     Inaugural-Dissertation.     BerHn,  1912. 


Or  a  Militia?  127 

of  immorality,  though  he  made  an  exception 
in  favour  of  the  engineers  and  artillery,  in 
whose  case  art  and  science  were  cultivated 
even  in  time  of  peace. 

Welcker,  of  Giessen,  demanded  that  "the 
standing  army,  that  moral  and  physical 
curse  of  nations,  should  give  place  almost 
entirely  to  the  freedom-and-life-breath- 
ing  force  of  the  Landwehr."  The  journal 
Nemesis  described  standing  armies  in  18 15 
as  "a  burden  on  the  States." 

Of  far  greater  importance  than  these 
random  effusions  was  the  attitude  taken 
by  Professor  Karl  von  Rotteck,  of  Freiburg. 
The  esteem  which  he  enjoyed  in  middle- 
class  circles  was  considerable.  It  was  based 
on  his  History  of  the  World,  which  began  to 
appear  in  the  year  18 12,  a  book,  as  Treit- 
schke  says, '  full  of  self-complacent  trivial- 
ity, "betraying  complete  ignorance  of  the 
necessary  development  of  historical  events. 
Rotteck    exhibits    at     once     that     barren 

'  Deutsche  Ceschichte,  ii. 


128     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

rationalism  which  characterized  the  his- 
torical writers  of  the  preceding  century  and 
that  violent  party  feeling  which  marked  the 
new  epoch.  He  viewed  the  State  on  prin- 
ciple only  from  below,  with  the  eyes  of  the 
governed — it  was  indeed  the  only  aspect  in 
which  he  knew  it.  It  never  occurred  to  him 
to  question  what  aspect  human  affairs 
might  wear  when  looked  at  from  above,  or 
what  ideas  might  determine  the  conduct  of 
the  ruling  classes,  and  what  obstacles  they 
might  have  to  overcome.    .  .  . 

' '  The  whole  bitterness  of  liberalism  found 
vent  in  a  work  by  Rotteck  published  in 
1816  and  entitled  Concerning  Standing 
Armies  and  National  Militia  ('Ueber  ste- 
hende  Heere  und  Nationalmiliz').  What 
a  contrast  to  Riihle  von  Liliemstem's 
patriotic  book  On  War  ('Vom  Kriege')! 
The  Prussian  officer  considered  with  states- 
manlike moderation  how  the  armies  might 
be  nationalized  and  the  nations  militarized; 
Rotteck,  the  partisan,  presents  us  immedi- 


Or  a  Militia  ?  t2g 

ately  with  his  radical  alternative:  Do  we 
intend,  he  says,  to  convert  the  nation  into 
an  army  or  to  convert  the  soldiers  into 
citizens?  That,  he  declares,  is  the  great 
question  at  this  critical  hour!  He  attacks 
the  Prussian  Army  Law  with  fanatical  fury, 
and,  scarcely  a  year  after  the  regular  army 
and  the  Landwehr  had  co-operated  so  glori- 
ously at  Belle  Alliance,  he  has  the  effrontery 
to  assert:  'Any  State  which  relies  upon  a 
standing  army  as  its  source  of  strength, 
will  inevitably  cease  to  maintain  a  power- 
ful Landwehr.'  He  describes  the  standing 
army  as  the  pillar  of  despotism.  He  main- 
tains : '  If  all  the  youth  of  a  nation  are  called 
to  the  army,  then  the  whole  people  will  be 
infected  with  the  sentiments  of  the  hireling.' 
Finally,  he  bluntly  demands  that  the  stand- 
ing armies  shall  be  abolished,  and  that  in 
peace  time  only  a  small  hired  force  shall  be 
maintained,  while  the  Landwehr  is  to  receive 
a  meagre  training  of  a  few  weeks'  duration. 
While  indulging  in  this  radical  claptrap,  he 


130     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

at  the  same  time  demands,  with  ingenuous 
egotism,  that  the  system  of  substitution 
shall  be  introduced  into  his  Landwehr. 
Whole  classes — and  students  in  particular — 
are  to  be  exempted  from  service." 

Even  in  Prussia  opinions  were  divided 
in  regard  to  the  Army  Law  of  1814.  Treit- 
schke  writes'  in  regard  to  this:  "Even 
the  high  officials  had  been  by  no  means 
completely  convinced  by  Boyen's  eloquence. 
Biilow  and  Beyme  openly  advocated  a  re- 
version to  the  old  army  organization,  and 
others,  without  distinction  of  party,  brought 
forward  ingenuous  schemes  with  a  view  to 
the  relief  of  the  upper  classes.  Schuckmann 
thought  that  there  could  be  no  question 
that  a  young  man  of  education  might  be 
trained  to  be  an  efficient  infantry  soldier  in 
six  weeks  at  the  outside.  Solms-Laubach 
recommended  that  the  students  of  Bonn 
and  Diisseldorf  should  merely  be  called 
upon  to  attend  occasional  drills  on  Simdays. 

« Loc.  cit. 


Or  a  Militia?  131 

Schon  looked  down  with  philosophic  dis- 
dain upon  the  parade-ground  tricks  of  the 
craftsmen  of  war.    He  proposed  that  all  the 
officers  of  the  Landwehr,  up  to  the  colonels, 
should  be  elected  by  the  provincial  diets, 
and  he  considered  that  three  days'  training 
a  year  was  quite  sufficient  military  educa- 
tion for  a  volimteer.    From  this  it  may  be 
seen  to  what  an  extent  even  the  statesmen 
of  that  time  had  become  infected  with  that 
contempt  for  a  rigorous  military  training 
which  breathes  from  the  pages  of  Rotteck's 
works.    Of  the  notable  publicists  of  Prussia, 
scarcely  one  showed  any  imderstanding  of 
the  indispensable  conditions  for  an  efficient 
army  organization.    Even  the  shrewd  Rhen- 
ish   patriot,    Benzenberg,    writing    to    his 
patron  Gneisenau,  remarked  casually  that 
the  nation  had  discovered  at  Belle  Alliance 
how  imnecessary  was  all  the  torture  of  the 
barrack  square.    Amdt  proposed  in  time  of 
peace  to  make  shift  as  far  as  possible  with 
merely   a   permanent   General    Staff;   the 


132     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Landwehr  would  do  the  rest.  The  no  less 
patriotic  author  of  the  widely  read  work 
Preussen  iiher  alles  wenn  es  will  ('Prussia 
over  all,  if  she  will')  also  maintained  in  1817 
that  a  standing  army  was  superfluous;  he 
thought  that  a  Landwehr  maintained  by  the 
parishes  would  meet  all  the  requirements. 
The  particularists  also,  who  were  enthusi- 
astically in  favour  of  the  allotment  of  the 
taxes,  tried  to  exploit  the  national  army  for 
their  purposes,  and  recommended  the  for- 
mation of  ten  independent  Landwehr  corps 
under  the  control  of  the  provincial  diets." 

If  even  in  Prussia,  with  her  proud  mem- 
ories of  the  War  of  Liberation,  where  it 
ought  to  have  been  clear  to  every  man  of 
ordinary  intelligence  that  the  very  life  of 
the  State  depended  on  the  maintenance  of  a 
strong  army,  such  views  could  find  adher- 
ents, it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  in 
South  Germany  they  fell  upon  fruitful  soil. 
The  paltry  army  administration  of  the  Bund, 
and  the  insignificance  of  the  standing  con- 


Or  a  Militia?  133 

tingents  of  troops,  did  not  favour  the  de- 
velopment of  a  sound,  soldierly  point  of 
view.  In  the  blissful  interval  of  peace  even 
the  Landwehr  organization  degenerated, 
and  the  theory  gained  ground  more  and 
more  that  expenditure  for  military  purposes 
was  not  worth  while.  The  influence  of  this 
theory  persisted  for  a  long  time.  The  v 
democratic  leaning  of  the  Chambers  was 
always  opposed  to  the  sound  development 
of  the  military  organization  in  the  South 
German  States.  There,  as  in  Austria,  the 
cultured  and  well-to-do  classes  could  escape 
the  liability  to  service.  From  motives  of 
economy,  the  term  of  service  with  the 
colours  had  been  reduced  to  little  more  than 
a  year  for  the  infantry;  only  in  the  case  of 
the  cavalry  and  the  artillery  was  it  rather 
longer.  The  weakness  of  the  peace  cadres 
rendered  a  really  thorough  military  training 
out  of  the  question.  No  great  manoeuvres 
were  held.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
army,  with  which  South  Germany  encoun- 


134     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

tered  Prussia  in  1866,  was  wholly  inade- 
quate. Since  the  Prussian  command  was 
well  aware  of  this  fact,  the  main  army  at 
that  time  was  allowed  to  remain  compara- 
tively weak,  thus  making  it  possible  to  con- 
centrate all  the  greater  strength  upon  the 
decisive  theatre  of  war  in  Bohemia. 

In  Prussia  those  misguided  theories  con- 
cerning the  military  organization,  which  we 
encoimter  directly  after  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion, gained  currency  once  again  owing  to 
the  general  sense  of  disillusionment  which 
marked  the  first  years  of  peace.  That  ill- 
humour  engendered  by  the  current  of 
reaction,  and  nourished  by  the  persecutions 
of  the  demagogues,  contributed  not  a  little 
to  cloud  men's  judgment  in  regard  to  the 
army.  Further,  this  hostility  to  the  army 
became  more  pronounced  as  a  result  of 
the  tendency  in  the  direction  of  review 
tactics  which  had  foimd  its  way  into  the 
army  owing  to  the  marked  predominance  of 
barrack-square  drill.    This  tendency  was  by 


Or  a  Militia?  135 

no  means,  as  has  generally  been  supposed,  of 
old  Prussian  origin;  it  was  a  result  of  the 
intimate  association  with  the  Russian  troops, 
with  whom  it  had  been  an  established  cus- 
tom since  the  time  of  the  Tsar  Paul.  In  the 
manoeuvres  the  warlike  gave  place  more  and 
more  to  the  spectacular.  These  aberrations 
in  the  training  of  the  Prussian  Army  at  that 
time  furnished  the  democrats  with  a  pretext 
for  declaring  that  training  by  means  of  drill 
was  altogether  harmful  and  unnecessary. 
They  were  blind  to  the  fact  that,  as  a  means 
to  an  end,  as  the  foundation  of  discipline, 
it  was  as  indispensable  then  as  it  is  now. 
Schiller's  words,  "The  soldier  must  be  con- 
scious of  his  own  worth,"  had  no  meaning 
for  them.  The  army  gradually  rid  itself 
of  this  dangerous  tendency  to  ceremonial, 
a  result  the  credit  for  which  is  chiefly  due 
to  Prince  Frederick  Paul,  whose  inspiring 
influence  made  itself  felt  in  the  'fifties  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  He  made  it  his 
aim  above  all  to  develop  the  full  manly 


136     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

worth  of  every  individual  soldier  for  mili- 
tary purposes,  though  at  the  same  time 
insisting  upon  the  necessity  of  a  certain 
stiffness  of  bearing,  for,  as  he  said,  the  out- 
ward appearance  of  the  troop  should  be 
*' proud  and  distinguished."  At  this  time 
there  was  bom  in  the  Prussian  Army  the 
spirit  which  helped  to  bring  about  the 
achievements  of  1864,  1866,  and  1870-71. 
It  is  true  that,  at  the  beginning  of  the  last 
century,  the  zealous  opponents  of  standing 
armies  were  to  a  certain  extent  justified  if 
they  based  their  objections  upon  the  preva- 
lence of  barrack-square  drill  in  Prussia, 
but  they  judged  what  was  merely  a  regretta- 
ble by-product  as  though  it  were  the  thing 
itself. 

The  July  Revolution  of  1830  had  given 
fresh  encouragement  to  the  theories  of  a 
militia  army,  and  finally,  about  the  year 
1848,  these  theories  came  conspicuously  to 
the  front.  The  troubled  condition  of  the 
time   produced   the   most   amazing   fruits. 


Or  a  Militia?  137 

"Behind  all  the  chaos  of  words,  it  is  possible 
to  trace  the  desire  for  an  armed  force  which 
should  be  in  all  respects  adequate,  and  at 
the  same  time  to  perceive  the  incompetence 
of  the  army  administration  of  the  Bund. 
In  consequence  of  the  dangers  threatening 
upon  all  sides,  and  the  military  preparations 
of  the  neighbouring  states,  the  demand  for 
a  strengthening  of  the  armed  force  became 
more  and  more  insistent.  It  was  proposed 
that  the  whole  nation  should  be  armed,  and 
it  was  suggested  that,  by  a  reduction  of  the 
standing  troops  and  the  institution  oi  an 
armed  nation  (though  the  latter  was  only 
to  be  assembled  in  case  of  need),  economies 
might  be  effected,  more  especially  in  regard 
to  the  officers'  corps,  since  almost  all  the  pro- 
posals put  forward  provided  for  a  diminu- 
tion of  the  latter  and  a  partial  replacement 
by  volunteer  officers.  It  was  believed  that 
the  nation  itself  could  furnish  a  means  of 
defence  at  once  cheaper  and  more  effectual. 
The  military  spirit  was  to  be  replaced  by 


138     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

enthusiasm ;  everyone  was  to  bear  arms,  but 
only  for  quite  a  short  period — six  months 
at  the  most.  The  army  was  to  be  made  up 
of  the  whole  mass  of  the  people.  The 
commanders  were  to  be  chosen  by  those 
whom  they  were  to  command.  The  citizen 
army  was  the  ideal." '  This  assertion  of  the 
right  to  choose  the  officers  is  constantly 
repeated,  and  is  sometimes  even  extended 
to  cover  the  Commander-in-Chief.  The 
officers  were  to  be  elected  by  the  whole  mass 
of  those  whom  they  were  destined  to  com- 
mand, upon  the  suggestions  of  trusted  repre- 
sentatives of  the  men.  Moreover  every 
imit,  even  the  smallest,  was  to  be  self-govern- 
ing. We  may  perceive  here  a  foreshadowing 
of  the  soldiers'  committees  of  the  recent 
Russian  Revolution  with  their  far-reaching 
prerogatives. 

The  same  demands  which  were  put  for- 
ward in  pamphlets  and  in  the  Press  also 
make  their  appearance  in  the  deliberations 

»  Pinkow,  loc.  cit.,  pp.  71-2. 


Or  a  Militia?  139 

of  the  Frankfort  Parliament.  The  abolition 
of  the  standing  army  was  demanded  by  the 
Left  of  the  House  in  resounding  phrases, 
which,  however,  betrayed  a  complete  ignor- 
ance of  the  factors  which  control  inter- 
national relations  as  well  as  of  what  was 
actually  feasible  under  the  existing  circum- 
stances. The  extent  of  this  mental  con- 
fusion may  be  gathered  from  a  speech  of 
Robert  Blum.  He  recommended  that  we 
should  not  summarily  reject  the  hand  held 
out  to  us  by  our  western  neighbour,  and  he 
continued:  "You  will  perhaps  reply  that, 
at  the  very  moment  when  the  French  were 
assuring  us  of  their  brotherly  sentiments, 
three  hundred  battalions  of  mobile  national 
guard  had  been  formed,  which  stood  armed 
and  ready  to  take  the  field  at  any  moment. 
.  .  .  Go  to  them!  Ask  them  upon  what 
terms  they  propose  to  offer  us  the  hand  of 
brotherhood!  Offer  them  your  hand!  By 
so  doing  you  will  disperse  the  three  hundred 
battalions,  and  you  will  free  the  neighbour- 


140     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

state  from  the  heavy  burden  of  their  main- 
tenance." '  Who  can  fail  to  be  reminded  by 
this  of  many  recent  proposals? 

In  vain  did  General  von  Radowitz  insist 
at  Frankfort  that  armed  men  were  not 
armies ;  in  vain  did  he  warn  the  advocates  of 
a  militia  army  against  generalizing  from  the 
examples  of  La  Vendee,  Spain,  and  the  Tyrol, 
and  applying  these  to  warfare  on  a  large 
scale.  The  General  laid  stress  upon  the 
special  circumstances  which  had  accom- 
panied these  popular  risings.  It  seems  not 
out  of  place  to  give  a  brief  summary  of  them 
here. 

'  Loc.  cit.,  p.  88. 


CHAPTER  VII 

popular  risings 

La  Vendee 

The  revolt  of  La  Vendee  broke  out  in 
1793,  when  the  Convention,  by  the  leuee 
en  masse, '  began  to  enforce  miHtary  service 
upon  the  youth  of  the  country.  Prior  to 
this,  the  measures  taken  against  the  clergy 
and  the  execution  of  Louis  XIV  had  already 
roused  the  greatest  excitement  among  the 
Vendeans,  who  were  thoroughly  loyal  to 
their  king.  If  they  succeeded  in  prolonging 
their  resistance  up  to  the  beginning  of  the 
year  1796,  it  ought  to  be  remembered  that 
the  first  rising  only  encountered  very  insig- 
nificant republican  garrisons,  and  that  of 
the  armies  of  the  Republic,  which  were  in 

'  See  p.  64. 

141 


142      A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

any  case  very  effective,  for  a  long  time  only 
second-rate  troops  were  employed  against 
La  Vendee.  These  divisions  proved  to  be 
badly  trained,  lacking  in  mobility,  and,  until 
Hoche  took  the  command  in  the  year  1795, 
badly  led.  Also,  the  scene  of  the  conflict 
was  very  much  to  the  advantage  of  the 
rebels.  The  undulating  hill-country,  with 
its  network  of  hedges  and  its  numerous 
scattered  farms  and  woods,  was  particularly 
favourable  for  mob-warfare.  Commanded 
by  energetic  men,  the  Vendeans,  who  for  a 
time  could  reckon  as  many  as  40,000  armed 
men  in  the  field,  occasionally  even  took  the 
offensive,  but  they  were  never  able  to  main- 
tain for  long  the  advantages  they  had 
gained.  The  peasants  dispersed  after  every 
victory,  and  there  was  no  co-operation  be- 
tween their  leaders.  Hence  this  stronghold 
of  royalism  was  compelled  finally  to  suc- 
ctimb  to  superior  numbers,  and  all  the  sacri- 
fices of  the  civil  war  which  had  been  waged 
with  so  much  bitterness  were  in  vain. 


Or  a  Militia?  143 

The  Spanish  Revolt  against   Napoleon 

The  long  and  successful  resistance  of 
Spain  to  Napoleon  was  only  rendered 
possible  by  the  fact  that  the  disorderly 
troops  of  the  Spanish  militia  were  strongly 
reinforced  by  an  English  army,  which, 
though  small,  was  not  only  brave,  but  also" 
employed  with  very  skilful  generalship  by 
Wellington.  The  Spanish  did,  to  be  sure, 
even  before  they  received  the  assistance  of 
the  English  troops,  achieve  one  isolated 
success  of  some  importance,  comparable 
with  that  of  the  Americans  at  Saratoga, ' 
but  even  here  the  attendant  circumstances 
have  to  be  borne  in  mind.  At  Baylen,  in 
the  Sierra  Morena,  on  the  226.  of  July,  1808, 
General  Dupont,  with  a  force  of  8290 
famished  and  exhausted  men,  who  had 
suffered  severely  from  the  burning  heat 
and  lack  of  water,  surrendered  to  a  far 
superior   force   of   the   Spanish   insurgents, 

'  See  p.  56. 


144     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

which  had  surrounded  him.  Dupont  was 
guilty  of  the  imprudence  of  including  in  the 
capitulation  a  division  numbering  9600  men 
which  was  following  him  under  General 
Wedel. '  The  result  was,  that  the  nimiber 
of  French  prisoners  of  war  was  raised  to 
nearly  18,000  men,  and  also  that  the  victory 
won  by  the  Spanish  militia  over  a  corps  of 
the  dreaded  and  hitherto  invincible  Napo- 
leonic army  was  correspondingly  enhanced. 
This  event  strengthened  the  resistance  in 
the  whole  country,  and  raised  the  hope  of  a 
Europe  groaning  imder  the  yoke  of  Napo- 
leon. The  French  evacuated  Madrid  and 
retreated  behind  the  Ebro.  The  event  in 
itself,  considered  from  a  military  standpoint, 
is  not  an  exploit  of  conspicuous  heroism  on 


I  Wedel  fell  in  with  this  condition,  although  the  possibility 
of  retreat  lay  open  to  him,  chiefly  for  the  reason  that  he  did 
not  wish  to  expose  Dupont's  troops,  who  had  already  been 
taken  prisoner,  to  the  revenge  of  the  Spaniards.  Wedel's 
troops  were  to  give  up  their  arms,  but  were  to  receive  them 
back  again  at  the  time  of  their  stipulated  embarkation  for 
France.  The  Spanish  violated  this  agreement  and  detained 
Wedel's  troops  also  as  prisoners  of  war. 


Or  a  Militia?  145 

the  part  of  the  Spanish  miHtia,  for  the 
troops  concerned  in  the  surrender,  like 
almost  all  the  French  forces  available  in 
Spain  at  that  time,  were  depot  troops  of 
inferior  quality,  that  is  to  say,  recruits  who 
had  received  a  superficial  training,  and  had 
then  been  hurriedly  put  together  into  ex- 
temporized imits.  The  Grande  Armee  was 
still  in  North  Germany.  Napoleon  brought 
strong  contingents  of  it  to  Spain  in  the 
autimm  of  1808,  and,  after  his  forces  had 
been  raised  to  more  than  200,000  men, 
scattered  the  Spanish  troops  and  pressed 
forward  by  way  of  Madrid.  His  hope  that 
the  coimtry  would  now  settle  down  was, 
however,  not  fulfilled.  The  apparent  calm 
of  the  Spanish  provinces  was  deceptive. 
It  was  enforced  by  the  powerful  French 
Army,  with  the  dreaded  Emperor  at  its 
head.  But  every  diminution  of  the  French 
forces  gave  new  lite  to  the  national  revolt. 
Napoleon's  troops  spent  themselves  for  five 
years  in  an  exhausting  guerilla  conflict,  a 


146     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

form  of  warfare  for  which  the  mountainous 
country,  with  its  bad  roads  and  its  strong 
and  numerous  monasteries,  was  very  well 
adapted. 

The  course  of  the  war  in  Spain,  like  that 
in  La  Vendee,  only  on  a  larger  scale,  demon- 
strates that,  for  the  purpose  of  crushing  a 
national  revolt,  a  ver}^  strong  armed  force 
is  required.  None  the  less,  it  was  reserved 
for  Wellington  to  drive  the  French  out  of 
Spain.  The  Spanish  alone  could  never  have 
done  more  than  oppose  a  passive  resist- 
ance; they  would  never  have  achieved  a 
victory  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word. 
Hence  the  national  levy  proved  itself  in- 
capable of  really  defendmg  the  country 
against  the  invader.  Moreover,  both  in  La 
Vendee  and  in  Spain,  there  were  spiritual 
motives  which  stimulated  the  resistance 
of  the  nation.  The  nation  had  been  most 
deeply  wounded  in  its  religious  susceptibili- 
ties, and  spurred  on,  and  to  some  extent  led, 
by  the  priests,  it  rose  against  the  invader, 


Or  a  Militia?  147 

whose  acts  of  oppression  and  barbarity  had 
stirred  up  fresh  hatred  against  him.  In  the 
Tyrol,  the  resistance  was  further  strength- 
ened by  that  loyalty  to  the  dynasty  which  is 
characteristic  of  the  German. 

The  Tyrol,   1809 

When  Austria  opened  operations  on  the 
Danube,  in  April,  1809,  the  carefully  pre- 
pared insurrection  broke  out  all  over  the 
Tyrol.  It  took  the  Bavarian  officials  and 
troops  completely  by  surprise.  The  re- 
volted peasants  overcame  the  weak  and 
scattered  Bavarian  garrisons,  as  well  as 
two  French  brigades  which  were  marching 
through  from  Italy  to  South  Germany;  and 
the  liberation  of  the  country  was  secured 
in  the  space  of  four  days.  An  Austrian 
division  marched  from  Villach  to  the  Tyrol, 
and  gave  additional  support  to  the  Land- 
sturm  companies.  At  the  end  of  April,  two 
Bavarian  divisions  advanced  from  Salzburg 


148     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

to  the  Inntal.  On  the  19th  of  May,  Inns- 
bruck was  occupied  after  several  battles. 
When,  soon  after,  one  of  the  Bavarian  divi- 
sions withdrew,  Andreas  Hofer,  with  an  Aus- 
trian force  of  no  more  than  nine  hundred  men 
with  five  guns,  succeeded,  on  the  29th  of  May, 
at  the  mountain  of  Isel,  near  Innsbruck,  in 
inflicting  a  severe  defeat  on  the  only  Bava- 
rian division  which  still  remained  in  the 
country.  No  less  than  18,000  peasants  had 
been  called  up.  After  the  Battle  of  Wag- 
ram,  Napoleon  brought  up  an  army  of 
50,000  men  against  the  Tyrolese,  who  were 
now  thrown  completely  on  their  own  re- 
sources. At  the  same  time  eight  columns 
advanced  from  all  sides  against  the  motin- 
tain  fortress  and  brought  the  northern 
Tyrol  into  subjection.  Nevertheless,  An- 
dreas Hofer  succeeded  in  securing  tem- 
porary possession  of  Innsbruck  once  again. 
Only  when  he  was  attacked  from  the  south 
also,  by  way  of  Trient,  did  he  finally 
succtimb. 


Or  a  Militia?  149 

Twice  had  the  country  freed  itself  prac- 
tically by  its  own  efforts.  None  the  less,  we 
encounter  the  same  phenomenon  here  as  in 
La  Vendee.  The  popular  levy  was  incapa- 
ble of  following  up  the  local  success  beyond 
the  frontiers  of  the  country.  The  attempts 
to  advance  into  Upper  Bavaria  against 
the  French  communications  had  no  success 
worth  mentioning.  Speckbacher,  one  of 
the  Tyrolese  leaders,  declared  later:  "We 
peasants  had  dauntless  hearts,  but  no  order; 
with  our  imperial  troops  it  was  the  other 
way  round;  but  the  troops  of  Blucher  and 
Yorck  had  both — order  and  dauntless  hearts; 
that  is  what  I  should  have  liked  to  see."' 
These  words  of  the  brave  leader  of  the 
peasants  put  the  inadequate  performances 
of  a  mere  militia  in  the  right  light,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  show  that  a  trained  national 
army  is  the  best  defensive  force.  The  na- 
tional wars  in  Spain  and  in  the  Tyrol  did 
indeed  act  like  a  signal  for  the  revolt  of  the 

»  Treitschke,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  ii. 


150     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

nations  against  Napoleon;  they  kept  the 
ideal  of  the  liberation  of  the  Fatherland 
before  the  eyes  of  German  patriots.  Hence 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  achievements  of 
the  popular  levies  of  both  countries  were 
very  much  exaggerated. 

It  was  forgotten  that  the  contest  for  a 
revolted  mountainous  country  has  always 
demanded  very  strong  forces  on  the  side  of 
the  aggressor.  For  instance,  in  the  year 
1878,  Austria-Hungary  sent  75,000  men  to 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  55,000  of  whom 
came  from  the  Save  and  20,000  from  the 
Dalmatian  coast.  As  soon  as  it  became 
clear  that  the  occupation  would  not  be 
effected  without  a  severe  struggle,  an  order 
was  given  for  the  mobilization  of  a  further 
three  and  a  half  divisions  to  protect  the 
advancing  columns  in  the  rear.  Subse- 
quently it  proved  necessary  to  bring  up  a 
further  50,000  men,  in  order  to  effect  the 
occupation.  The  effectiveness  of  modem 
weapons  would  have  altered  these  condi- 


Or  a  Militia?  151 

tions  to  a  large  extent.  It  would  be  almost 
impossible  for  a  mere  popular  levy  to  keep 
up  a  resistance  for  any  length  of  time  if  it 
were  faced  with  a  superiority  in  respect  of 
howitzer  artillery  and  numerous  machine- 
guns.  For  instance,  in  Serbia,  in  the  autumn 
of  19 1 5,  though  we  were  opposed  by  an 
organized  Serbian  army,  the  fact  that  we 
were  equipped  with  more  effective  weapons 
made  it  very  much  easier  for  us  and  our 
allies  to  penetrate  into  the  mountainouc 
country. 

In  the  Tyrol  and  in  Bosnia,  the  popula- 
tion, who  had  been  furnished  with  firearms, 
were  contending  for  their  native  soil,  in  the 
case  of  Bosnia,  intermixed  with  regular 
Turkish  battalions,  but  in  spite  of  their 
superior  numbers,  they  were  finally  van- 
quished by  the  invader.  As  to  what  would 
happen  if  the  case  were  reversed — that  is  to 
say,  if  it  were  attempted  to  invade  a  moun- 
tainous country  with  a  militia  army — we 
may  gain  some  idea  from  the  conduct  of 


152     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Garibaldi's    volunteer   bands    in    the   year 
1866. 

These  assembled  to  the  number  of  from 
35,000  to  40,000  men  at  Brescia  and  in  the 
north  for  the  conquest  of  the  Southern 
Tyrol.  For  the  defence  of  the  latter  only 
11,000  soldiers  and  4000  local  riflemen  were 
available,  under  the  command  of  Major- 
General  (later  Master  of  Ordnance)  Baron 
von  Kuhn.  On  the  i6th  of  July,  some  of 
Kuhn's  troops  advanced  into  the  Chiesetal 
and  up  the  adjacent  heights  against  the 
main  body  of  Garibaldi's  army.  A  few 
Austrian  companies  were  sufficient  to  throw 
these  into  confusion.  They  withdrew,  after 
having  sustained  quite  trifling  losses,  with 
eight  times  their  number  of  prisoners.  A 
second  blow  delivered  on  the  21st  of  July, 
north-west  of  the  Garda  Lake,  with  stronger 
forces,  was  equally  successful.  The  inten- 
tion of  intimidating  and  paralyzing  the 
volunteer  bands,  so  as  to  gain  a  free  hand 
in  another  direction,   was  completely  ful- 


Or  a  Militia?  153 

filled.  These  inefficient  Italian  troops 
proved  completely  unequal  to  mountain 
warfare. 

The  Boers 

The  vast  extent  of  the  South  African 
veldt  presents  a  theatre  of  war  of  an  en- 
tirely different  character  from  that  of  La 
Vendee,  Spain,  the  Tyrol,  or  Bosnia.  The 
Boer  militia,  however,  exhibited  the  same 
deficiencies  as  those  which  marked  the  pop- 
ular levies  engaged  in  the  above-mentioned 
European  theatres  of  war.  On  this  sub- 
ject General  von  Beseler  writes:'  "Just  as 
their  leaders,  after  brilliant  beginnings,  sud- 
denly broke  down,  so  the  Boer  army  itself, 
in  the  further  course  of  the  war,  proved  tm- 
equal  to  its  task.  The  experiences  which 
Washington  had  had  with  his  militia  army 
were  repeated.  The  Boers,  too,  for  all  their 
splendid  warlike  spirit  and  presence  of 
mind,  were  lacking  in  that  discipline  which 

'  Loc.  cit. 


154     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

alone  renders  an  army  permanently  capable 
of  great  successes,  and  keeps  it  together  even 
under  misfdrttme.  With  the  Boers,  too,  it 
was  not  an  unusual  occurrence  for  them  to 
abandon  their  detachment  without  asking 
permission,  in  order  to  go  and  see  if  all  was 
well  at  their  farm  at  home;  and  the  au- 
thority of  their  self-elected  officers  was  as 
inadequate  to  check  such  disorders  as  it 
was  to  force  their  troops — dauntless  and 
willing  though  they  were  for  the  most  part 
— to  do  anything  in  the  course  of  the  fighting 
which  might  seem  to  them  to  be  superfluous. 
It  is  to  these  moral  qualities  of  the  Boer 
army  alone — apart  from  the  palpable  blun- 
ders of  the  higher  command — that  their 
ultimate  failure  is  to  be  attributed.  .  .  . 
Subsequently  the  conflict  degenerated  to  an 
exhausting,  uneventful  irregular  warfare, 
the  only  parallel  to  which  in  recent  history 
is  furnished  by  the  thankless  campaign  of 
the  French  in  Spain.  It  proves  incontro- 
vertibly  that  even  the  best  militia  in  the 


Or  a  Militia?  155 

world,  composed  of  an  indigenous  popula- 
tion animated  by  a  genuinely  warlike  spirit, 
is  not  adapted  for  a  resolute  conduct  of 
war.  ...  If  any  one  should  object  here 
that  the  well-trained  English  armies  were 
incapable  of  doing  anything  rightly  even 
against  the  diminished  militia  troops,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  the  failure  of 
the  British  in  North  America,  and  their 
dubious  successes  in  South  Africa,  were  due 
not  only  to  the  arms  of  their  opponents, 
but  that  other  factors,  moral,  political,  and 
local,  also  entered  in.  The  North  American 
War  of  Independence  has  been  described 
not  without  justice  as  a  war  rather  of  ideas 
than  of  arms,  and  the  course  of  the  Boer 
War  was  governed  as  much  by  the  in- 
calculable influence  of  the  ground  and  the 
climate  as  by  the  decision  of  arms." 

The  Polish  Rising  of  18^0-31 

The  first  half  of  the  last  century  witnessed 
yet  another  popular  rising  of  considerable 


156     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

proportions  upon  European  soil,  namely,  the 
Polish  insurrection  of  1830-31.  This,  how- 
ever, cannot  be  adduced  in  favour  of  militia 
troops.  The  rising  of  Poland  against  Nicho- 
las I  began  with  the  defection  of  the  regular 
Polish  Army,  and  it  was  only  because  such 
an  army,  and  moreover  an  exceedingly 
well-trained  army,  was  available,  that 
Russia  had  so  much  trouble  in  overcoming 
the  insurrection.  The  Polish  Army  num- 
bered 35,000  men,  and,  moreover,  since  the 
Poles  had  furnished  a  considerable  contin- 
gent to  Napoleon's  army,  there  was  further 
available  in  the  country  a  considerable 
nimiber  of  discharged  officers  and  older 
discharged  soldiers.  Hence  the  strength  of 
the  army  could  be  increased  forthwith  by 
as  many  as  20,000  men.  Moreover,  owing 
to  the  number  of  cadres  which  were  avail- 
able, it  was  possible  to  enlist  by  degrees  a 
further  45,000  men  in  so-called  territorial 
regiments.  These  new  formations,  as  usual, 
proved  to  be  of  very  little  value,  but  they 


Or  a  Militia  ?  157 

were  strongly  supported  by  the  old  troops. 
They  were  further  supplemented  by  8000 
men  of  the  volunteer  regiments  known  as 
Krakusen.     If  the  Polish  Army  had  been 
better  led,  and  if  it  had  not  been  for  dissen- 
sion among  those  in  charge  of  the  adminis- 
tration,  Russia  would  have  found  in  the 
Poles,  whose  bravery  was  conspicuous,  an 
even  more  dangerous  antagonist.    The  chief 
deficiency  of  the  newly  formed    regiments 
was  in  respect  to  their  officers'  corps.     It 
might   have   been   expected   that   recourse 
would    have    been   had    for   the   latter  to 
veteran  non-commissioned   officers;  but  in 
spite  of  the  desperate  situation  of  the  na- 
tion which  was  fighting  tor  its  existence, 
this  was  not  done.     The  officers'  posts  were 
conferred  upon  the  lower  aristocracy,  the 
Schlachta,  and  consequently  it  frequently 
happened  that  quite  incompetent  men  occu- 
pied high  positions  in  the  army.     It  has  to 
be  added  that  all  these  yoimg  men,  who 
constituted  the  bulk  of  the  new  officers' 


158     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

corps,  belonged  to  the  radical  wing  of  the 
revolutionary  party,  and,  for  all  their  mili- 
tary incapacity,  exhibited  an  unexampled 
insolence.  These  officers  did  not  scruple  to 
criticize  openly  their  superior  officers.  Such 
men,  who  were  more  lavish  with  words  than 
with  deeds,  invariably  tended  to  lower 
discipline.  The  Polish  Government  by  no 
means  turned  to  the  best  account  the  excel- 
lent military  forces  which  it  had  at  its 
disposition,  and  to  a  certain  extent  put 
them  in  the  field  in  the  shape  of  inferior 
troops,  when  there  was  really  no  necessity 
for  this. 

When  the  Polish  insurrection  broke  out, 
the  quarters  of  the  Russian  Army  were 
very  widely  dispersed  over  the  vast  Empire. 
Hence  it  arose  that  only  very  inadequate 
forces  could  be  dispatched  for  the  subju- 
gation of  the  extensive  revolted  territory. 
Only  170,000  men  all  told  were  allotted  to 
Field-Marshal  Prince  Diebitsch.  Of  these 
only  130,000  were  available  in  the  first  in- 


Or  a  Militia?  159 

stance,  and  the  Polish  frontier  was  crossed 
on  February  5,  1831,  with  only  100,000  men. 
Owing  to  a  sudden  thaw,  it  was  necessary 
to  abandon  the  original  plan  of  campaign. 
Instead  of  advancing  from  the  Narew-Bug 
against  Warsaw,  in  the  hope  of  driving 
considerable  contingents  of  the  Poles  from 
the  capital,  it  was  necessary  to  consume  a 
considerable  time  in  effecting  a  movement 
to  the  left,  with  Brest-Litowsk  as  base. 
When  Diebitsch  finally  advanced  towards 
the  Vistula  from  a  due  easterly  direction, 
he  arrived  at  the  latter  with  no  more  than 
70,000  men,  so  that  his  force  was  no  longer 
superior  to  the  Polish  field  army  of  60,000 
men,  supported  by  the  fortified  line  of  the 
river.  The  climatic  conditions  of  the  seat 
of  war  and  the  traditional  incompetence  of 
the  Russian  commissariat  were  further  in- 
strumental in  protracting  the  war,  until 
finally,  on  the  7th  of  September,  1831,  after 
the  Russian  Army  had  received  substantial 
reinforcements,  Field-Marshal  Paskievitsch 


i6o     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

succeeded  in  taking  Warsaw  by  storm.  A 
month  later  the  last  attempt  at  armed 
resistance  in  the  whole  coimtry  was  sup- 
pressed. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   NORTH    AMERICANS    IN    THE    CIVIL   WAR 
OF  1861-65 

Composition  of  the  Armies 

In  the  North  American  War  of  Secession, 
the  Confederation  of  the  Southern  States, 
with  a  population  of  only  12,000,000,  was 
opposed  to  the  Union,  with  a  population 
of  19,000,000.  Since,  however,  from  the 
12,000,000  of  the  South,  about  4,000,000  of 
negroes  have  to  be  deducted,  the  North  pos- 
sessed from  the  outset  an  overwhelming 
advantage,  which  was  further  enhanced  by 
the  fact  that  the  population  of  the  South 
was  scattered  over  a  very  much  wider  extent 
of  territory,  so  that  it  was  very  much  more 
difficult  to  bring  it  into  operation,  as  well 

n  161 


i62     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

as  by  the  fact  that  there  was  a  brisk  and 
continuous  immigration  from  Europe  to  the 
North  such  as  did  not  exist  in  the  South. 
Moreover,  since  in  the  western  theatre  of 
war,  the  North,  apart  from  a  few  isolated 
reverses,  made  slow  but  continuous  progress, 
and  only  in  the  east,  in  Virgmia,  failed  up 
to  the  very  end  to  achieve  any  success,  the 
South  was  very  soon  at  an  even  greater  dis- 
advantage in  respect  of  numbers  as  com- 
pared with  the  North,  and  the  decisive 
contest  was  fought  with  five  as  opposed  to 
twenty  millions. 

In  addition  to  a  larger  population,  the 
North  had  at  its  command  quite  different 
material  resources,  and,  above  all,  a  sea- 
power  which  was  constantly  increasing,  and 
without  which  the  war  could  not  have  been 
decided  in  its  favour.  The  fleet  of  the 
Northern  States  not  only  rendered  import- 
ant assistance  in  the  operations  on  land, 
but,  above  all,  by  blockading  the  ports  of 
the  Southern  States,  it  prevented  the  cotton 


Or  a  Militia?  163 

export  to  Europe,  which  was  the  main 
source  of  revenue  of  the  Southern  States, 
and  at  the  same  time  rendered  the  import  of 
war  material  from  Europe  very  much  more 
difficult. 

The  fact  that,  in  spite  of  these  unfavour- 
able circumstances,  the  South  not  only  kept 
up  a  resistance  for  years,  but  even  at  times 
seemed  as  if  it  would  emerge  victoriously 
from  the  conflict,  was  due  in  the  first  place 
to  the  undoubted  superiority  of  its  human 
material.  On  both  sides  the  militia  of  the 
various  States  constituted  the  primary 
armed  force  which  was  in  some  degree 
organized  and  ready.  In  addition  to  these, 
and  to  some  extent  completing  them,  were 
the  so-called  volunteer  contingents,  which 
the  central  authorities  compelled  the  various 
States  to  raise  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
The  central  authorities  enlisted  these  volun- 
teer contingents  directly  into  their  service, 
so  that  they  formed  a  kind  of  regular  army 
as    opposed    to    the   local    militias.      The 


164     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

Southern  States  were  very  soon  under  the 
necessity  of  resorting  to  universal  miHtary 
service.  In  the  South,  the  hierarchical  or- 
ganization of  the  newly  formed  armies  was 
very  much  facilitated  by  the  existing  class 
distinctions  within  the  population.  The 
ruling  classes  filled  the  positions  of  officers. 
Consequently  the  South  did  not  suffer  from 
those  disadvantages  which,  in  the  case  of 
the  North,  arose  from  the  choice  of  their 
officers  by  the  men.  The  poorer  classes  of 
the  white  population  formed  the  bulk  of  the 
soldiery  of  the  Confederation,  the  negroes 
being  employed  only  for  labour  service.  The 
habits  of  an  open-air  life,  together  with  their 
experience  of  hunting  and  of  warfare  with 
the  Indians,  had  hardened  the  population  of 
the  South;  the  sons  of  the  numerous  farmers 
of  the  coimtry  furnished  excellent  material 
for  troops  of  cavalry  thoroughly  trained  and 
mounted  on  blood-horses.  The  war  roused 
the  natural  inclination  of  such  a  population 
for  daring  exploits,  and  favoured  by  the 


Or  a  Militia?  165 

character  of  the  country,  the'  Confederate 
partisans  did  successfully  achieve  many 
such  exploits.  Since  it  had  been  necessary 
to  enlist  40,000  volunteers  for  the  Mexican 
War,  and  since  these  volunteers  belonged 
almost  without  exception  to  the  Southern 
States,  at  the  very  outset  the  Confederation 
had  at  its  disposal  a  considerable  number 
of  men  with  experience  of  war  and  a  cor- 
responding number  of  officers.  Moreover, 
of  the  officers  of  the  regular  army  of  the 
Union,  which  numbered  only  14,000  men,  a 
comparatively  large  number  both  of  those 
still  in  the  service  and  of  those  who  had 
retired  belonged  to  the  Southern  States. 
By  far  the  greater  number  of  these  pledged 
themselves  to  the  cause  of  their  native  state. 
They  had  all  received  a  good  military  train- 
ing at  the  military  college  at  West  Point. 

The  armies  of  the  North  also  developed 
soldierly  qualities,  but  only  gradually  and 
in  the  course  of  the  war  itself.  The  North 
had  set  to  work  on  the  preparation  of  its 


1 66     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

armaments  later  than  the  South,  since  a 
certain  number  of  the  Southern  States  had 
been  for  a  long  time  aiming  at  a  rupture. 
Hence,  since  the  Northern  armies  were  in 
no  way  prepared  beforehand,  it  was  only 
gradually  that  their  efforts  could  be  crowned 
with  success.  When  the  secession  became 
an  actual  fact,  President  Lincoln  not  only 
called  up  the  militia,  and  entrusted  them 
with  the  defence  of  Washington,  the  Federal 
capital,  which  was  situated  near  the  borders 
of  the  Southern  States,  but  he  also  gave 
orders  for  the  levy  of  a  volunteer  army  of 
75,000  men.  The  regular  army  was  in- 
creased to  23,000  men,  and  as  soon  as  it 
became  clear  that,  in  view  of  the  gravity 
of  the  situation,  a  three-months'  term  of 
service,  such  as  had  originally  been  pro- 
vided for  the  volunteer  contingents,  was  not 
sufficient,  the  States  were  called  upon  to 
furnish  500,000  men,  with  an  obligation 
partly  to  two  years'  and  partly  to  three 
years'  service.    Although  in  adopting  these 


Or  a  Militia?  167 

measures  the  North  was  having  recourse 
to  pure  improvisations,  none  the  less  they 
furnished  the  ingredients  for  the  gradual 
creation  of  a  force  which  should  be  in  the 
nature  of  a  standing  army.  Moreover  the 
danger  that  the  secession  would  be  success- 
ful and  the  serious  threat  presented  to  the 
territory  of  the  Northern  States  roused  the 
population  of  the  North  to  a  more  active 
participation  in  the  war;  and  the  fact  that 
many  industries  had  been  ruined  by  the 
war  was  favourable  to  the  enlistment  of 
volunteers;  so  that  the  North  soon  became 
superior  to  the  South  in  respect  to  the 
number  of  its  fighting  forces,  though  not 
in  respect  to  their  quality.  Both  among 
leaders  and  men  the  town-bred  element  was 
preponderant,  and  hence  they  proved  very 
ill  adapted  for  the  exertions  and  privations 
of  the  campaign.  Only  in  the  West  was 
the  human  material  of  both  the  conflicting 
parties  approximately  equal  in  value.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  bulk  of  the 


i68     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

officers  of  the  Northern  States  not  only 
lacked  any  previous  military  training,  but 
also  they  were  deficient  in  that  natural 
authority  which  belonged  to  the  propertied 
classes  of  the  South.  In  the  North  men  who 
lacked  any  soldierly  training  or  talent 
occupied  even  the  higher  positions  in  the 
army.  The  volunteers  were  enlisted  by  the 
aid  of  countless  recruiting  offices,  which 
sprang  up  all  over  the  country  and  made  it 
into  a  business .  Influential  men ,  well-known 
politicians  or  political  refugees  from  Europe 
of  alleged  military  renown,  raised  regiments 
and  assumed  the  position  of  colonel  of  these 
with  the  sanction  of  the  States  concerned. 
The  captains  and  lieutenants  were  elected  by 
the  men.  Only  the  generals  were  nominated 
by  the  President.  Frequently  whole  bodies 
of  the  Northern  troops  were  composed  of 
foreign  immigrants — Germans,  Irish,  French. 
At  the  beginning,  what  the  North  chiefly 
needed  was  such  a  military  organization  as 
could  have  given  cohesion  to  the  masses,  for 


Or  a  Militia?  169 

there  was  m  fact  an  absolute  lack  of  efficient 
cadres.  Further,  the  administration  was 
guilty  of  fraud  and  peculation  on  a  large 
scale  to  the  detriment  of  the  army.  More- 
over, the  task  of  the  commanders  of  the 
troops  was  rendered  very  much  more  diffi- 
cult by  the  fact  that  the  Federal  States 
neglected  to  replenish  at  the  proper  time 
formations  which  had  already  been  created 
and  preferred  to  form  new  bodies  of  troops 
in  order  that  they  might  make  a  boast  of 
the  large  number  of  their  regiments,  although 
as  a  result  of  the  rapid  wastage  which  always 
occurs  in  the  case  of  such  improvised  armies, 
some  of  these  regiments  existed  only  in 
name. 

Conduct  of  the  Armies  in  the  Field 

For  the  purposes  of  comparison  with 
European  conditions,  only  the  Eastern 
Virginian  theatre  of  war  comes  into  question. 
Here  the  first  important  encounter,  at  Bull 
Run,  south  of  Washington,  did  not  redound 


170     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

to  the  glory  of  either  party  concerned. 
About  30,000  men  on  the  two  sides  engaged 
in  the  battle.  At  first  the  Union  troops  had 
the  advantage.  The  ranks  of  the  Confeder- 
ates wavered  seriously,  until  the  unexpected 
appearance  of  a  weak  brigade  and  a  battery 
on  the  right  flank  of  their  opponent  resulted 
in  the  complete  collapse  of  his  whole  line. 
Only  a  regular  battalion  and  the  cavalry 
made  a  stand  in  the  midst  of  the  general 
flight.  Large  numbers  of  the  fugitives  could 
not  be  brought  to  a  halt  on  the  southern 
shore  of  the  Potomac;  they  overflowed 
Washington,  some  even  fleeing  as  far  as 
New  York,  400  kilometres  further,  at  the 
same  time  spreading  through  the  country 
the  wildest  rumours  of  the  treachery  of  their 
leaders.  A  swarm  of  Members  of  Congress, 
politicians,  journalists,  and  photographers, 
who  had  desired  to  witness  the  hoped-for 
defeat  of  the  Confederates,  found  themselves 
involved  in  the  general  flight.  The  extent 
of  the  defeat  was  bv  no  means  considerable 


Or  a  Militia  ?  171 

in  itself,  for  the  battle  had  cost  the  Union 
troops  in  all  only  1500  dead  and  wounded 
and  1400  missing;  but  the  disgrace  lay  in 
the  fact  that  these  troops  were  not  able  to 
endure  even  such  comparatively  insigni- 
ficant losses,  that  they  had  abandoned 
twenty-eight  guns,  and  that  they  had  fur- 
nished irresistible  proof  of  their  complete 
worthlessness.  Such  little  discipline  as  had 
existed  before  now  disappeared  completely, 
a  process  which  was  assisted  by  the  wrang- 
ling among  the  senior  officers,  who  mutually 
attributed  the  blame  to  each  other.  For- 
tunately, the  enemy  forces,  too,  consisted 
only  of  new  formations,  and  the  battle  had 
reduced  these  to  such  a  state  of  exhaustion 
and  disorder  that  they  were  completely 
incapable  of  following  up  the  pursuit,  al- 
though they  had  lost  not  more  than  1700 
men.  With  such  weak  forces  and  an  equip- 
ment of  guns  which  was  inadequate,  even 
for  warfare  in  the  open  field,  there  could  be 
no  question  of  taking  the  strong  fortifica- 


172     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

tions  which  had  been  constructed  for  the 
defence  of  Washington,  and  behind  which 
even  the  poorest  troops  could  still  offer  a 
resistance. 

Both  armies  exhibited  the  characteristic 
qualities  of  a  militia,  but  this  was  more 
conspicuous  in  the  case  of  the  troops  of  the 
Union.  In  the  case  of  the  Confederates,  the 
skill  and  confidence  of  their  generals  saved 
them  from  the  gravest  of  disasters  and  gave 
a  favourable  turn  to  a  situation  which 
seemed  already  lost.  On  the  side  of  the 
Northern  States,  on  the  contrary,  the  Com- 
mander-General, McDowell,  received  very 
inadequate  support  from  the  subordinate 
command;  dilettantism  was  conspicuous, 
and  the  army,  with  its  quite  insufficient 
training,  was  imequal  to  standing  any 
serious  test.  Finally  the  Union  awoke  to 
the  fact  that  no  success  could  be  attained 
with  such  troops  as  these,  and  they  set  to 
work  to  create  the  army  which  had  been 
lacking  in  time  of  peace.     If  the  Confeder- 


Or  a  Militia?  173 

ates  had  possessed  the  means  tor  turning  to 
account  their  success  at  Bull  Run,  the  cause 
of  the  Union  would  have  been  lost.  How- 
ever, the  state  of  terror  which  had  prevailed 
at  Washington  subsided  again,  and  pre- 
parations were  set  on  foot  for  new  arma- 
ments. At  the  end  of  1861  the  total 
fighting  forces  of  the  Union  amounted 
already  to  527,000  men.  In  addition  to 
garrison  troops  to  the  number  of  55,000 
men,  who  were  employed  for  the  immediate 
defence  of  the  Federal  capital,  General 
McClellan  had  organized  on  the  Potomac 
by  the  spring  of  1862  a  new  field  army  of 
158,000  men.  His  predecessor,  McDowell, 
had  already  been  violently  attacked  when 
he  began  to  drill  his  troops.  It  was  con- 
sidered that  this  was  a  needless  tyranny 
over  the  soldiers.  When  McClellan  refused 
to  advance  forthwith  against  Richmond 
with  his  undisciplined  hordes,  but  insisted 
that  they  must  first  have  some  training, 
even  if  it  were  only  a  very  superficial  one, 


174     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

he  was  suspected  of  being  in  favour  of 
reconciliation  with  the  South. 

He  decided  to  convey  the  army  from 
Potomac  in  March,  1862,  by  means  of  a  large 
transport  fleet,  to  the  so-called  Virginian 
Peninsula,  and  then  to  advance  against 
Richmond.  By  this  means  he  avoided 
several  very  difficult  pomts  at  which  the 
enemy  might  have  confronted  him  if  he  had 
advanced  by  the  direct  route  to  Richmond. 
The  adoption  of  this  circuitous  route  by 
water  was  none  the  less  not  the  outcome  of 
any  profound  and  wise  strategy,  but  was 
chiefly  due  to  an  unwillingness  to  engage 
with  the  enemy  in  the  open  field  with  troops 
which  had  been  insufficiently  trained. 

McClellan  was  really  postponing  the 
crisis,  in  the  uncertain  hope  that,  on  the 
route  he  had  adopted,  it  might  be  attended 
with  a  smaller  sacrifice.  The  fact  that 
the  military  operations  on  the  Peninsula 
dragged  themselves  out  with  excessive  slow- 
ness was  in  accordance  with  the  very  nature 


Or  a  Militia  ?  175 

of  a  newly  formed  army,  and  the  slowness  of 
its  movements  resulting  from  the  inefficiency 
of  the  troops  and  the  lack  of  effective  co- 
operation between  the  leaders.  The  enter- 
prise was  a  complete  fiasco.  Only  the  fact 
that  it  was  supported  by  the  fleet  saved  the 
Northern  Army  from  being  annihilated  by 
Lee,  w^ho  had  now  assumed  the  command 
of  the  Confederates  in  Virginia. 

The  attacks  upon  the  territory  of  the 
Northern  States,  which  Lee  undertook  in 
1862  and  1863,  were,  however,  equally  im- 
successful.  In  view  of  the  relative  strengths 
of  the  opponents,  any  mvasion  of  the 
enemy's  territory  undertaken  by  the  South 
could  not  in  any  case  be  more  than  an  offen- 
sive with  a  limited  objective.  Moreover, 
the  army  of  General  Lee  had  to  contend  with 
still  further  disadvantages.  Chief  among 
these  was  their  deficiency  in  respect  of  arms 
and  equipment.  A  large  proportion  of 
their  guns  had  had  to  be  captured  first 
from  the  enemy,  and  they  were  reduced  to 


176     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  necessity  of  utilizing  the  supplies  of 
clothing  ot  the  Union  troops.  Moreover, 
in  spite  of  the  excellent  material  contained 
in  the  Confederate  Army  of  North  Virginia, 
none  the  less  in  respect  to  its  composition 
and  spirit,  it  was  nothing  but  a  militia 
army,  and  was  therefore  unequal  to  tjie  task 
of  a  prolonged  offensive  campaign  in  enemy 
territory. 

In  the  home  territory,  on  the  other  hand, 
Lee  achieved  several  successes,  both  in 
defence  and  attack;  and  in  1863  he  won  a 
great  victory.  In  the  three-days'  battle  in 
the  forest  round  Chancellors ville,  he  drove 
back  the  enemy  over  the  frontier  of  Virginia. 
The  battle  opened  favourably  for  the  South, 
since  the  corps  on  the  right  wing  of  the 
Union  Army  was  unabie  to  deploy  to  the 
right  flank  when  it  was  attacked  from  that 
direction.  It  was  driven  back  in  wild  flight. 
The  Northern  armies  suffered  up  to  the  very 
end  from  serious  moral  defects.  In  1864 
Grant  made  an  attempt  to  shatter  Lee's 


Or  a  Militia?  177 

army  by  iininterrupted  "hammer  blows" 
and  to  open  the  way  for  his  own  troops  to 
Richmond.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
numerical  strength  of  his  army  was  more 
than  twofold  that  of  the  enemy,  he  did  not 
succeed  in  doing  this;  and  he  left  quite  a 
third  of  his  troops  lying  before  the  positions 
of  the  enemy.  When  Grant,  with  the  aid 
of  the  fleet,  transferred  the  army  to  the 
southern  bank  of  the  James  River,  the 
"hammer  blows "  against  the  entrenchments 
of  Richmond-Petersburg  again  proved  in 
vain.  A  consideration  of  the  very  deficient 
striking  force  of  his  army  induced  President 
LiQcoln,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  South- 
em  States  were  already  completely  en- 
veloped, to  attempt  once  more  to  effect  a 
reconciliation.  It  was  onl}?-  owing  to  the 
unyielding  attitude  of  Jefferson  Davis,  the 
President  of  the  Confederation,  that  such  a 
reconciliation  did  not  take  place. 

Lee's  army  finally  succumbed,  in  April, 
1865,    not   to   the   arms   of    the   opponent 


178     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

but  to  strangulation  by  the  overwhelming 
superiority  of  the  Union  in  the  Western 
theatre  of  war.  The  River  Mississippi  had 
been  in  the  hands  of  the  Union  since  the 
summer  of  1863,  as  a  result  of  which  the 
territory  of  the  Confederation  was  cut  in 
two.  Following  upon  this,  the  successful 
operations  of  the  Northern  troops  under 
General  Sherman  in  the  siunmer  of  1864 
and  in  the  winter  of  1 864-5  severed  also  the 
communications  of  the  Eastern  States  of  the 
Confederation  with  the  South.  After  four 
years  of  war,  the  so-called  "Anaconda 
Plan"  of  the  North  was  finally  realized. 

According  to  one  estimation,'  the  war 
involved  the  sacrifice  of  500,000  lives,  and, 
without  taking  into  account  the  cancelled 
assets  of  the  South,  a  pectmiary  expenditure 
on  both  sides  of  eleven  milliard  dollars,  a 
high  sum  for  that  time  and  in  consideration 
of  the  strength  of  the  armies  engaged.    The 

'Kaufmann,  Die  Deutschen  im  Amerikanischen  Eiirger- 
kriege.     Munich  und  Berlin,  191 1,  p.  577. 


Or  a  Militia  ?  179 

war  charges  of  France,  in  connection  with 
the  campaign  of  1870-71,  apart  from  the 
war  indemnity  of  five  milliard  francs,  are 
estimated  at  only  four  and  a  half  million, 
that  is  to  say,  in  all  at  only  nine  and  a  half 
million    francs.     In    the    North    American  I 
Civil  War,  the  armies  of  both  sides  furnished  J 
very  striking  evidence  of  the  defects  of  a  I 
militia.     It  was  chiefly  the  lack  of  an  effi-  J 
cient  fighting  army  which  was  responsible 
for  the  long  duration  of  the  struggle. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  FRENCH  ARMY  FROM   THE    RESTORATION 
UNTIL    1 87 1 

From  the  Second  Peace  of  Paris  until 
1870 

Under  the  rule  of  the  Boiirbons  conscrip- 
tion with  substitution  was  retained.  The 
distaste  for  the  profession  of  arms  increased 
more  and  more.  In  the  period  between 
1 815  and  1830  not  more  than  3000  men 
on  the  average  came  forward  annually  for 
voluntary  enlistment.  Of  the  conscripts 
an  average  of  one  in  twenty-five  deserted. 
The  Militdr-WochenUatt  of  the  21st  of 
June,  1823,  writes:'  "The  practice  of  sub- 
stitution had  a  very  prejudicial  effect  on 

'M.  Jahns,  Das  franzosische  Heer  von  der  grossen  Revo- 
lution  his  zur   Cegenwart.     Leipzig,    1873. 

180 


A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms     i8i 

recruiting,  on  the  spirit  of  the  army,  and  on 
the  morality  of  the  nation.  Speculators, 
for  the  most  part  ex-soldiers,  combined  to 
make  a  regular  business  out  of  the  sale  of 
men;  they  resorted  to  all  kinds  of  abomin- 
able practices  in  order  to  induce  yoimg  men 
to  pledge  themselves  as  substitutes  for  small 
sums  of  money,  and  these  were  then  put  in 
the  army  in  the  place  of  wealthy  conscripts, 
who  had  to  pay  these  speculators  from  4000 
up  to  6000  francs.  Such  companies  or 
individuals  had  their  offices,  agents,  and 
correspondents  in  all  the  departments,  and 
worked  in  close  connection  with  the  civil 
and  military  authorities.  This  trade  in 
human  beings  was  plied  with  special  energy 
in  Alsace  and  Lorraine." 

These  abuses  induced  General  Morand,  in 
1829,  to  make  a  speech  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  in  favour  of  universal  military 
service.  Another  veteran  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars.  General  Foy,  coined  the  phrase 
"blood-tax"    {impot  du   sang)    in   its   bad 


1 82     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

sense.  He  declared :  "  It  is  wrong  to  materi- 
alize a  moral  obligation,  wrong  to  regard 
military  service  as  the  payment  of  a  tax. 
But  misappreciation  of  the  ethical  value  of 
military  service  is  only  too  apt  to  make  its 
appearance  where  the  obligation  to  service 
is  not  universal."' 

Later,  under  Napoleon  III,  in  the  year 
1855,  the  purchase  of  exemption  was  in  so 
far  regularized  that  the  Government  under- 
took the  furnishing  of  a  substitute  in  con- 
sideration of  the  payment  of  a  definite  sum 
(on  the  average  2500  francs).  The  money 
thus  obtained  was  allotted  to  the  Dotation 
Fund  of  the  army.  All  those  liable  for 
service  had  to  decide  beforehand  whether 
they  wished  to  purchase  exemption  or  not. 
Those  who  purchased  exemption  were  re- 
leased henceforward  from  any  obligation  to 
service.  Those  who  pledged  themselves  for 
a  prolongation  of  their  term  of  service  were 
paid  fixed  sums  by  the  State  according  to 

•Jahns,  loc.  cit. 


Or  a  Militia?  183 

the  length  of  the  prolongation.  By  this 
means,  the  State  acquired  a  stock  of  pro- 
fessional soldiers,  but  paid  for  them  with  the 
disadvantage  that  a  large  number  of  soldiers 
of  a  low  standard  of  morality  were  retained 
in  the  army,  while  the  new  recruits  were 
drawn  more  and  more  exclusively  from 
the  proletariat.  The  French  people  insured 
themselves  against  enrolment  in  this  mer- 
cenary army  much  as  they  might  have 
insured  themselves  against  an  accident. 

The  July  Revolution  kindled  new  life  in 
the  National  Guard.  In  a  commission  ap- 
pointed to  investigate  the  conditions  of 
military  service,  the  Prussian  model  came 
under  discussion.  Victor  Cousin,  the  philo- 
sopher and  academician,  who  was  entrusted 
with  the  supervision  of  public  education, 
was  sent  by  the  Government  to  Berlin,  in 
order  to  study  conditions  in  Prussia.  "He 
maintained,"  writes  Jahns, '  "that  universal 

^  Loc.  cil.,  p.  317,  quoting  Cousin's  essay,  De  V instruction 
pubhque  dans  quelques  pays  de  I'AUemagne  el  particuli^re- 
ment  en  Prusse. 


1 84     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

compulsory  education  and  universal  com- 
pulsory military  service  were  the  chief  ele- 
ments in  the  power  of  the  State;  the  former 
he  judged  to  be  a  spiritual  force  and  the 
latter  a  force  for  military  education  of  the 
highest  importance."  The  Duke  of  Orleans 
remarked  at  that  time  to  a  Prussian  Staff 
Officer:  "You  are  helped  by  your  organiza- 
tion; with  you  everything  follows  a  soldierly 
and  resolute  procedure;  that  is  what  is 
lacking  with  us.  The  army  is  properly 
merely  the  vanguard  of  the  nation,  and  I 
hope  that  we  too  shall  arrive  at  this."  But 
how  could  the  king  of  the  bourgeoisie  have 
ventured  to  mtroduce  universal  military 
service,  even  if  he  had  wished  to  do  so? 
"Your  organization  is  perfect,"  remarked 
General  Blancard  to  the  same  Prussian 
officer,  "but  we  can  never  establish  such  an 
organization,  because  it  would  involve  a  com- 
plete transformation  of  our  manners,  cus- 
toms, and  laws."  This  transformation  was 
only  brought  about  as  a  result  of  the  defeats 


Or  a  Militia?  185 

of  1870-71,  as  formerly  in  Prussia  it  had  been 
brought  about  by  those  of  the  year  1806. 
As  a  result  of  the  frequent  political  revolu- 
tions which  France  had  experienced  since 
the  first  Peace  of  Paris,  the  army  was  in- 
evitably drawn  into  the  arena  of  politics. 
The  army  took  part  in  the  elections  for 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  among  the 
members  of  the  latter  were  a  number  of  gen- 
erals and  senior  officers.  As  the  disturb- 
ance of  the  time  increased,  and  as  the  lack  of 
distinguished  personalities  became  more  and 
more  conspicuous,  the  figure  of  Napoleon, 
glorified  by  legend,  gained  more  and  more 
hold  on  the  popular  imagination.  And  it 
was  the  liberal  and  republican  circles,  that  is 
to  say,  men  professing  opinions  which  the 
Emperor  had  always  fought  against  with 
the  utmost  rigour  during  his  lifetime,  and 
to  which  he  had  made  concessions  on  his 
return  from  Elba  only  with  great  reluctance, 
who  now  felt  called  upon  to  lead  the  chorus 
of  praise  of  the  Napoleonic  era. 


1 86     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

These  traditions  were  naturally  restored 
to  new  life  under  the  Second  Empire.  The 
fighting  in  Algiers  had  furnished  the  army 
with  experience  only  of  irregular  warfare; 
the  Crimean  War  for  the  first  time  gave  it  an 
opportunity  of  showing  what  it  could  accom- 
plish on  a  large  scale.  The  conduct  ot  the 
army  before  Sevastopol  was  thoroughly 
satisfactory,  and  renewed  the  ancient  fame 
of  French  valour.  To  be  sure,  all  kinds  of 
moral  defects  and  failures  of  organization 
were  conspicuously  revealed.  The  increase 
of  the  French  troops  before  Sevastopol  from 
30,000  to  100,000  and  finally  to  150,000 
men,  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
them  at  this  strength  and  the  heavy  losses 
in  dead,  sick,  and  wounded,  resulted  in  a 
complete  disorganization  of  the  regiments 
which  remained  at  home.  The  increase  of 
the  annual  levies  of  recruits  did  not  really 
furnish  an  effective  remedy,  the  more  so 
since  the  leaders  of  the  army  in  the  Crimea 
required  trained,  older  men,  as  the  twenty- 


Or  a  Militia?  187 

year-old  recruits  only  filled  the  hospitals. 
It  was  resolved  to  guard  the  recurrence  of 
these  evils  in  the  future  by  increasing  the 
annual  levy  of  recruits  to  100,000  men. 
After  deducting  the  unfit,  those  exempted 
on  account  of  domestic  circumstances,  and 
the  naval  recruits,  there  remained  as  a 
matter  of  fact  only  70,000  men.  Of  these 
the  so-called  deiixieme  portion,  amounting  to 
about  50,000  men,  were  discharged  after  a 
superficial  training  in  the  home  country,  and 
only  20,000  men  were  permanently  enlisted. 
The  very  meagre  figures  of  the  army  budget 
rendered  a  further  augmentation  of  the 
armed  force  out  of  the  question.  Taking 
into  account  the  shrinkage  resulting  from 
death  and  other  circumstances,  it  was  still 
hoped  that  the  deuxieme  portion  might  be 
counted  on  to  furnish  a  reserve  force  of 
320,000  men,  although  these  had  received 
only  a  very  insufficient  military  training. 

The  French  Army  which,  in  1859,  com- 
menced operations   in  the  theatre  of  war 


1 88     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

in  Northern  Italy  numbered  108,000  men. 
Since  the  army  in  peace  time  numbered 
380,000  men,  in  the  case  of  further  European 
compHcations,  which  for  that  time  appeared 
imminent  and  which  resulted  in  the  mobili- 
zation of  Prussia  and  of  the  German  federal 
corps,  after  deducting  the  garrison  and  depot 
troops,  only  a  very  limited  nimiber  of  troops 
would  have  remained  for  the  defence  of  the 
Rhine  frontier.  It  is  true  that  150,000  dis- 
charged soldiers  were  called  up,  but  they 
obeyed  the  summons  only  very  slowly  and 
unwillingly,  as  they  considered  that  they 
had  been  finally  released  from  military 
duties,  and  in  consequence  of  their  defective 
training  they  did  not  by  any  means  come  up 
to  the  expectations  which  had  been  placed 
on  them.  The  levy  of  recruits  for  the  year 
1859  was,  to  be  sure,  increased  to  140,000 
men,  but  these  could  not  yet  be  employed 
for  service  in  the  field.  In  a  memoir  of 
the  7th  of  February,  1859,  Moltke  calculates 
that  France  could  open  a  campaign  against 


Or  a  Militia?  189 

Germany  with  at  the  most  236,000  men,  and 
that  hence  these  would  be  confronted  with 
a  numerical  superiority  of  from  100,000  to 
150,000  men.  From  this  it  is  clear  how  little 
the  actual  military  strength  of  France  at 
that  time  accorded  with  the  aggressive 
policy  pursued  by  Napoleon  III.  Since  the 
French  Army  could  only  be  mobilized  by  de- 
grees, the  Emperor  was  very  much  depend- 
ent on  the  favourable  development  of  the 
war  in  Italy,  where  he  did,  in  fact,  reap  a 
success  as  considerable  as  it  was  undeserved. 
He  was  not  dazzled,  however,  by  his 
victories  in  Italy,  and  was  by  no  means  blind 
to  the  numerous  defects  which  adhered  to 
the  organization  of  the  French  Army.  But 
his  efforts  to  bring  about  an  improvement 
were  frustrated  by  the  opposition  on  the 
one  hand  of  the  legislative  bodies,  on  the 
other  by  the  army  itself,  which  would  not 
hear  of  a  short  term  of  service.  Hence  no 
fundamental  reform  was  effected.  It  was 
by  no  means  the  fault  of  the  Government 


I90     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

alone  that  France  in  1870  opposed  to  the 
mighty  array  of  the  whole  German  armed 
force  only  a  fraction  of  what  the  cotintry 
could  have  furnished  if  adequate  exertions 
had  been  made.  A  considerable  share  of 
blame  attaches  to  the  National  Assembly, 
as  it  does  to  any  parliament  which,  in  order 
to  win  the  favour  of  the  electors,  closes  its 
ears  to  the  incontestable  truth  once  expressed 
by  the  great  Napoleon  when  he  said  that  it 
is  possible  to  win  a  battle  with  a  minority, 
but  not  to  win  a  campaign.  For  the  latter 
big  battalions  are  essential. 

As  a  result  of  the  victories  of  Prussia  in 
the  year  1866,  the  Minister  of  War,  Marshal 
Niel,  laid  before  the  parliament  a  proposal 
for  the  introduction  of  universal  military 
service.  He  did  not,  however,  carry  his 
point,  and  obtained,  in  1868,  only  improve- 
ments on  the  basis  of  the  existing  organiza- 
tion which  still  admitted  substitutions.  The 
term  of  service  was  fixed  at  five  years  with 
the  colours  and  four  years  with  the  reserves. 


Or  a  Militia?  191 

The  army  was  to  consist  of  (i)  volunteer 
recruits,  (2)  voliinteers  for  a  prolonged  term 
of  service  (as  substitutes) ,  and  (3)  conscripts 
determined  by  lot ;  and  was  to  be  brought  up 
to  a  strength  of  400,000  men,  to  be  increased 
in  case  of  war  to  800,000  men  by  the  addition 
of  the  reserves.  The  garde  nationale  mobile, 
with  its  400,000  men,  was  to  constitute  an 
auxiliary  force.  The  latter  embraced  those 
of  the  same  annual  classes  as  formed  the 
standing  army  and  the  reserve  who  had 
either  not  been  drawn  for  service  as  con- 
script or  who  had  been  replaced  by  sub- 
stitutes. The  reserve,  however,  could  not 
be  brought  to  a  strength  of  400,000  men 
until  after  the  lapse  of  five  or  six  years,  and 
the  garde  mobile  could  only  arrive  at  its  full 
strength  after  nine  years.  On  the  whole  it 
may  be  said  to  have  existed  only  on  paper, 
since  it  was  only  to  be  called  up  fifteen  times 
in  the  year,  and  then  never  for  more  than 
one  day.  The  putting  into  execution  of 
Niel's  proposed  reforms  would  thus  in  any 


192     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

case  have  taken  a  considerable  time,  and 
they  were  still  under  discussion,  when,  after 
the  death  of  Niel  in  the  year  1869,  Leboeuf 
was  appointed  Minister  of  War.  In  order 
to  please  the  Chamber,  which  was  clamour- 
ing for  economies,  Leboeuf — who  was  very 
intent  upon  winning  the  public  favour — 
agreed  to  a  reduction  of  the  annual  con- 
tingent of  recruits  by  10,000  men  and  to 
other  deductions  from  the  army  budget. 
Thus  the  French  drifted  towards  the  War  of 
1870,  without  having  effected  any  funda- 
mental changes. 

The  War  of  1870-71 

It  is  sufficiently  well  known  in  what  a 
state  of  unpreparedness  the  Imperial  French 
Army  assembled  a/c  the  frontier  in  1870  and 
what  were  the  consequences  of  this  for  the 
troops.  In  spite  of  these  disadvantages,  as 
well  as  of  the  defective  organization  of  the 
commissariat,  the  lack  of  confident  general- 


Or  a  Militia?  193 

ship  and  the  fact  of  its  numerical  inferiority, 
the  Imperial  Army  made  a  very  brave  fight 
in  the  August  battles,  and  streams  of  Ger- 
man blood  had  to  be  shed  before  it  was  van- 
quished. The  fact  that  this  was  the  case 
testifies  to  the  valour  of  the  troops.  It  was 
essentially  an  army  of  professional  soldiers 
which  here  encountered  the  German  na- 
tional army :  an  army  which  betrayed  numer- 
ous weaknesses,  but  which  was  inspired  by 
a  lofty  sense  of  honour.  Even  the  army  of 
Chalons,  in  spite  of  its  loose  construction 
and  hesitating  leadership,  preserved  its 
military  honour  at  Sedan  up  to  the  last. 

The  fact  that,  even  after  Sedan,  the 
French  nation  still  did  not  despair  of  the 
salvation  of  the  Fatherland  will  always  re- 
dound to  its  honour,  although  the  attempt 
to  repel  the  German  invasion  by  a  national 
levy  on  a  very  large  scale  was  not  successful, 
and,  indeed,  could  not  have  been  successful  in 
view  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  improvised 
troops. 


194     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

The  first  steps  towards  the  creation  of  new 
armed  forces  had  already  been  taken  under 
the  Empire,  when  the  reservists  were  rein- 
forced from  the  depots  of  the  regiments, 
and  were  formed  into  marching  units. 

Subsequently,  all  the  unmarried  men  and 
childless  widowers  belonging  to  the  so-called 
deuxiemes  portions  of  the  annual  classes  for 
1865  to  1868,  as  well  as  the  annual  class  for 
1870  and  the  garde  nationale  mobile,  were 
called  up.  The  "National  Defence  Govern- 
ment,"  which  entered  on  its  activities  upon 
the  Proclamation  of  the  Republic  on  the  4th 
September,  1870,  in  addition  to  the  above, 
formed  companies  out  of  the  stationary 
national  guard,  that  is  to  say,  men  of  30  to 
40  years  of  age,  who  received  the  name  garde 
nationale  mobilisee.  In  the  latter  all  the 
unmarried  men  and  childless  widowers 
between  21  and  40  years  of  age,  who  had  not 
already  been  placed  elsewhere,  were  forced 
to  enroll  themselves.  At  the  beginning  of 
November,  the  liability  for  service  was  ex- 


Or  a  Militia?  195 

tended  to  married  men  and  widowers  with 
children,  who  received  the  name  deuxieme 
ban.  Therewith  universal  compulsory  ser- 
vice became  an  actual  fact.  It  was  bom  in 
France  from  the  necessity  of  the  moment, 
just  as  it  was  in  Prussia  in  181 3. 

The  organization  of  the  army  which  was 
entrusted  with  the  defence  of  the  capital 
made  comparatively  rapid  progress.  The 
nucleus  of  the  Paris  army  was  composed  of 
the  Thirteenth  Army  Corps,  which,  by  a 
timely  retreat  from  Mezieres  had  escaped 
the  capitulation  of  Sedan,  and  a  newly 
formed  Fourteenth  Army  Corps ;  both  these 
being  reinforced  by  depot  troops.  By  the 
addition  of  further  formations  from  the  regu- 
lar army,  the  National  Guard,  and  the 
volunteer  corps,  the  total  armed  force  avail- 
able in  Paris  finally  attained  a  strength  of 
400,000  men.  The  organization  of  the 
resistance  in  the  provinces  was  only  roused 
to  genuine  activity  when  Gambetta  entered 
Tours  from  Paris,  by  balloon,  on  the  9th 


196     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

of  October.  As  his  colleague  in  the  dic- 
tatorship, which  he  exercised  as  Minister 
both  of  the  Interior  and  of  War,  he  elected 
Freycinet,  the  civil  engineer. 

Arthur  Chuquet'  says  of  the  latter  that 
on  the  whole  he  was  adapted  for  his  difficult 
task  at  that  time,  but  he  adds:  "As  a  result 
of  his  overweening  self-confidence,  he  was 
satisfied  with  any  expedient;  he  never  saw 
any  difficulties.  Thus  he  imagined  that  he 
could  direct  military  operations  from  his 
cabinet,  he  treated  experienced  and  highly 
patriotic  generals  in  an  off-hand  manner, 
giving  them  his  orders  and  regarding  him- 
self as  under  a  special  obligation  to  bring 
them  to  their  senses.  He  demanded  of  the 
troops  the  same  mobility  as  was  possessed 
by  the  German  Army,  and  he  could  not 
understand  that  a  newly  formed,  untrained 
army  is  necessarily  incapable  of  executing 
movements  quickly,  as  well  as  of  with- 
standing the  inclemencies  of  the  weather 

'  La  Guerre  1870-71,  pp.  167-8.     Paris,  1898. 


Or  a  Militia?  197 

and  of  gaining  the  victory  over  experienced, 
disciplined  and  trained  troops. 

"Gambetta  shared  the  illusions  of  his 
colleague.  He  considered  that  the  conduct 
of  war  was  the  task  of  the  civilian,  and  he 
surrounded  himself  with  engineers,  scholars, 
and  journalists.  After  Worth  and  Sedan  he 
was  at  one  with  the  whole  French  nation  in 
the  conviction  that  professional  soldiers  were 
short-sighted,  incapable  people,  fit  at  the 
most  to  put  into  execution  the  brilliant 
plans  of  those  wiser  than  themselves.  He 
fancied  that  in  Freycinet  he  had  discovered 
a  second  Camot,  and  that  with  his  aid  the 
legendary  achievements  of  1792  and  1793 
might  be  repeated,  while  at  the  same  time  he 
broke  with  all  traditions.  In  this  Gam- 
betta  overlooked  the  fact  that  it  was  chiefly 
the  volimteers  of  the  First  Republic  who,  by 
their  cowardice  and  insubordination,  were 
responsible  for  the  failures  of  the  Revolution- 
ary Army,  and  that  the  Republic  was  saved 
at  that  time  not  by  the  heroism  of  its  troops, 


198     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

but  by  the  lack  of  unity  within  the  Coali- 
tion; that  the  Germans  of  1793,  irresolute 
and  few  in  number,  only  penetrated  a  few 
miles  beyond  the  frontier,  while  the  Ger- 
mans of  1870,  strong,  victorious,  and  imited, 
had  not  stopped  short  at  the  Sauer  and  the 
Scheldt,  but  had  reached  the  Seine  and  the 
Loire,  that  is  to  say,  the  heart  of  our 
country." 

None  the  less  Gambetta  was  the  very  soul 
of  the  defence  of  the  provinces.  It  was  due 
to  him  that  vanquished  and  tottering  France 
still  maintained  a  proud  mien  and  kept  a 
firm  grasp  of  her  broken  sword.  "Never, " 
he  wrote  on  the  5th  of  December,  1870,  "has 
despair  come  near  to  my  soul. " 

When  Gambetta  entered  Tours,  he  found 
that  new  troops  were  already  in  process  of 
formation  in  the  north,  the  west,  and  the 
east  of  France;  in  the  Middle  Loire  district, 
a  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  under  General  de 
la  Motterouge  was  already  at  an  advanced 
stage  of  formation;  by  November  it  had 


Or  a  Militia?  I99 

attained  a  strength  of  60,000  men.  The 
revival  of  the  idea  of  the  levee  en  masse  was 
as  little  approved  by  the  bulk  of  the  popu- 
lation as  it  had  been  before.  The  deuxieme 
ban  were  not  called  to  the  colours.  The 
premier  ban  had  already  furnished  580,000 
men.  Eleven  large  camps  were  to  be 
formed  for  the  purpose  of  assembling  and 
training  these  masses.  Since  the  depart- 
ments were  ordered  to  furnish,  for  every 
100,000  inhabitants,  one  battery  complete 
with  men,  horses,  and  equipment,  there  was 
no  lack  of  guns;  since,  moreover,  the  traffic 
by  sea  remained  open,  and  the  public  credit 
of  the  rich  country  stood  firm,  the  fighting 
forces  of  France,  which  on  the  ist  of  October 
numbered  about  550,000  men,  could  be 
increased  before  February,  irrespective  of 
casualties,  by  about  400,000  men.  At  the 
end  of  the  war  France  still  had  950,000  men 
under  arms.  The  greatest  difficulty  which 
had  to  be  overcome  was  the  finding  of  officers 
for  the  numerous  new  formations.     In  order 


200     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

to  supply  this  want,  Gambetta  introduced 
the  "promotion  according  to  merit,"  as  a 
result  of  which  non-commissioned  officers, 
privates,  and  even  non-soldiers,  could  be 
promoted  to  officer's  rank.  Apart  from  a 
few  individuals  of  conspicuous  ability,  who 
as  a  result  of  this  measure  attained  high 
positions  in  the  army,  it  was  out  of  the 
question  that  such  officers  could  infuse  into 
the  new  troops  that  firmness  of  which  they 
stood  in  so  great  need.  Napoleon  himself 
was  only  able  to  use  his  newly  formed 
army  in  the  field  in  1813,  because  he  had 
at  his  disposal  tolerably  good  and  sufficient 
officers'  cadres. 

The  French  General  Staff '  declared,  more- 
over, in  regard  to  Gambetta's  officers: 
"These  improvised  officers  were  not  lacking 
in  good-will  or  courage,  but  the  history  of 
the  second  stage  of  the  war  furnishes,  un- 
fortunately, only  too  frequent  testimony  to 
their  general  inexperience  and  the  inade- 

»  Revue  d'histoire,  Part  CIV.,  p.  327. 


Or  a  Militia?  201 

quacy  of  their  training  for  the  miHtary  pro- 
fession, while  at  the  same  time  it  reveals 
how  very  little  respect  they  enjoyed  with  the 
men  and  how  slight  was  their  influence  over 
their  subordinates. " 

The  masses  which  France  put  into  the 
field  in  the  second  period  of  the  war  were 
greatly  superior  in  niimber  to  the  Germans. 
They  were  able  to  prolong  the  duration  of 
the  war,  but  not  to  alter  the  fate  of  the 
coimtry,  for,  wherever  they  engaged,  those 
deficiencies  which  characterize  all  militia 
troops,  prevented  them  from  reaping  any 
decisive  results.  None  the  less,  this  huge 
national  levy,  as  a  result  of  modern  weapons 
had  an  importance  quite  out  of  comparison 
with  what  it  would  have  possessed  at  an 
earlier  date.  On  the  other  hand,  the  value 
of  Germany's  trained  troops  was  rendered 
so  much  the  more  conspicuous.  In  order  to 
form  a  just  estimate  of  their  achievements 
in  this  second  stage  of  the  war,  one  has  to 
bear  in  mind  the  extraordinary  weakness  of 


202     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  units.  The  three  corps  of  the  second 
army  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  when  they 
reached  the  Loire  after  the  fall  of  Metz, 
numbered  no  more  than  15,000  infantry 
each,  that  is  to  say,  approximately  the  war 
strength  of  a  division.  It  was  only  the  tact 
that  the  artillery  was  at  its  full  strength 
which,  to  some  extent,  made  up  for  this  dis- 
advantage. About  the  same  time,  the  end 
of  November,  the  four  divisions  imder  the 
Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburgh  numbered  no 
more  than  35,000  infantry  in  all.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  opposing  French  Army  at 
the  Loire  numbered  more  than  200,000  men. 
Although  they  were  invested  by  no  more 
than  150,000  German  troops  and  were  sup- 
ported by  a  powerful  siege  artillery,  the 
400,000  armed  defenders  of  Paris  proved 
incapable  of  breaking  the  siege.  Finally  the 
ill-fated  offensive  of  Bourbaki's  army  in  the 
south-east  of  France  revealed  the  utter 
inadequacy  of  militia  armies.  General  von 
Werder,  with  his  43,000  men,  succeeded  in 


Or  a  Militia?  203 

eluding  the  attack  of  Bourbaki  with  his 
135,000  men,  which  had  been  intended  to 
take  him  by  surprise,  and  Bourbaki  was 
unable  to  vanquish  Werder  at  the  Lisaine. 
The  retreat  sealed  the  fate  of  the  ill-starred 
army,  exposed  as  it  was  to  the  inclemencies 
of  the  winter  season  in  difficult  mountain- 
ous country  and  most  scantily  furnished 
with  provisions.  Pursued  by  Werder,  and 
threatened  by  Manteuffel  on  the  left  flank 
and  in  the  rear,  it  renounced  all  attempts 
at  further  resistance  and  took  refuge  on  the 
other, side  of  the  Swiss  frontier  as  the  only 
way  of  escape.  "The  French  eastern  army 
was  not  properly  conquered  at  the  Lisaine. 
Its  attack  had  merely  been  repelled,  and  the 
losses  were  in  fact  comparatively  small. 
And  none  the  less  there  occurred  this  com- 
plete and  indescribable  collapse  when  the 
news  arrived  that  General  von  Manteuffel, 
with  an  army  considerably  inferior  in  num- 
bers, was  threatening  the  rear.  The  only 
possible    explanation    is    to    be    found    in 


204     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

the  fact  that  the  army  was  in  the  nature 
of  a  miHtia. " ' 

In  the  German  Reichstag,  on  the  i6th 
of  February,  1874,  Field- Marshal  Count 
Moltke  expressed  his  opinion  of  the  armies  of 
the  French  Republic  in  the  War  of  1870-71 
in  the  following  terms:  "Gentlemen,  we  have 
all  been  able  to  convince  ourselves  from 
experience  that  even  the  most  numerous 
collection  of  brave  and  worthy  and  patriotic 
men  is  none  the  less  incapable  of  maintaining 
a  resistance  to  a  genuine  army.  The  French 
mobile  and  national  guards  prolonged  the 
duration  of  the  war  by  several  months,  they 
increased  its  cost  in  human  blood,  and  they 
caused  great  misery  and  devastation;  but 
they  could  not  alter  the  course  of  the  war; 
they  could  not  procure  better  peace  terms 
for  France.  Finally,  the  excesses  of  the 
franc-tireurs  did  not  delay  our  operations 


» Oberst  v.  Zimmermann,  Milizheere.  Vierteljahrshefte 
fur  Truppenfuhrung  und  Heereskunde,  X  Jahrgang  IQ13. 
4  Hfft. 


Or  a  Militia?  205 

for  a  single  day;  though  they  eventually 
endued  our  conduct  of  the  war  with  a  harsh- 
ness which  we  regret,  but  which  we  could  not 
avoid." 


CHAPTER  X 

CONCLUSION 

At  the  beginning  of  an  essay  written  on 
the  occasion  of  the  Army  Bill  of  1893, 
retired  Major  Count  Otto  Moltke'  writes: 
"In  the  impressive  words  of  a  famous  Ger- 
man writer,  'It  is  only  at  their  birth  that 
great  ideas  are  free  from  alloy.'  Even  the 
strong,  inspiring  thought  of  Schamhorst — 
that  the  devotion  of  the  whole  energy  of  a 
people  for  the  purpose  of  securing  its  na- 
tional existence  and  national  Kultur  is  neither 
too  great  nor  too  dear  a  sacrifice — has  par- 
taken of  this  fate."  As  we  have  already 
shown,  there  was  danger  more  than  once, 
even  in  Prussia-Germany,  that  this  thought 

'  "  Einst,  jetzt,  was  dann?  Belenchlung  der  Militdrvorlage." 
Berlin,  1893.  E.  S.  Mittler  und  Sohn,  Konigl.  Hofbuch- 
handlung. 

206 


A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms     207 

would  be  altogether  forgotten.  This  was 
the  case  just  before  the  World  War,  and  it 
was  in  fact  the  World  War  which  revealed 
that,  in  view  of  the  central  position  of 
Germany,  it  was  only  by  straining  the 
defensive  force  of  the  nation  to  the  utmost 
limits  that  our  existence  could  be  made 
secure. 

In  the  case  of  Prussia,  it  might  have  been 
expected  that  this  fact  would  be  generally 
recognized  after  the  War  of  Liberation;  and 
although  it  is  not  altogether  surprising  that 
it  was  not  fully  grasped  in  the  states  of  the 
former  Rhenish  Confederation,  none  the 
less,  in  the  War  of  Liberation,  all  Germany 
was  fighting  under  the  black  and  white 
standard.  The  general  war- weariness  and 
the  efforts  of  the  "Holy  Alliance "  (although 
the  latter  was,  in  fact,  in  marked  antagon- 
ism to  democratic  tendencies)  presented 
favourable  soil  for  attacks  against  the 
standing  armies  as  well  as  against  the 
system  of  universal  service  embodied  in  a 


2o8     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

standing  army  like  that  of  Prussia.  It  was 
overlooked  that,  in  point  of  fact,  this  animus 
was  being  directed  against  something  which 
no  longer  existed,  namely,  against  the  old 
type  of  professional  army,  such  as  existed 
in  the  eighteenth  century. 

Those  proposals  made  by  German  demo- 
crats in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  reminding  us  as  they  do  of  the 
measures  adopted  but  soon  foimd  to  be 
impractical  in  the  Russian  Revolution  of 
19 1 7,  reappear  in  the  fiery  speeches  of  the 
Frankfort  Parliament.  If  we  compare  the 
world  of  ideas  which  is  here  revealed  with 
the  reality,  as  it  was  exhibited  in  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  German  national  army  in 
1870-71  and  in  the  World  War,  we  see 
very  clearly  which  method  of  organizing  the 
armed  force  of  the  nation  is  best  adapted  to 
the  conditions  of  international  life  as  it  exists 
at  the  present  day.  Just  as  in  the  year 
191 7  a  wave  of  democracy  passed  over  the 
world,  the  ideas  of  the  French  Revolution 


Or  a  Militia  ?  209 

continued  for  a  long  while  to  exert  an 
influence  in  Germany.  The  theories  of 
the  devotees  of  a  militia  were  based  on 
the  superficial  aspect  of  the  question,  on  the 
conditions  under  which  the  armies  of  the 
Republic  had  fought;  they  did  not  pene- 
trate below  the  surface;  they  entirely 
ignored  the  teachings  of  the  great  Napo- 
leonic wars.  In  the  essay  we  have  quoted 
concerning  the  Army  Bill  of  1893,  it  is 
averred  with  justice  that,  in  the  German 
nation  "there  exist,  side  by  side,  a  continual 
striving  towards  the  highest  ideals  of  exist- 
ence and  an  extraordinary  distaste  for  the 
most  pressing  necessities  of  this  life. "  Doc- 
trinaire tendencies  are  always  dangerous, 
and  nowhere  so  much  so  as  with  us,  as  was 
illustrated  ir/ the  passionate  opposition  to 
standing  ^rmies  exhibited  in  Germany  at 
that  time. 

It  was  overlooked  that  a  great  State, 
however  much  it  may  be  in  favour  of  set- 
tling disputes  by  arbitration  and  desisting 


n;^ 


210    A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

from  the  display  of  armed  force,  none  the 
less,  for  the  sake  of  its  credit  and  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  order  at  home,  can- 
not entirely  dispense  with  a  permanently 
ready  armed  force.  Even  the  most  ex- 
treme pacifist  and  advocate  of  a  super- 
state organization  will  not  desire  to  dispense 
with  this  element  of  national  security. 
ence  disarmament  on  a  large  scale  would 
unquestionably  bring  about  a^^version  to 
the  hired  professional  army:  That  there  is 
a  dark  side  to  the  latter  is  at  once  evident 
if  we  study  the  history  of  France  between 
1 8 1 5  and  1 870.  In  vain  did  patriotic  French- 
men at  that  time  draw  attention  to  the 
advantages  of  universal  military  service, 
as  it  existed  in  Prussia.  The  high  moral 
value  which  attaches  to  the  personal  fulfil- 
ment of  the  military  obligation  remained 
imappreciated.  It  was  overlooked  in  France 
at  that  time  that  it  was,  in  fact,  an  army 
essentially  of  the  nature  of  a  mercenary 
troop  which  jeopardized  both  the  internal 


Or  a  Militia?  2ii 

freedom  of  the  State  and  its  security  from 
perils  from  without,  and  "was  driven 
to  seek  an  outlet  for  an  insatiate  military 
ambition."'  General  Trochu  was  in  the 
minority  when  he  expressed  the  following 
opinion:''  "An  army  which  completely  re- 
news itself  periodically  by  absorbing  each 
year  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  best 
population  of  the  country,  and  which  in 
return  restores  to  the  country  annually  a 
contingent  of  well-trained  soldiers,  con- 
tributes from  decade  to  decade  to  the  mass 
of  the  nation  a  mi  llion  good  citizens,  and  is  a 
valuable  instrument  for  the  education  of  the 
people." 

The  champions  of  a  militia  organization 
have  always  urged  in  behalf  of  their  views 
that  the  introduction  of  such  a  system  would 
result  in  a  considerable  economy.  Now  in 
Switzerland  we  see  an  example  of  an  exceed- 


'  Treitschke,    Der     Bonapartismus.     Preuss.      Jahrbucher. 
(20  Band.) 

'  Jahns,  Das  franzosische  Heer. 


212     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

ingly  well-organized  militia,  but  none  the 
less  the  cost  of  it  is  by  no  means  incon- 
siderable, and  it  has  yet  to  be  proved  that, 
in  the  case  of  a  large  State,  the  cost  would 
not  be  far  greater  than  that  of  a  "Rahmen- 
heer"  (skeleton  army)  like  the  German. 
Above  all,  the  case  of  Switzerland  cannot  be 
taken  as  a  criterion,  because,  in  the  case  of  a 
great  power  resorting  to  a  militia  army,  the 
expenses  resulting  from  the  high  cost  of 
the  technical  equipment  indispensable  at  the 
present  day  would  be  quadrupled  in  pro- 
portion to  the  war-strength  of  the  army. 

In  the  Swiss  schools  for  recruits,  the  term 
of  traming  for  the  mass  of  the  army,  that  is 
to  say,  the  infantry,  is  sixty-five  days,  with 
annual  repetition  courses  lasting  eleven 
days,  as  long  as  the  men  belong  to  the 
regular  army  ("Auszug"),  i.e.,  from  twenty 
to  thirty- two  years  of  age.  The  liability 
for  service  in  the  Landwehr  continues  up  to 
forty  and  for  service  in  the  Landsturm  up  to 
forty-eight  years  of  age,  but  without  obliga- 


Or  a  Militia?  213 

tion  for  service  in  time  of  peace.  The 
organization  of  the  Swiss  armed  force  gave 
proof  of  its  efficiency  both  in  1871  and 
recently  in  the  World  War,  but  it  did  not 
win  unreserved  approbation  throughout  the 
country.  Moreover  the  troops  which  were 
called  up  were  only  employed  for  the  defence 
of  the  frontier  and  the  safeguarding  of  Swiss 
neutrality;  they  had  no  opportunity  of 
showing  what  they  could  do  in  actual  war- 
fare. The  whole  armed  force  of  Switzer- 
land is  really  only  cut  out  for  the  armed 
defence  of  neutrality  and  for  the  defence  of 
the  mountainous  country.  The  existing 
organization  is  in  harmony  with  the  char- 
acter of  the  population.  Quite  apart  from 
the  fact  that  the  political  considerations  in 
its  case  are  of  an  entirely  different  character, 
a  great  power  will,  in  case  of  war,  only 
abandon  the  better  mode  of  defence,  which 
consists  in  preserving  the  initiative  and  in 
attack,  at  great  cost  to  itself.  A  militia 
army  of  a  million  men  with  so  short  a  term 


214    A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

of  service  as  that  of  the  Swiss  army  will,  as 
we  know  from  the  experience  of  all  wars, 
possess  neither  the  requisite  firmness  nor 
flexibility  to  be  able  to  meet  successfully 
the  demands  of  a  war  of  movement.  The 
greater  the  mass  the  greater  the  firmness 
required.  Its  officers  will  lack  the  experi- 
ence for  this  piupose,  an  experience  which 
can  be  gained  only  in  continuous  profes- 
sional service;  its  General  Staff  will  lack 
training  experience  of  leadership.  A  large 
militia  army  may  in  time  of  peace  acquire 
the  outward  appearance  of  a  trained  army, 
but  it  will  not  acquire  that  self-confident 
co-operation  of  all  the  various  units  which 
war  demands  and  which  can  only  be  ac- 
quired as  the  result  of  long  training. 

Even  Switzerland  cannot  dispense  with 
professional  officers.  The  officers  of  the 
General  Staff  and  the  officers  in  charge  of 
the  instruction  of  the  army  are  soldiers  by 
profession.  The  militia  army  of  a  great 
state    would    need    a    considerably    larger 


Or  a  Militia?  215 

number  of  such  officers,  but  these  officers 
would  not  be  able  to  improve  their  experi- 
ence satisfactorily,  because  for  a  large  part 
of  the  year  they  would  not  be  in  command 
of  any  troops.  They  could  never  be  the 
transmitters  of  such  a  warlike  spirit  and  a 
sound  tradition  as  exists  in  the  German 
Army.  They  would  lack  that  faculty  for 
forming  a  decision  which  is  cultivated  in  our 
army  and  which  can  only  be  acquired  as  the 
result  of  long  practice.  Only  by  means  of 
strong  peace  cadres  is  it  possible  to  preserve 
that  warlike  spirit  with  which  the  militia 
army  too  must  be  inspired  when  it  is  a 
question  of  defending  the  Fatherland,  espe- 
cially if  it  can  oppose  only  an  entrenched 
resistance. 

The  historical  facts  which  we  have  cited 
bear  witness  without  exception  against 
militia-armies.  None  the  less  it  might  be 
conceived  that  these  facts  had  been  pre- 
sented with  a  military  bias  and  prejudice 
if  a  term  of  service  such  as  existed  in   the 


2i6    A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

German  Army  before  the  war  is  considered 
necessary.  The  World  War  should,  above 
all,  be  an  incentive  to  us  to  submit  all 
questions  to  a  sober  and  searching  examin- 
ation. In  the  period  of  reform  which 
followed  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  many  things 
were  done  away  with  which  had  until  then 
been  regarded  as  rightful  and  necessary 
characteristics  of  the  Prussian  Army.  At 
that  time,  however,  after  a  severe  defeat,  it 
was  a  question  of  getting  rid  of  everything 
that  had  shown  itself  to  be  out-of-date  and 
unequal  to  requirements,  while  the  German 
Army  of  today  has  accomplished  the  great- 
est military  achievement  in  history.  Yet 
criticism  should  not  stop  short  even  in  the 
face  of  this  supreme  achievement,  for  the 
times  change  and  they  bring  changed 
conditions.  The  two-years'  term  of  service 
was  introduced  in  Prussia  for  the  infantry, 
then  abandoned  in  favour  of  the  three- 
years'  term  of  service,  and  then,  in  1893, 
once  more  introduced.     At  that  time,  Count 


Or  a  Militia?  217 

Otto  Moltke  wrote:'  "Perhaps  it  has  been 
above  all  the  most  honest  and  well-informed 
opponents  of  the  two-years*  term  of  service 
who  have  declared  that  it  would  be  the 
ruin  of  the  army.  .  .  .  On  behalf  of  this 
view  they  cited  the  unimpeachable  author- 
ity of  our  heroic  Emperor,  William  I,  and 
of  those  heroes  of  Duppel,  Koniggratz,  and 
Sedan,  old  in  years  but  young  in  energy — 
Roon  and  Moltke.  ...  It  is,  however,  al- 
ways dangerous  and  unreasonable  to  make 
the  past  the  final  arbiter  of  the  present,  how- 
ever sublime  that  past  may  have  been,  nay, 
perhaps,  the  more  unreasonable  according  as 
that  past  has  been  the  more  sublime.  The 
testimony  of  one  who  is  dead,  as  it  concerns 
burning  questions  of  the  day  and  the  needs 
of  the  living,  can  be  admitted  as  decisive 
only  in  respect  to  their  ethical,  but  not  in 
respect  to  their  material  aspect."  Is  it 
possible,  therefore,  that  what  has  here  been 
said  in  respect  to  the  two-years'   term  of 

'  Loc.   cit.,  p.   22. 


2i8     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

service,    is    applicable    also    to    a    further 
reduction  of  the  term  of  service? 

The  answer  to  this  is,  that  it  is  here  a 
question  not  of  the  judgment  of  the  dead, 
not  of  a  past  state  of  things,  but  of  the  events 
and  experiences  of  the  most  recent  blood- 
stained past,  and  that  there  must  be  an 
ultimate  minimum  term  of  service  below 
which  one  can  go  only  at  the  expense  of 
thoroughness  and  of  renouncing  the  attempt 
to  maintain  well-disciplined  troops.  The 
World  War  has,  above  all,  proved  that  it 
is  now  far  more  important  than  ever  before 
to  encourage  the  development  of  a  war- 
like individuality,  but  this  requires  a  certain 
length  of  time.  And  here,  where  it  is  not 
a  case  of  an  opinion  the  validity  of  which 
is  subject  to  the  changes  of  the  times,  but 
of  a  universal  truth,  we  may  rely  on 
Moltke's  authority,  when  he  says:'  "It  is 
not  a  question  merely  of  the  technical,  I 
might  almost  say,  mechanical  training  of  the 

'  Speech  in  the  Reichstag,  March  i,  1880. 


Or  a  Militia?  219 

soldier — that  we  might,  if  necessary,  accom- 
plish in  the  period  of  twenty  weeks,  which 
has  been  here  proposed  for  the  training 
coiirses  of  the  reserves;  by  this  means  we 
might  furnish  a  supply  of  men  who  could 
be  profitably  inserted  in  the  firm  framework 
of  the  army,  but  who  couM  never  form  the 
kernel  of  the  army.  Butat  is  a  question  of 
far  more  than  this ;  it  i^  a  question  of  the 
training  and  strengthening  of  moral  quali- 
ties ;  it  is  a  question  of  the  military  training 
of  the  youth  to  manhood.  That  cannot  be 
accomplished  by  mere  drilling;  it  is  the 
fruit  of  experience  and  habit. " 

Physical  culture  may  be  helpful  as  a 
preparation  for  the  army,  but  since  it  is  not 
directed  towards  any  genuinely  military 
aim,  it  cannot  take  the  place  of  service 
in  the  ranks.  The  soldier  cannot  be  trans- 
formed between  today  and  tomorrow  into 
a  fighting  man  capable  of  resisting  the  nerve- 
shattering  experiences  of  the  present  con- 
flict.    Moreover,  in  the  case  of  all  troops, 


220     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

quite  apart  from  the  special  troops  and  the 
aviation  troops,  modern  technology  demands 
so  much  special  training  that,  on  this 
account  alone,  any  reduction  of  the  present 
term  of  service  would  be  seriously  detri- 
mental. 

What  is  needed  throughout  the  army  is  to 
build  up  an  enduring  structure  which  shall 
stand  firm  in  the  hour  of  danger.  Nothing 
in  the  world  is  perfect,  and  hence  not  every- 
thing in  our  army  is  perfect.  Therefore  we 
must  aim  at  effecting  individual  improve- 
ments, and  we  must  never  let  ourselves 
imagine  that  what  is  good  today  will  also 
be  good  for  all  eternity ;  but  the  foundations 
of  our  army  organization  must  be  left  un- 
touched, "mindful  of  the  old  truth  that  a 
state  will  persist  by  virtue  of  the  same 
qualities  which  helped  to  shape  its  growth. " ' 
Careful  training  has  been  the  source  of 
strength  of  the  German  Army.  Without  it 
even  the  magnificent  spirit  revealed  by  our 

•Treitschke,  Politics   ("Politik"),  i. 


Or  a  Militia?  221 

people  in  19 14  would  not  have  been  able  to 
reap  those  unexampled  successes,  the  full 
magnificence  of  which  will  be  revealed  only 
when  it  is  made  known  to  the  world  in  the 
face  of  what  odds  they  were  achieved  and 
at  the  cost  of  what  mental  strain  upon  both 
leaders  and  men. 

To  the  generation  which  lived  in  the 
period  following  the  Wars  of  Liberation,  the 
words  of  Treitschke  are  applicable :  ' '  Public 
opinion  of  whole  generations  has  been  com- 
pletely in  error  about  the  most  important 
political  questions. "  The  world-embrac- 
ing theories  of  that  time,  however,  did  not 
constitute  any  immediate  danger.  Europe 
had  just  struck  to  earth,  by  her  united 
forces,  the  tyrant  who  had  kept  her  in 
thraldom.  It  was  permissible  then  to 
dally  with  thoughts  of  a  militia.  At 
the  present  day,  in  view  of  Germany's 
central  position  and  of  the  mighty  world- 
political  interests  which  she  has  at  stake, 
it   is  not   permissible.      Only    too    clearly 


222     A  Nation  Trained  in  Arms 

has    it  been  revealed  that   our   safety   in 

the    future    can    only  be   guaranteed    by 

a  firmly-knit,   trained  national   army,   not 
by  a  loose  militia. 


A  Selection  from,  Um 
Catalogue  of 

C  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


mm  mpfp)\.—Amm. 


Deductions  from  the 
World  War 

By  Lieutenant-General  Baron 

von  Freytag-Loringhoven 

Deputy  Chief  of  the  German  Imperial  Staff 

12°.    $1.2$  net.    By  mail,  $1.35 

**  In  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  the 
German  people  will  have  to  seek  firm 
cohesion  in  its  glorious  army  and  in  its 
belaurelled  young  fleet." 

Some  Extracts 

"  The  spirit  of  German  militarism,  which  has 
enabled  us  to  stand  the  test  of  the  World  War, 
we  must  preserve  in  future,  because,  with  it, 
our  position  stands  or  falls." 

"  Germany  must  for  all  time  to  come  main- 
tain her  claim  to  world  power." 

**  Lord  Kitchener  was  prompt  in  grasping 
the  situation,  and  by  raismg  a  strong  army 
put  the  country  in  a  position  to  sustain  a  long 
war." 

**  Now,  as  always,  it  is  the  sword  which 
decides  in  war  ...  it  is  victory  on  the 
battlefield  that  gives  the  decision." 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


The 
Guilt  of  Germany 

For  the  War  of  German  Aggression 

By 
Prince  Karl  Lichnowsky 

Preface  by 
Viscount  Bryce 

12°.     Price,   75c.  net.     By  mail,  85c. 

This  volume  contains  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky's  famous  "memorandum"  in 
which  he  fastens  the  guilt  for  propagat- 
ing the  world  war,  on  Germany — un- 
hesitatingly proclaims  it  the  war  of 
German  Aggression.  The  author  was 
German  Ambassador  to  England  before 
hostilities  broke  out,  and  he  upholds 
England  as  blameless,  and  hails  Earl 
Grey  as  an  apostle  of  Peace.  Von 
Jagow^s  reply  to  the  "memorandum"  is 
included. 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


The  Vandal  of  Europe 

By   Wilhelm   Miihlon 


J2°.     $1.50  ftet.     By  mail,  $1.65 


Herr  Miihlon,  formerly  one  of  the  important 
directors  of  the  great  Krupp  works,  and  inti- 
mately connected  with  the  ruling  group  of  the 
German  Empire,  is  now  an  exile.  Why  ?  Be- 
cause he  became  sickened  by  the  ruthless  am- 
bition and  barbarous  methods  of  the  military 
caste  that  plunged  the  world  into  the  present 
terrible  warfare. 

This  book  is  Mtihlon's  diary,  kept  during  the 
first  few  months  of  the  war,  when  he  was  still  a 
director  of  Krupp's. 

On  August  30,  1914,  he  wrote:  "  It  is  only  to- 
day that  I  have  at  last  learned  to  know  my  com- 
patriots." A  few  days  later :  "  The  German 
press  is  a  shameful  liar."  On  November  loth: 
"  I  have  received  authentic  information  from  the 
front  that  the  Kaiser  declared  before  an  as- 
sembly of  officers  that  Germany  had  enough 
prisoners,  and  that  henceforth  no  more  prison- 
ers must  be  taken  alive."  This  all-important 
volume  merits  world-wide  circulation. 

G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  London 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below, 
or  OQ  the  date  to  which  renewed.  Renewals  only: 

Tel.  No.  642-3405 
Renewals  may  be  made  4  days  ^rior  to  date  due. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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